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I. Introduction 
 
In a 1998 interview, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright referred to the 
United States as an ―indispensable nation‖ in world affairs.  The U.S. ―stands tall‖ and 
―sees further into the future than other nations.‖ Its interests cannot be sacrificed in 
pursuit of multilateral cooperation and thus must be taken into account if such 
cooperation is to be successful. She made these remarks in the midst of the post-Cold 
War rise of international organizations and the burgeoning of cooperative multilateral 
endeavors. While her statement was specifically referring to military action, the words 
apply profoundly to the U.S. role in all international organizations. Albright‘s comments, 
and similar sentiments from Hillary Clinton,
1
 suggest that multilateral cooperation will 
not operate effectively without support from the United States. This perspective operates 
on the assumption that U.S. policy matters a great deal to the success of any multilateral 
endeavor. This claim has not been addressed empirically and deserves more serious 
scrutiny than it has received to date. 
U.S. policy toward multilateral initiatives has varied widely: sometimes, the U.S. 
signs, ratifies, and strongly supports an institution. At other times the U.S. will refuse to 
ratify a treaty, but will abide by the spirit of the agreement and cooperate informally. At 
other times, the U.S. will reluctantly sign a treaty, agreeing to comply with its provisions. 
Or, the US might actively oppose the treaty, obstructing its operation by advocating for 
                                                       
1 Steven Lee Meyers, "Hillary Clinton's Last Tour as a Rock Star Diplomat," The New York Times, June 27, 
2012, Magazine, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/magazine/hillary-clintons-last-tour-as-a-rock-star-
diplomat.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. ―In ―21st-century statecraft,‖ though, ―the general understanding, 
which cuts across parties, is that the United States can‘t solve all of the problems in the world,‖ she said. 
―But the problems in the world can‘t be solved without the United States. And therefore, we have to 
husband our resources, among which is this incredibly valuable asset of global leadership, and figure out 
how we can best deploy it.‖  
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an alternative means to solve the global problem. This variation in behavior provides 
opportunities for analysts to explore the causes of such variation and its impact on the 
success of multilateral cooperation. There has been extensive literature on the reasons 
why the U.S. should or should not ratify specific treaties, engage in multilateral efforts, or 
cooperate with other states. There has also been some literature evaluating the 
effectiveness of certain international organizations. This study will speak to both 
literatures and seek to systematically address the ―indispensable power‖ argument by 
determining whether U.S. policy has any impact on the ability of an international 
organization to operate effectively. 
Madeleine Albright‘s quote reflects an intuition that bears a striking resemblance 
to hegemonic stability theory, which has provided theoretical inspiration for this study. I 
will not test hegemonic stability theory in this thesis, but my findings could reopen the 
debate about the status of the United States as a hegemon and whether its leadership or 
engagement is necessary for the success of multilateral initiatives in the 21
st
 century. 
Both the realist and liberal paradigms offer theories as to how the international system 
behaves with the presence of a hegemon. While the conditions that sparked this theory, 
and the status of the United States as a hegemon, have changed, the debates that have 
arisen between supporters and critics of hegemonic stability theory provide a useful 
starting point for this study.  Contemporary theory suggests that the United States offers 
valuable resources to international organizations, and implies that U.S. obstruction could 
negatively impact institutional effectiveness. However, in accordance with the logic of 
several scholars and critics of hegemonic stability theory, empirical applications of such a 
bold thesis are shaky. With the rise of new global powers, treaties and organizations that 
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the United States has opposed have continued to operate without the full support – and 
sometimes despite the opposition – of the United States. Whether or not the organizations 
operate effectively is the ultimate question of this study. 
This paper approaches this general question of international organization performance 
as it relates to one state‘s foreign policy in an inductive manner. First, the existing 
literature on the merits and criticisms of hegemonic stability theory, as well as theories on 
international cooperation and multilateralism per U.S. policy, is explored to build a 
theoretical foundation for this research. Instead of creating an original theory, my 
research will be analyzing four case studies in order to produce a theory before 
recommending other cases on which to test it. I take a broad policy question—is the 
United States necessary for an organization to perform effectively? — and conduct 
empirical research to determine whether any patterns emerge in the historical record. 
Several political science scholars advocate using case studies as a means to derive theory 
and explore causality through process-tracing methods. As George and Bennett explain: 
In particular, the ‗scientific realist‘ school of thought has emphasized that causal 
mechanisms…are central to causal explanation. This has resonated with case study 
researchers‘ use of process-tracing to uncover evidence of causal mechanisms at 
work…Case study methods, particularly when used in the development of typological 
theory, are good at exploring complex causality.
2
 
 
By having the opportunity to observe certain cases with a high level of scrutiny, this 
study constructs an evidence chain linking two specific variables through process tracing. 
The independent variable is the level of U.S. involvement in an organization and the 
dependent variable will be the effectiveness of said organization. Because case study 
methods do not require large sample sizes, this paper describes and analyzes complex 
                                                       
2 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 10 
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interactions between variables and allows me to derive theory from my cases. This case 
study method is employed by many scholars and is considered by its practitioners as 
―better…for the possibility of learning.‖3  By systematically testing the impact of U.S. 
involvement in certain treaties and using those treaties as case studies, I can better isolate 
the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable to determine whether 
changing the former affects the latter. In the process of applying these methods to 
specific case studies, new or unexpected trends could emerge and influence the resulting 
theory. This study uses process-tracing methods to examine the question of causality 
between U.S. involvement in an institution and its effectiveness, and attempts to derive 
theory through case studies of specific multilateral institutions that the U.S. has interacted 
with in a variety of ways. 
After explaining the literature, theoretical implications, and methods employed, I 
analyze selected cases in order to determine the value of the relevant variables and 
evaluations of internal and external outputs for each treaty or organization. Finally, I 
compare the cases more generally to determine if certain trends occurred within each 
case, which would indicate a possible theory to be tested further. One possible outcome 
that could be observed is that the U.S. significantly influences an institution‘s 
effectiveness, which would support the ―indispensible‖ theory. However, another 
possible outcome could be that the level of U.S. involvement in an institution has no 
bearing on how effective it is. There could also be a middle option in which the U.S. has 
influence over some measures of effectiveness, while not having any impact on others. 
                                                       
3 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory, p. 34; George King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994); Jack S. Levy, ―Learning in Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,‖ International 
Organization 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994): 279-312, p. 291 
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Finally, the study will conclude with a summary of the findings and recommendations for 
future work in which other scholars can test the theory derived from this case study 
analysis. 
II. Literature Review 
The post-WWII expansion of multilateralism demonstrates that it is possible for 
states to share mutual interests and therefore have grounds for cooperation on a number 
of global issues through treaties, institutions, and international organizations. Indeed, 
international relations scholars have debated the merits and benefits of multilateral 
institutions in the international system and how cooperation can be achieved. While 
realists are more inclined to discount international institutions as mere instruments 
through which strong states can achieve their interests, liberal institutionalists argue that 
non-state actors such as international organizations can facilitate cooperation to better 
solve global problems. 
The role of the U.S. in multilateral cooperation has remained a topic of contention 
domestically and internationally, particularly during the tumult following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. In order to examine the impact U.S. policy has on the effectiveness and 
performance of international organizations, previous literature on the topic must be taken 
into consideration. First, hegemonic stability theory and its application to the 
determinants of stable international regimes are discussed in light of both its strengths 
and its shortcomings. Second, this section assesses the unique role of the U.S. as a global 
hegemon and why cooperation exists despite its relative hegemonic decline. This will not 
only illuminate what the U.S. has to bring to the table for international discussions, but 
also suggests why scholars believe that cooperation can occur without U.S. support. 
 9 
Third, this review touches on scholars‘ previous attempts at assessing U.S. interaction 
with various international regimes and the effects of those interactions. Mostly, scholars 
have researched determinants of the U.S. decision to cooperate in various regimes, while 
others assess the impact that U.S. policy has had on the organization itself. While most of 
this research is introduced in later sections on specific case studies, assessments of U.S. 
policy and its potential influence on international organizations have been included here. 
Finally, this literature review describes previous attempts to measure the effectiveness of 
international organizations and regimes in order to supply a firm methodological 
foundation for this research. 
Hegemonic Stability Theory 
One of the most prominent theories purporting to explain cooperation between 
states is hegemonic stability theory. This theory—advanced by both institutionalists and 
realists—suggests that order in the international system depends on the presence of a 
single dominant power, or hegemon. Spawned from a theory on free trade, hegemonic 
stability is rooted in micro-economic logic. Charles Kindleberger explains the emergence 
and persistence of international free trade as dependent on a ―benevolent despot‖ that is 
capable of providing necessary public goods for other states.
4
 The theory also suggests 
that a benevolent hegemon, one that is more predisposed to utility, shapes the 
international order to its benefit and to the benefit of all in the system, especially weaker 
states. A benevolent hegemon bases its capability to enforce its interests on the 
                                                       
4 Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization (Fall 1984): p. 
2; Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (University of California Press, 1973), p. 
307; Public goods are defined as goods that are non-excludable and non-rival, meaning that no individual 
or state can be excluded from consuming that good, and use by one individual does not reduce availability 
to others. Examples include national defense, clean air, and free trade. 
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international system because if the hegemon has a dominant interest in a cooperative 
outcome, it will ensure its emergence.
5
 
However, scholars with a more realist inclination, like Robert Gilpin, do not 
ground their claims in economic logic, but argue that a dominant state will shape the 
order suited only to their interests at weaker states‘ expense. The theory of hegemonic 
stability has been useful for realist scholars, not because it claims that hegemony is 
necessary for cooperation, but because it frames the structure of institutional systems in 
light of the preferences of a powerful state.
6
 Hegemonic stability theory has evolved 
beyond the issues of free trade and optimal tariffs. The ability of states to cooperate with 
each other on a variety of global issues could be influenced by a hegemon willing to 
enforce rules or provide public goods, thereby affecting the strength of international 
agreements and subsequent organizations. Indeed, a hegemon could incur benefits by 
choosing a multilateral forum in order to solve a problem. Cooperation could benefit a 
hegemon in a variety of ways. First, it can reduce transaction costs of interacting with 
weaker states. It would be more costly to negotiate several bilateral treaties instead of just 
one multilateral agreement. The hegemon could also structure a forum that would allow 
other states to have a say, therefore reducing the likelihood that a significant challenger 
would arise out of conflicts of interest. Finally, by dispersing decision-making power to 
others, the hegemon is protecting itself from a major shift in power leading to further 
                                                       
5 Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, p. 12 
6  Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 39; Joanne Gowa, ―Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and 
Small Groups: an Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?‖ World Politics 41, No. 3 (Apr., 1989), pp. 
307-324, p. 323.  
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stability.
7
 Because of these benefits, a hegemon might prefer cooperation and would 
ensure its continuation. 
I build upon this theoretical framework by analyzing the conditions under which 
the United States chooses to invest in institutions and multilateral agreements. I examine 
those conditions and their implications for how involved the U.S. will be and what that 
involvement means for an institutions‘ effectiveness. Arguments for the validity of 
hegemonic stability indicate that a hegemon would be necessary to ensure a stable 
cooperative regime. By providing resources, investing a continuing interest in the 
survival of the organization or treaty, and by using its power to enforce the rules of the 
institution, the U.S. will perpetuate its existence. While this theory explains the 
continuation of particular agreements, it does not speak directly to the level of 
effectiveness the organization will achieve, even with U.S. support. If the U.S. is a 
relative hegemon in a particular issue area, its support could determine how well the 
organization or regime is able to achieve its goals and if the agreement persists. 
However, the criticisms of hegemonic stability are also relevant to this project, 
particularly the work of Duncan Snidal, John Ruggie, and Robert Keohane‘s later 
revisions. Norms and institutions matter in world politics and have continued to exist as 
valid outlets of international cooperation despite the absence of a hegemon. Some 
scholarship indicates that cooperation does not entirely depend on the existence of a 
powerful state. Multilateralism and its benefits outweigh the influence of a single 
                                                       
7 Lisa Martin, "The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism," in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and 
Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John Gerard Ruggie (New York, NY: New York University Press, 
1993) p. 111 
 12 
hegemon and can enhance cooperation in a more holistic way.
8
 Such criticisms could 
indicate a framework for a possible theory regarding U.S. effect on international 
organization effectiveness, in that the U.S. might not be a determining factor in the 
outcome of cooperation because multilateral institutions are able to adapt in the absence 
of a strong power. 
Snidal keeps the theory in its paradigmatic origins, but argues that it lacks validity 
because of several research design flaws. He points out that if a hegemon existed in the 
system, there is a possibility that it would not act benevolently towards all states. HST 
lacks data to measure this component of the theory and trivializes its most potentially 
relevant detail: that a state is powerful enough to prevent smaller ones from leaving the 
regime. Additionally, Snidal argues that the original theory does not address the size of 
the hegemon relative to other states or if the hegemon is benevolent or coercive.
9
 Even 
though a simple test determining whether or not the presence of a dominant state leads to 
lasting regimes is a viable way to empirically associate hegemons with stable 
cooperation, without data indicating whether or not the hegemon is coercive or 
benevolent and actually distributes benefits to all states, hegemonic stability theory is 
incomplete.
10
 This study begins to build a foundation for designing such a test. 
By ignoring possible discrepancies between relative and absolute size of a 
hegemon, hegemonic stability theory does not encompass the possibility that a 
hegemon‘s relative size to other states could be getting smaller while it‘s absolute size is 
getting bigger. If a powerful state continues to grow and expand, but other states grow 
                                                       
8 John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 5. 
9 Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, p. 11. 
10 Ibid, p. 6. 
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and expand at the same time, its relative size shrinks in comparison and could indicate a 
decrease in influence. Therefore the net gain from an absolute gain will be high, but the 
state might not be considered a hegemon because its relative size has diminished and it 
can no longer enforce its interests to preserve cooperation.
11
 This distinction is 
particularly relevant for this paper because it allows for a clearer classification of the 
United States‘ hegemonic status during the period of this study. There is also a strong 
possibility that states will have different interests across different issue areas that will 
determine whether they will act benevolently, or act according to a stronger capacity to 
coerce. Different issue areas will require a different distribution of benefits by the 
hegemon, which is an inconsistency that is not observed in the hegemonic stability 
theory, and could leave room for destabilization.
12
 At this point, my research breaks from 
scholars‘ preoccupation with differentiating between varying issue areas. Because there 
will be tests conducted on a variety of cases across several international regimes, a theory 
regarding conditions for U.S. cooperation will be more generalized and therefore 
applicable to the field of multilateral cooperation and U.S. foreign policy.
13
 
These methodological assessments of hegemonic stability nicely complement 
Robert Keohane‘s revisions of the hegemonic stability theory in After Hegemony 
(1984)—in which he revises several tenants of the original theory in light of declining 
hegemonies. He selectively applies hegemonic stability theory by determining that the 
presence of a hegemon can facilitate cooperation, but it is not a necessary or sufficient 
                                                       
11 Ibid, p. 9 
12 Ibid, p 36. 
13 G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake and Michael Mastanduno, ―Introduction: Approaches to Explaining 
American Foreign Economic Policy,‖ International Organization 42, No. 1 (Winter, 1988): 1-14, p. 1 
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condition to ensure its success and continuation.
14
 He demonstrates that cooperation can 
occur after the creation of international regimes and can continue throughout a post-
hegemonic era.
15
 He argues that empirically, the presence of a hegemon was not 
necessary for international cooperation in the twentieth century. Cooperation and 
harmony did not occur for long after the U.S. was established as a hegemon in the years 
after World War II, and Britain, while having the most extensive free trade policy in the 
early twentieth century, did not necessarily dictate the rules of the system and enforce 
their trading scheme on others.
16
 Additionally, Keohane argues that hegemonic stability 
theory is not sufficient for cooperation. Concentrated power is not enough to create 
stability, particularly if it is not powerful relative to other states.
17
 In order to demonstrate 
his revised hegemonic stability theory, Keohane assesses the phenomenon of U.S. 
hegemony and its decline as well as the subsequent impact it has had on international 
cooperation. Similar to Keohane, but starting with different assumptions, is John 
Ikkenberry who posits that the collapse of the Cold War did nothing to undermine the 
global system at which the U.S. was at the center. He also believes in the continuity of 
cooperation post-Cold War, but acknowledges the continuation of an American-liberal 
hegemonic order into the 1990s.
18
 
U.S. Hegemony and International Cooperation 
                                                       
14 Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, p. 31. 
15 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 32 
16 Ibid, p. 35-36; Thanh Duong, Hegemonic Globalization (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2002), p. 66. Duong 
argues that Britain and the United States were not actually full sponsors of free trade in that free trade was 
merely a mechanism to maximize their own benefits. 
17 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 38; Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, ―Hegemonic Stability 
Theory: An Empirical Assessment,‖ Review of International Studies 15, No. 2 (Apr., 1989): 183-198, p. 
184. 
18 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 223. 
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The status of the United States as the world‘s superpower shifted significantly in the mid 
to late twentieth century. In the twenty years after World War II, the U.S. enjoyed 
hegemony over the international system and sought to find mutual interests with partners 
in order to shape other states to conform to its will.
19
 ―American hegemonic leadership in 
the postwar period, presupposed a rough consensus in the North Atlantic area, and later 
with Japan, on the maintenance of international capitalism, as opposed to socialism…‖20 
The U.S. had to invest in institutions and the resulting regimes coming from such 
investment created a stable, cooperative system. Because smaller states and allies could 
expect the hegemon to ensure the consistency of a stable system and preserve the status 
quo, hegemony itself reduced transaction costs and uncertainty in cooperation.
21
 
There were several benefits the U.S. provided for others in the system around this 
time: a stable international monetary system, provision of open markets for goods, and 
access to stable oil prices. The U.S. could also offer provision of currency, monitoring of 
exchange rates, protection by the U.S. Navy, a decrease in pirate activity, and lower 
transaction costs through trade.
22
 Those are some examples of how U.S. hegemony 
determines contributions the U.S. could make to a system of cooperation in order to 
ensure stability and lead to an effective outcome. If the conclusions of this paper indicate 
that U.S. support for international institutions makes them more effective, they will not 
necessarily indicate that the U.S. is once again displaying complete hegemonic 
leadership, but build from the idea that a strong international player‘s investment in 
cooperation is necessary for institutions‘ effectiveness. 
                                                       
19 Webb and Krasner, Hegemonic Stability Theory, p. 185. 
20 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 137. 
21 Ibid, p. 138. 
22 Ibid, p. 139; Webb and Krasner, Hegemonic Stability Theory, p. 185. 
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After the mid-1960s, U.S. hegemony began to shift in order to encompass the new 
bipolar international system, as the Soviet Union became a security threat to the U.S. 
After the collapse of the USSR, other states have risen on the global stage to challenge 
the U.S. internationally, diminishing its relative status as a global hegemon. Here, the 
realist paradigm of looking at relative power in a post-hegemonic system is again 
relevant. In the post-hegemonic era, how can cooperation be achieved? Keohane argues 
that there is evidence for a decline in international cooperation following the decline in 
American hegemony, however the difficulty of attributing decreasing cooperation only to 
declining American hegemony prevents hegemonic stability theory from being as 
straightforward as originally postulated.
23
 
Other scholars argue that though the bipolar system collapsed at the end of the 
Cold War, the liberal order that the U.S. created remained intact but was significantly 
undermined by the Bush era push toward unilateralism and the subsequent economic 
recession and loss of confidence in U.S. markets.
24
 The future of a stable liberal order 
depends on certain variables already emphasized in the literature including the U.S. 
ability to strike regional bargains, the willingness of the U.S. to provide public goods, a 
general agreement of rights and privileges and the ability of other rising global powers to 
operate within this system.
25
 This research contributes to the literature on American 
hegemony, for it will explore empirical connections between U.S. policy and 
effectiveness of multilateral endeavors and what that could mean for the future of 
cooperation and American influence. 
Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy 
                                                       
23 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 196. 
24 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, p. 224-225. 
25 Ibid, p. 281-282. 
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Outside of the broad, theoretical components of hegemony, cooperation, and the role of 
the U.S. within that framework, there is extensive literature addressing U.S. choices when 
it comes to multilateralism. The traditional, nominal definition of multilateralism is ―the 
practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states.‖26 This 
definition certainly lays the groundwork for more sophisticated analysis of the method 
through which states choose to cooperate with each other. Multilateralism does not just 
focus on the number of states involved, but also the kind of relations that result.
27
 The 
literature on multilateralism includes extensive analysis on the role that the United States 
has played in its expansion and within specific institutional regimes. This paper not only 
builds on theoretical concepts of hegemonic stability, but also onto previous scholars‘ 
work on multilateralism and U.S. policy. 
For the U.S. there are several factors that contribute to the decision to enter a 
multilateral agreement. A general consensus among scholars concludes that since the end 
of the Cold War, U.S. ambivalence towards international organizations has increased. 
The Bush era, from 2001 to 2008, has been characterized as a major shift towards 
unilateralism.
28
 This could be attributed to the failures of some multilateral endeavors, 
such as Bosnia and Somalia, or to factors such as domestic political structures, the role of 
interest groups, and U.S. exceptionalism. There have been some studies that argue that 
the United States‘ global dominance has not led to an increase in cooperation, even if it is 
by American standards, as hegemonic stability would suggest. Rather, some scholars 
                                                       
26 Ruggie, Multilateralism, p. 13. 
27 Ibid, p. 6; James A. Caporaso, ―International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for 
Foundations,‖ in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John Gerard 
Ruggie (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993) pp. 51-90, p. 55.  
28 Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., US Hegemony and International 
Organizations (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), p 2.; Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, p. 268. 
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believe that U.S. dominance has been expressed through its pursuit of unilateralism, 
instead of cooperation through multilateral engagements.
29
 According to realist logic, the 
structure of multilateralism and the commitment to shared norms or principles despite 
significant costs and self-restraint are not attractive to a great power like the U.S. This 
contradicts the theory of hegemonic stability, but provides context to why the U.S. would 
choose to engage unilaterally.
30
 
There has been some scholarship on the extent to which U.S. engagement with 
international organizations has affected the organization itself. These scholars have 
generally assumed that the impact of U.S. policy on the terms and success of an 
agreement would be immense.
31
 The application of power can come in the form of 
anticipatory surrender—smaller states giving up their power and actions to the interests 
of a larger state because they believe the payoffs will be higher—or in the capacity to set 
agendas. Both of these methods are ways that the U.S. can dictate the outputs and the 
process of international organizations and therefore greatly affect their efficiency and 
legitimacy.
32
 Some scholars have attempted to answer the question of the impact of the 
U.S. on particular multilateral regimes. Gautnam Sen and Ngaire Woods analyze U.S. 
power on the WTO and World Bank/IMF respectively.
33
 In those two instances, the U.S. 
is a major player in that it sets policy, holds significant administrative capacity, and 
                                                       
29 Foot, MacFarlane, Mastanduno, US Hegemony, pg. 6; Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages: American 
Politics and International Organization, 1919-1999 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999) 
30 Stewart Patrick, ―Multilateralism and Its Discontents,‖ in Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Ambivalent Engagement, ed. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Foreman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc. 2002), p. 9. 
31 Foot, MacFarlane, Mastanduno, U.S. Hegemony, p. 11. 
32 Ibid, p. 10. 
33 Ngaire Woods, "The US, the World Bank, and the IMF," in US Hegemony and International 
Organization, ed. Foot, MacFarlane, Mastanduno (2003), p. 97; Gautnam Sen, "The United States and the 
GATT/WTO," in US Hegemony and International Organization, ed. Foot, MacFarlane, Mastanduno 
(2003), p. 137. 
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provides the primary market for action. Both conclude that without U.S. power, both 
organizations would not have the capacity to effectively achieve its goals. This thesis 
contributes to the work already done by these scholars, and looks at issues outside of the 
realm of world trade and international monetary regimes. So while the essays by Sen and 
Woods are useful for cases in which the U.S. has already supported, there is still a 
significant empirical gap on organizations and treaties that the U.S. has not signed or 
ratified. 
International Cooperation in the Environmental Regime 
Because two case studies used to assess the impact of U.S. policy on 
organizational effectiveness are environmental agreements, this section offers a very brief 
overview of some of the theories on the challenges of global environmental governance, a 
unique issue area, and its relationship to hegemony. Some authors usefully characterize 
environmental issues as common pool resources (CPRs).
34
 This characterization of 
resources sums up challenges with appropriation and allocation of nonexcludable finite 
resources and therefore greatly influences the ability of treaties to be successful.
35
  
Hegemonic stability theory traditionally claims that hegemons can provide public goods, 
but some theory suggests that in a CPR situation, a hegemon would not be able to 
effectively ensure the preservation of a resource. A hegemon can theoretically override 
the free-rider problem by paying for the free riders‘ share so long as they can manage the 
allocation of the resource. However, there is no way for the hegemon to ensure that free 
riders do not use up all of the remaining shares of the resource while also bearing no cost. 
                                                       
34 Samuel J. Barkin and George E. Shambaugh, "Hypotheses on the international politics of common pool 
resources." In Anarchy and the Environment: The International Relations of Common Pool Resources, eds. 
J. Samuel Barkin and George E. Shambaugh. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999): p. 13. 
35 Ibid, p. 15. 
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There is little incentive, therefore, for a hegemon like the United States to agree to 
environmental cutbacks and pay for other states to indiscriminately consume the 
resource. Coercive hegemons have a higher likelihood of succeeding in a CPR situation, 
and must be willing to impose negative sanctions on free riders that would make the cost 
of overconsumption greater than the cost of forcing cooperation.
36
 Therefore, existing 
theories on common pool resources and hegemony characterize some incentive structures 
for the U.S. when contemplating environmental agreements and the extent to which its 
support could influence other states in the regime. 
Attempts at creating international environmental law are often plagued with 
various dilemmas and challenges stemming from environmental objectives having to 
compete with problems of international development for political priority level. While 
some states may be aware of the need to reduce environmental harm for the sake of 
protecting the environment, doing so would come at the expense of development because 
their economies may rely on certain industries affected by environmental regulation. 
Requiring a developing country to reduce their industrial output and therefore 
intentionally hurt their economy in order to adhere to environmental treaties is often 
fruitless. The debate over environmental policy and its effects on development is a 
continual theme throughout the several decades of attempted multilateral engagement 
over environmental problems. One notable exception to many common environmental 
governance dilemmas is the Montreal Protocol, which is a case study in this thesis for 
analyzing the impacts of U.S. policy on multilateral effectiveness. 
Other challenges to achieving agreement on environmental issues come from the 
reality that there are seldom reliable enforcement mechanisms to ensure that states meet 
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their treaty obligations. While specific treaties attempt to enforce provisions, there are 
relatively few consequences for a state to walk away. Canada‘s recent withdrawal from 
the Kyoto Protocol exemplifies this weakness. Canadian industry was unable to meet the 
required emissions reduction under compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
Canadian government withdrew its ratification in 2011.
37
 Many scholars have speculated 
on the ability of hard law treaties to create any positive effect on the environment, and 
indeed, the United Nations reports that many environmental problems from 2002 were 
exacerbated despite the growing number of signatories to environmental treaties.
38
 
Recent evidence and scholarship on environmental agreements‘ success indicates that the 
number of signatures on a treaty does not necessitate a guarantee that all states parties 
will comply with the agreements because, despite flexibility mechanisms, many treaties 
do not have a substantial enforcement mechanism that forces states to honor 
commitments. All of the above theoretical conditions explore the challenges facing 
international agreements on environmental issues as well as how a hegemon or powerful 
state could affect the negotiations, compliance, and success of a treaty. These 
considerations will be vital in exploring the United States‘ role in the two environmental 
case studies. 
Performance of International Organizations 
The final component of political science literature that speaks to my central 
question is the methods by which other scholars have assessed the performance and 
efficiency of international organizations (IOs) and international regimes. In order to 
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38 ―Keeping Track of Our Changing Environment: From Rio to Rio+20 (1992-2012),‖ United Nations 
Environmental Programme (2011), accessed at http://www.unep.org/geo/pdfs/Keeping_Track.pdf. 
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create a research design that produces meaningful results, I assess the existing literature 
on performance. When scholars first began to study international institutions in the wake 
of the post-war reconstruction effort in the 1950s, the focus was on their external 
effectiveness, or how well the institutions were addressing the post-war chaos. The factor 
that many academics believed undermined the success of institutions was the scope of the 
reconstruction itself and the huge problems from which the world suffered.
39
 The 
perpetuity of those institutions in later decades could indicate that support from global 
powers (like the United States) ensured their existence, meaning that the literature on 
organization effectiveness relates directly to the concepts of hegemonic stability theory. 
Since then ―effectiveness‖ has been a primary focus of scholarship on international 
organizations.
40
 
Tamar Gutner and Alexander Thompson, in a Special Issue of the Review of 
International Organization, have consolidated previous work on IO performance and 
have established guidelines for studying regime effectiveness that would be consistent 
with the works already written and would avoid common methodological errors that 
devalue the conclusions made. First, they assert an important distinction between internal 
process ―performance‖ and external output ―effectiveness.‖ When measuring the 
dependent variable, I consider this framework and use it in order to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of institutional effectiveness. In order to measure internal 
process, I build on previous research, which indicates that IO performance hinges greatly 
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40 Martin and Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies, p. 734; Carsten Helm and Detlef Sprinz, 
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on bureaucratic elements. Dysfunction within the IO bureaucracy can create pathological 
behavior and therefore hinder its internal process performance.
41
 
Additionally, Gutner and Thompson identify external factors that could influence 
IO support, reinforcing the idea that power exerted by individual states can have an 
impact on IO effectiveness.
42
 Other scholars have contributed to the evaluation of IO 
performance by using different methods that illuminate the best way to generate 
meaningful conclusions. Michael Lipson used process-tracing analysis in order to 
determine the performance level of UN peacekeeping operations, warning that the line 
between process and outcome analysis in this issue area can be ambiguous.
43
 Therefore, 
Lipson demonstrates the need to distinguish between process and outcome performance, 
particularly tailored to a specific issue area. Because this research will be applied over 
multiple issue areas, each case study will be evaluated along both dimensions. In 
addressing the environmental regime, scholars such as Carsten Helm and Detlef Sprinz 
have used simultaneous analysis comparing actual results to both a collective optimum 
and a ―no-regime counterfactual.‖44 Counterfactuals are a useful tool in this study as it 
explores how the value of one variable could affect the value of another. By asking how 
effectiveness would change if the U.S. had initiated a different policy, I can make 
inferences about the extent to which the variables interact. 
Other methods for evaluating IO performance as employed by scholars have evolved 
from Abbott and Snidal‘s emphasis on Transnational New Governance and the ability of 
an IO to enhance performance by involving public and private actors to orchestrate global 
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42 Ibid, p. 230. 
43 Ibid, p. 241. 
44 Helm and Sprinz, Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes, p. 630. 
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governance networks. This theory recognizes that IOs are only one actor in complicated 
systems of issue areas and without addressing the other actors involved, outputs and 
performance of the IO cannot be fully understood.
45
 This method is useful when 
evaluating the performance of regimes, but my research will treat IOs as individual actors 
as they relate to an individual state. More literature is presented later in the paper 
regarding the individual case studies and previous studies analyzing their performance, 
but the overall literature on IO effectiveness, particularly Gutner and Thompson‘s 
reconciling piece provides a reasonable research design that is compatible with previous 
work. 
III. Theory and Methods 
 
In order to obtain empirical results, I have developed a policy scale, hereafter the 
Multilateral Policy Scale, as an independent variable, indicating a range of possible 
policy options the U.S. could choose to initiate toward treaty negotiations and compliance 
with treaty provisions. Because the U.S. rarely responds to a policy issue in a black-and-
white manner, this scale is necessary to represent all possible policy choices. The 
Multilateral Policy Scale starts at ―Ratification‖ to indicate whether the United States has 
ratified or signed an agreement. However, because ratification is not necessarily a 
determinant of compliance, the Policy Scale then moves through a separate 
―compliance‘‖ variable as an indication of how well the U.S. has adhered to treaty 
agreements. The Policy Scale then moves through ―providing resources‖ to ―diplomatic 
support.‖ There is a middle option of ignoring the agreement. The Scale moves 
downward to include the negative policy options: ―refusal to give diplomatic support,‖ to 
                                                       
45 Gutner and Thompson, Politics of IO Performance, p. 242. 
 25 
―refusal to offer resources,‖ to ―non-compliance,‖ which could apply even in the absence 
of ratification. The U.S. might comply without ratifying an agreement, and can also ratify 
an agreement without complying. This distinction is crucial in determining the level of 
U.S. involvement. Finally, ―obstruction‖ is the most hostile value that the variable can 
take, and is indicated by non- ratification and efforts to broker an alternative to the 
existing arrangement. A visual representation appears below, assigning numerical values 
for each component. This visual representation of the scale will appear within each case 
study across four sample years in order to more clearly capture variation on the 
independent variable. 
 
There has been extensive literature on the best way to measure a variable as 
multifaceted as ―effectiveness,‖ and scholars often differ in their interpretation of the best 
conceptualization. One of the challenges for this study will be to conceptualize 
―effectiveness‖ in a way that is able to be used across different issue areas while still 
 26 
producing meaningful and practical observations to be used in policy making or 
derivation of future theory. Thomas Bernauer discusses this methodological conundrum 
at great length in the context of international environmental policies, and offers a useful 
method for measuring this variable. Effectiveness should first be measured in terms of 
goal achievement. Has the institution been successful in achieving its stated goals? Then, 
the analysis determines the extent to which the institution contributed to goal 
attainment.
46
 This allows me to both measure effectiveness based on how well the treaty 
achieves its goals, and also to measure effectiveness based on how the institution has 
contributed to the overall process in solving a global problem. This framework nicely 
complements that of Gutner and Thompson, who distinguish between IO effectiveness 
and IO performance. Considering both methodological recommendations, ―effectiveness‖ 
is conceptualized in this way: the organization is evaluated based on external output 
effectiveness and how well it has achieved its stated goals. Then the organization is 
evaluated based on internal performance by examining structural mechanisms, 
compliance mechanisms, and how much the organization itself has contributed to solving 
a global problem. 
In order to measure effectiveness for each case, I establish a baseline standard by 
determining the ideal outcome as specified in original treaties and the stated goals in an 
organization‘s founding documents. I then compare the actual, observed outcome with 
the ideal figure to get a measure of how effective the IO has been at solving problems 
identified in the founding documents. I observe the impact that the institution had on goal 
attainment by looking at state compliance and internal process in areas that could impact 
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effectiveness (particularly those in which the United States could be involved). Finally, I 
assess the contribution that the treaty has made to global legal processes of solving a 
particular global problem. The indicators of output effectiveness and the ability of the 
institution to contribute to problem solving provide crucial evidence as to whether or not 
the particular IO has been successful since its inception. 
In order to determine a causal chain between U.S. policy and IO effectiveness, I 
employ two separate analytical methods, including process tracing and comparative case 
studies. In order to determine causation within each case, the case is isolated and heavily 
researched. Then, I move down the policy scale using the measures and indications 
previously explained, and determine the value of the independent variable in each case. 
After isolating the applicable policy actions, I then conduct another test to analyze the 
dependent variable for effectiveness of the institution. After establishing U.S. policy and 
behavior toward a given regime and knowing what the outputs are and are not, I outline a 
causal chain to link the variables and determine whether the policy option exercised by 
the U.S. contributed to the observed results. By understanding the indicators on the 
independent variable and by exploring counterfactuals to determine the resources that 
U.S. brings to the table for that particular case, one can draw conditional conclusions 
about the relationship between variables. 
Several political science scholars have advocated the use of counterfactuals in 
deriving inferences and conclusions from small-N case study methods. Because 
counterfactuals explicitly deal with situations and suppositions that did not actually 
happen, there are certain methods for an analyst to use in order to validate arguments 
derived from counterfactuals. James Fearon explains that researchers, when looking to 
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make causal claims through counterfactuals, must make arguments about what could 
have happened based on invoking general principles and theories and using existing 
historical knowledge relevant to the counterfactual scenario.
47
 Fearon demonstrates 
several examples of successful use of counterfactuals in small-N designs, all of which 
contain elements of explaining how elements of an independent variable explain 
outcomes in certain cases with implicit emphasis on how the outcome could have been 
different given historical realities.
48
 Counterfactuals in this study are a necessary 
component to deriving useful conclusions and to justifying causal claims regarding U.S. 
involvement and effectiveness of an institution because it involves a small sample of 
cases but a wide variety of independent variable options. In order to achieve this, this 
study ensures that counterfactual analysis is both explicit and defensible by providing 
evidence for any assumptions made by presuming a different outcome. 
The second portion of the research involves constructed comparison between the 
cases, looking to determine whether or not the expected outcome occurred in all 
situations. I use the results of comparative case study analysis to determine the 
consistency of my theory and to ultimately demonstrate whether any overarching 
relationship is observable between U.S. involvement and regime effectiveness. 
Case selection for this study consists of treaties or multilateral endeavors in the 
post-1990 era that the U.S. has rejected, has fully supported from the beginning, or has 
complied with informally without ratification. The U.S. Senate Treaty Series and several 
IO scholars have data on all treaties and relevant amendments and protocols that the U.S. 
has signed since 1990. Additionally, because the United Nations requires members to 
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submit all negotiated treaties to a database, the UN Treaty Series (UNTS) provides 
crucial data on determining the total population of cases that the U.S. has participated in 
since 1990. According to the UNTS, the United States has been listed as a participant in 
approximately 3,000 bilateral and multilateral treaties since 1945. After filtering the data 
to only include those negotiated after 1990, the population shrinks to 548 bilateral and 
multilateral treaties signed. Out of those 548, a majority of those treaties are bilateral and 
not applicable to this study. However, the U.S. has ―participated‖ in approximately 40 
international treaties since 1990.
49
 There are still some limitations to the usefulness of 
this data since it does not include treaties that the U.S. did not sign, however, there is no 
existing comprehensive source. Using this data, I can better choose cases that are 
representative of the wide variation in my independent variable. It is important to achieve 
variation on case selection in order to illuminate the resources that the U.S. can bring to 
IOs to help them succeed and to isolate the effect of U.S. support on effectiveness. 
The following cases were selected based on variation in the independent variable: 
The Montreal Protocol (1987), The International Aid Transparency Initiative (2008), The 
Rome Statute (2002) that establishes the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto 
Protocol (2005). These cases all vary significantly along the Multilateral Policy Scale, 
and demonstrate a wide variation of U.S. policy. The Montreal Protocol has the highest 
value of U.S. participation and the Kyoto Protocol has the lowest value, and the case 
studies are presented in descending order down the Multilateral Policy Scale. In order to 
obtain comparable results, the cases selected deal with ―low-politics‖ issues, such as 
international justice, environmental issues, foreign aid, or monetary policy. To avoid a 
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misleading comparison, ―high politics‖ issues like nuclear proliferation, advanced 
weaponry, or military invasions should be excluded from consideration. This is because 
high politics issues generally attract significant external factors (i.e. human cost) that 
shape U.S. policy. 
The implications of this research are expansive. It empirically evaluates a specific 
diplomatic paradigm adopted by many representatives and treaty delegations, namely that 
a multilateral agreement not receiving U.S. support is doomed to fail. By building on the 
framework of hegemonic stability theory and its criticisms, these tests could illuminate a 
useful theory in addressing IO performance as it relates to U.S. policy. The conclusions 
of this paper could indicate a specific path for U.S. foreign policy as well as explain a 
logical prediction for the future of effective international organization. Given that good 
performance is a source of legitimacy for an international organization, this research 
could indicate whether U.S. support is a necessary element that an IO must obtain in 
order to be successful, effective, or legitimate. 
IV. The Montreal Protocol 
 
The first case study used to empirically test the influence of U.S. policy on a 
multilateral organization is The Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances. This 
Protocol, added to the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer is 
considered one of the most successful international environmental agreements of all time 
and represents a case at the top of the Multilateral Policy Scale. This chapter will first 
contextualize the Protocol and the events implicit in its creation to get a sense of how the 
U.S. participated and what preferences it demonstrated when negotiating the Protocol. 
Then, U.S. involvement in the treaty is explored to measure how U.S. policy measures up 
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on the Multilateral Policy Scale. This chapter then isolates the dependent variable and 
assesses how effective the Montreal Protocol has been so far with respect to external 
outputs and internal performance. Finally, this chapter employs process-tracing methods 
to determine whether there is a link between the variables. 
Background: United States and Ozone Protection 
In the first half of the twentieth century, industrial and technological advancement 
skyrocketed to the level of unprecedented innovation in fields of science, weaponry, and 
efficient production. In the latter half of the twentieth century, innovation and 
development continued to increase exponentially but with the newfound awareness of 
certain environmental costs of such rapid industrial expansion. In 1972, several states 
recognized the need for common principles that address the detrimental effects of 
industrial development on human health and protect the human and physical environment 
and gathered in Stockholm, Sweden in order to discuss and affirm such principles. Using 
the same rhetoric and spirit of the potential for human innovation and advancement, 
states in Stockholm codified the idea that humans must take responsibility for man-made 
problems in the environment and succeeded in developing language that would build the 
international legal structure of environmental agreements.
50
 By the early 1990s, the 
international community began to recognize that environmental degradation would come 
at the expense of human health, food security, and development unless serious 
multilateral action was taken. Several states and representatives convened in Rio de 
Janerio in 1992 in order to develop a multilateral agreement on environmental policy and 
human development. The Rio Conference continued establishing framework language for 
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issues that do not adhere to territorial boundaries such as fish, animals, air and water 
pollution, and rising global temperatures. Now, after twenty years of attempting to 
regulate environmental policy on an international level, the international community has 
remained committed to decreasing hazardous behavior, but results have been varied. 
Cooperation over the environment is exceedingly difficult and has exposed several 
challenges to achieving the necessary cooperation from all states. 
The Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer is evidence of the evolving trend towards international cooperation on 
environmental issues. It first opened for discussion in 1986 and entered into force January 
1, 1989. The United States Senate ratified the agreement in 1988, and in 1990, the terms 
of the treaty entered U.S. law via amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970. The 
Montreal Protocol was designed to reduce ozone-depleting substances in the atmosphere 
by 50 percent below 1986 base levels in response to scientific reports linking chemical 
compositions of household products to significant damage in the ozone layer. According 
to British scientists studying the atmosphere in Antarctica in 1984, a recurring ―hole‖ in 
the ozone layer appeared when levels of ozone dropped below 10 percent of their 
expected value for that region.
51
 Another measurement indicated an even sharper drop in 
ozone concentration from previous decades: nearly 35 percent of the previous levels of 
ozone in Antarctica‘s atmosphere had disappeared.  The ozone hole had spread over the 
populated areas of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and the southern tip of South 
America, greatly concerning scientists over possible impacts on human health. The ozone 
layer of the atmosphere protects life on earth from harmful ultraviolet rays released 
through sunlight. Conditions like high-level radiation could significantly damage the 
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earth‘s delicate ecosystem and cause immune system deficiencies, eye damage, and skin 
cancer in humans.
52
 
By 1987, public awareness of the ozone hole and its potential effects on human 
life had spread globally—along with the ozone hole itself. Public opinion about solutions 
to the ozone hole phenomenon played a large role in the policy process in the United 
States and pressured policymakers to address this serious concern. Asked in a 1988 
survey conducted by the National Geographic Society, ―If the ozone layer were to be 
damaged to any significant extent, would the impact be limited to industrialized nations, 
underdeveloped Third World countries, or do you think the effects would be felt all over 
the world?‖, 94 percent of U.S. respondents indicated that they believed ozone depletion 
to impact the whole world.
53
 In the same survey, 84 percent of respondents indicated that 
they were aware of the destructive impact of CFCs on the ozone layer.
54
 One year later, 
the J. Walter Thompson Company determined that 79 percent of U.S. respondents 
favored ―a ban on fluorocarbons and other chemicals known to damage the ozone layer, 
even if it means higher prices for air conditioners, refrigerators, and some other consumer 
products.‖55 Finally, the Opinion Research Corporation determined in a poll that 57 
percent of respondents were ―very concerned‖ about greater exposure to the sun‘s rays 
due to ozone depletion. Another 25 percent indicated that they were ―fairly concerned.‖56 
According to this polling data, the American public was aware of and concerned 
about the danger related to ozone depletion and would be willing to incur higher 
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individual costs in favor of reducing emissions of ozone depleting substances (ODSs). 
These opinions put significant amounts of pressure on policymakers in Washington to 
address ozone depletion as a matter of importance. In addition to a high level of public 
support for action against ODS emissions, politicians also had to consider the potential 
economic consequences of seriously committing to reduce consumption of ODSs. 
Several U.S.-based manufacturing companies produced refrigeration and cooling 
technologies that consumed high levels of ODSs, therefore leading to increased research 
into the exact substances that have caused these problems and how best to mitigate their 
impact on the atmosphere. Companies such as Du Pont and Allied Signal Inc. produced 
large amounts of products using ODSs and eventually became significant actors in 
determining the type of regulations imposed during the negotiations.
57
 In addition, these 
industrial actors, combined with hundreds of thousands of businesses that consumed 
ODSs in regular operation, contributed to scientific research on the specific harms of 
chemicals to the ozone layer and eventually developed economically and environmentally 
viable substitutes to these chemicals. American industry played an instrumental role 
during the treaty negotiations in Vienna and Montreal, as exemplified by the full 
discussion of U.S. involvement is fully explored in the next section of the chapter. 
The final text of the Montreal Protocol was added to the Vienna Convention in 
1987, requiring a complete phase out of several chemicals including chlorofluorocarbons, 
halons, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform from industrial production in state 
parties by the year 2000. The treaty provisions did distinguish between the industrialized 
(non-Article 5) and non-industrialized (Article 5) nations and reflected an international 
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consensus that the latter countries would have more time and more assistance to meet 
their treaty obligations. Developed countries had until 1995 to completely phase out those 
chemicals, while developing countries were given until 2015. States were also required to 
incrementally reduce other more sophisticated chemicals like hydro chlorofluorocarbons 
(HCFCs) over five year periods and totally phase them out by 2020.
58
 The parties to the 
Montreal Protocol also established a financial flexibility mechanism in 1991, the 
Multilateral Fund, to ensure that developing countries are able to fulfill their treaty 
promises by funding sustainable development projects in 148 Article 5 countries whose 
annual emissions of ODSs do not exceed .3 kilograms per capita.
59
 The Montreal 
Protocol internal structure also contains various advisory boards, scientific assessment 
panels, and environmental assessment panels that regularly monitor compliance with 
provisions and continue researching the scientific components of ozone depletion and its 
environmental effects. The Protocol allowed limited exceptions to the consumption ban 
of ODSs if any equipment vital to human security or medicine required their 
consumption. Currently, the Montreal Protocol has 191 signatories, making it a universal 
treaty.
60
 Twenty years after the Montreal Protocol has entered into force, the UN 
Environmental Program through the Scientific, Environmental Effects, and Science and 
Economics Assessment Panels have determined that ozone-depleting substances have 
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declined significantly since 1990 and even more significantly between the 2006 
assessment and 2010 assessment.
61
 
The United States Involvement the Montreal Protocol 
This section identifies the level of U.S. involvement with regard to the 
Multilateral Policy Scale, which ranges from ratification to obstruction. The U.S. 
involvement in the Montreal Protocol has been consistently positive. This section 
provides evidence for all four positive indications for U.S. involvement in an institution. 
The U.S. has ratified the Montreal Protocol and has so far complied with its obligations. 
There is also evidence of the U.S. providing resources and technical assistance to the 
Protocol through its contributions to the Multilateral Fund, the heavy involvement of 
American scientific communities, and the role industrial actors in the negotiations for the 
treaty and domestic implementation. Finally, there is evidence of diplomatic support from 
U.S. officials in the executive and legislative branches in each administration from 
Ronald Reagan during the 1980s to Barack Obama from 2009 to 2012. 
The U.S. expressed immense support for the binding regulations of ODS 
emissions on signatories when the Montreal Protocol was negotiated in 1987. Domestic 
law from previous decades laid the groundwork for an immediate American ratification 
of the Protocol, despite many scientific uncertainties. The Clean Air Act, passed in 1970, 
allowed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate the emissions of any 
substance that ―may reasonably be anticipated to affect‖ the stratosphere or ozone layer.62 
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Richard E. Benedick, the chief negotiator at the Montreal Protocol negotiations and 
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment, Health and Natural 
Resources, emphasized the achievement of the Montreal Protocol in requiring states to 
incur significant short-term costs for scientific conjecture that, in 1986, was still a 
theory.
63
 Indeed, some officials within the Reagan Administration at the time of the 
negotiations questioned the necessity to impose binding restrictions on American industry 
if scientific evidence was not confirmed. While Reagan‘s ideological predisposition 
usually opposed such binding restrictions and regulations on American industry, various 
domestic forces including support from Congress, new scientific reports confirming 
environmental effects of ODSs, overwhelming support from the American public, and 
pressure from industrial actors who wished to capitalize on manufacturing ODS 
substitutes influenced him to vocalize American support for binding regulations. 
In a statement following ratification, Reagan proclaimed the Protocol as 
―[marking] an important milestone for the future quality of the global environment and 
for the health and well-being of all the peoples of the world.‖64 The U.S. Senate 
unanimously ratified the treaty 83-0 on March 14, 1988.
65
 In addition to ratification, the 
U.S. demonstrated its commitment to the Montreal Protocol by integrating the binding 
treaty provisions into domestic law through Title VI of the Clean Air Act, prohibiting 
consumption of ODSs after the target dates for the phase out plans. Manufacturers were 
prohibited from producing more than 10 percent of the individual level of ODSs from the 
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baseline year for that chemical (1986 for most ODSs). Title VI also provides legal and 
technical assistance for the development clause of the Montreal Protocol by allowing 
production of goods using limited amounts of ODSs to be exported for domestic use in 
Article 5 countries.
66
 
Beyond ratifying the treaty, the U.S. demonstrated other indicators on the 
Multilateral Policy Scale, notably satisfying the compliance variable and contributing to 
significantly reducing global ODS emissions. According to the UNEP Ozone Secretariat 
Reports last updated in January 2013, the United States has achieved the following levels 
of ODS consumption (production plus imports minus exports to state parties): 
 
Levels of ODS consumption in ODP tonnes as of January 11, 2013; UNEP Ozone Secretariat Report.
67
 
 
Broken down, this indicates that the U.S. has reduced consumption of various ODS 
chemicals in the last five years. Negative figures indicate how far below the baseline 
level (1986 levels, as stipulated by the treaty) consumption has moved for each chemical. 
According to this chart, the U.S. has met the targets stipulated in the Clean Air Act and 
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the Montreal Protocol, excepting HCFCs and Methyl Bromide because those target dates 
are still in the future. In 2007, the twentieth anniversary of the Montreal Protocol, the 
U.S. had met its targets for phasing out the following chemicals from production: Halons 
by January 1, 1994; CFCs by January 1, 1996; Carbon tetrachloride by January 1, 1996; 
Hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs) by January 1, 1996; Methyl chloroform by January 
1, 1996; Chlorobromomethane by August 18, 2003; and Methyl Bromide by January 1, 
2005. In addition, the report mentions that the U.S. is on track for future phase out plans 
for chemicals such as the elimination of HCFCs by January 1, 2030.
68
 In 1990 the U.S. 
consumed 232,682.2 metric tons of ODSs. In 2012, the U.S. consumed 2,339.5 metric 
tons.
69
 While precise figures for the exact percentage of total global emissions caused by 
the U.S. are unclear due to incomplete emissions history, U.S. consumption of ODS were 
anywhere from 10 percent to 50 percent of the global levels. This would imply that the 98 
percent reduction of ODS consumption in the U.S. significantly impacted global levels as 
well, considering that the U.S. was one of the largest consumers of ODSs in the world. 
The U.S. was highly involved in providing resources and technical assistance to 
further the implementation of the Montreal Protocol. This variable contains three 
components that indicate the level of involvement by the United States in providing 
resources to further the goals of the Montreal Protocol. The first is the involvement of the 
U.S. in the Multilateral Fund and its assistance to sustainable development projects per 
the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol in 1993. Success of this mechanism is 
useful in determining how the treaty was able to reduce emissions globally and obtain 
universal participation. The second factor involves the U.S. government spearheading the 
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Protection Agency, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/ozone/downloads/spd-annual-report_final.pdf. 
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scientific research in the public and private sector that was able to provide empirical and 
scientific foundations for the Protocol and why emissions targets are a pressing 
environmental concern. The third factor involves the role of American industrial actors in 
developing viable chemical alternatives and the influence they had on political leaders 
during negotiations. 
The Multilateral Fund allocates monetary assistance from developed countries 
into projects in Article 5 countries in order to help them comply with the stringent 
reduction requirements. The Fund consists of an Executive Committee, on which the 
United States has a permanent seat, and a Secretariat. These bodies delegate 
appropriation power to the World Bank and the UNEP, which then implement local 
projects on the ground in developing regions. Per Article V of the Protocol and 
commitments under the London Amendment, U.S. law allows for up to $30 million for 
developing countries to help achieve baseline emissions of ODS production in the 1991, 
1993, and 1995 fiscal years.
70
 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined 
in 1997 that the U.S. was the largest contributor to the Multilateral Fund and accounted 
for 25 percent of total contributions.
71
 The U.S. has maintained its position as the Fund‘s 
largest contributor, despite switching to an alternative payment method.
72
 
The additional two aspects of technical assistance provided by the United States 
include contributions in scientific assessment and discovery, and the role of industry. 
Before the Montreal Protocol was created, a large-scale multinational effort to increase 
scientific study about ozone depletion began under leadership of U.S. scientists. 
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Launched by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a massive coordination effort 
emerged, involving over 100 scientists from around the globe. They produced a 
groundbreaking study, published in 1985, which provided an extensive analysis of ozone 
depletion and its causes.
73
 American industry also played a significant role in promoting 
research on ozone depleting chemicals, particularly after the U.S. had ratified the 
agreement and enacted the industrial regulations. The role of industry in implementation 
of the Montreal Protocol was largely based on market incentives. Du Pont, for example, 
was suffering from a poor corporate image for its production of harmful chemicals. Du 
Pont, having access to scientific reports linking CFCs to ozone depletion, then spent 
millions of dollars throughout the 1980s researching viable substitutes for ODSs and 
successfully completed chemical substitutes for CFCs that do not have as large an impact 
on ozone depletion. In order for these advancements to be marketable, global regulation 
must occur to be cost beneficial for the company. A statement by Du Pont‘s 
environmental manager Dr. Joseph Steed indicated that the only beneficial option for the 
company was to develop alternatives and to support an international regulatory treaty.
74
 
Therefore, joined by other chemical companies, American industrial actors used their 
influence to push American politicians to support a global regulatory treaty on CFCs and 
to help implement the provisions after ratification in 1988.
75
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To round out the analysis of the independent variable, this next portion focuses on 
the strength of the United States‘ diplomatic support for the Montreal Protocol. During 
the negotiations, many prominent emitters of ODSs in the European Community and 
Japan were reluctant to implement regulation. After British scientists discovered the 
ozone hole in Antarctica, the British government subsequently defunded such scientific 
expeditions, bowing to the pressure of chemical companies.
76
 In order to persuade other 
states to agree to reductions in ODS emissions, several U.S. State Department 
representatives waged a global diplomatic campaign advocating for greater regulation. 
Richard Benedick along with scientific experts from NASA conducted seminars with 
diplomats, officials, environmental ministers, and foreign officers in key blocking 
countries in order to share scientific insight and to explain the U.S. rationale.
77
 Such 
efforts were successful, and many key opponents eventually signed the Protocol 
alongside the U.S. in 1988.
78
 
In addition to diplomatic efforts around the time of entry into force, all subsequent 
U.S. administrations have supported the Montreal Protocol. William K. Riley, an EPA 
administrator during the George H.W. Bush Administration, addressed the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol in 1990, not only expressly stating diplomatic support for governments 
signing the treaty, but also concrete support for its goals. 
We are particularly pleased that 59 nations have now ratified the Protocol, 
almost double the number that had ratified 15 months ago when we 
gathered last in London. Full international participation and 
implementation of the Protocol is essential to its effectiveness. We urge 
therefore all nations that have not yet done so to accede to both the 
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78 "Parties That Have Signed the Montreal Protocol.‖ 
 43 
Protocol and its framework agreement, the Vienna Convention on the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer. 
 
We support an 85% reduction of carbon tetrachloride by 1995 and a 
complete phase-out by the year 2000, with 1989 as a base year. We support 
a freeze on methyl chloroform by 1993, a 30% reduction by 1995 and a 
50% reduction by the year 2000 with 1989 as a base year. We also support 
the resolution to phase out this substance as soon as possible.
 79
 
 
The Clinton Administration expressed willingness to continue to comply with the 
Montreal Protocol, as well as expand its influence, by agreeing to amendments limiting 
imports and trade of methyl bromide in addition to authorizing contributions to the 
Multilateral Fund. ―The Clinton-Gore Administration is working aggressively to 
implement the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer… The 
President today called on Congress to approve the funds needed to sustain strong 
international efforts to protect the ozone layer.‖80 Similarly, the George W. Bush 
administration continued to support the Montreal Protocol initiatives and continued 
regulation to oversee complete phase out of several ODSs. In 2007, the U.S. 
recommended an acceleration of remaining phase-outs by ten years. Demonstrating 
continual cooperation over this issue, the parties to the Protocol accepted this proposal 
and moved the phase out schedule for HCFCs to 2020 (up from 2030) for developed 
countries.
81
 
Finally, the Obama administration has celebrated and recognized the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Montreal Protocol and has expressed commitment to furthering the 
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phase-outs and regulations of ODS emissions. Daniel A. Reifsnyder, deputy assistant 
secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, spoke on behalf of the United States at the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the State 
Parties in 2012, and focused on forward momentum by using the Montreal Protocol as a 
springboard for further protection of the atmosphere: 
In particular, I urge that we not deplete the store of benefits to the climate 
system that we have built up under the Montreal Protocol by ignoring the 
impacts on the climate system of our actions to protect the stratospheric 
ozone layer. We have a critical opportunity now to "get it right" – let us 
seize it.
82
 
 
This sampling of diplomatic statements demonstrates continual commitment to abide by 
Montreal Protocol regulations and indicates a consistent presence of positive diplomacy 
in favor of the Protocol. The visuals below outline the involvement that the U.S. initiated 
relating to the Montreal Protocol for four years since 1987. 
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Overall, when evaluating the independent variable based on the Multilateral 
Policy Scale, the United States fully supported the Montreal Protocol by becoming an 
original signatory and by implementing regulations into domestic law, and this policy 
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was maintained throughout several administrations.  The U.S. contributed resources, 
funding, and technical assistance through spearheading scientific study, involving 
industrial actors, contributing and influencing the creation of the Multilateral Fund, and 
by successfully complying with treaty provisions and reducing ODS emissions by over 
97 percent since 1990. 
The Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol 
Effectiveness for this study is defined as the ability of the treaty to meet its stated 
goals and the extent to which the institution contributed to the larger international process 
for solving a global problem with respect for both output effectiveness and internal 
process performance.
83
 The concrete goal as stated in the Montreal Protocol and its 
subsequent amendments is a total phase out of ozone depleting substances by 2020. 
Cooperation for an agreement like the Montreal Protocol follows certain models of 
international dependency and indicates how such an agreement can be successful. 
Looking first at the output effectiveness and how well the treaty has achieved its 
stated goals, it is clear that the Montreal Protocol has been largely successful in this 
respect. Quoting Kofi Annan, the UNEP Rio+20 report hails the Montreal Protocol as 
―perhaps the most successful international agreement to date.‖ This report offers 
staggering data about the overall reduction in ODSs since the Protocol was signed in 
1992. The consumption of ODSs worldwide has decreased by 93 percent since 1992. The 
area of the ozone hole peaked in 2006, according to daily NASA projections and has 
since begun to decline nearly to its previous size during the 1980s. The 2006 peak 
indicates the enormous impact of universal ratification. By 2006, all developing countries 
had phased out ODSs causing a dramatic decline in global emissions levels and an 
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apparent re-thickening of the ozone hole. The expansion of the ozone hole has halted, and 
while scientists do not expect the condition of the ozone layer to be restored to its pre-
1980 levels until 2050, parts of the ozone layer have not gotten any thinner since 1988 
and the average area of the ozone hole has decreased.
84
 The stated goals of the Protocol 
included a complete phase out of ODS emissions by 2020 and, with only HCFC phase 
outs left to go, the state parties to the Protocol are close to achieving that goal and are 
scheduled to do so within the next seven years. 
Then, with regard to internal process performance, the Montreal Protocol has 
demonstrated effectiveness through its structural mechanisms, including compliance and 
the Multilateral Fund. The text of the Protocol established certain procedures to 
investigate possible cases of non-compliance and to develop measures against states that 
do not comply. Per the procedure delineated in Article 7 of the Protocol,
85
 no non-
compliance complaints have yet been filed by other parties. In some instances, however, 
states have expressed concern over future target dates and whether or not they could meet 
certain deadlines. In 1992, several Eastern European states, including the Russian 
Federation, filed a request for assistance to the Implementation Committees out of 
concern that they would not comply with looming deadlines. The MOP took appropriate 
action by obtaining data, identifying sources of future non-compliance, and granting 
financial assistance from the Multilateral Fund for each state. They eventually did meet 
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the target phase out dates and maintained compliance.
86
 In 2001, the Meeting of the 
Parties (MOP) issued a non-compliance status to thirty Article 5 (developing) states due 
to failure to report required data. The MOP followed the standard procedure indicated by 
Article 7 and declared that the states should continue to receive assistance from the 
Multilateral Fund to help achieve future targets, but it also warned that if emissions 
targets were still not met by the negotiated deadlines, it would be compelled to issue 
standard consequences for non-compliance. Such punitive measures include removing 
monetary and developmental assistance from the institutions of the Protocol for meeting 
targets, exclusion from the MOP and the decision-making process, and loss of trade 
privileges with any state party to the Protocol.
87
  Despite occasional issues of non-
compliance, states at the MOP have not issued any of these measures to a non-complying 
state thus far. 
In addition to the internal compliance mechanisms, the Multilateral Fund has been 
instrumental in facilitating universal ratification by offering billions of dollars to 143 
Article 5 countries to help reduce emissions. The seven broad purposes of Multilateral 
Fund projects include ―(1) country program preparation, (2) institutional strengthening, 
(3) technical assistance, (4) training, (5) demonstration projects, (6) project preparation, 
and (7) investment projects.‖88 Over 80 percent of the projects funded are directed at 
investing in local businesses in order to facilitate their transitions from production using 
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ODSs to production that does not result in ODS emission.
89
 The Executive Committee 
and Secretariat of the Fund create a budget for contributions and formulate development 
plans to determine where money goes and what projects to fund.
90
 Projects are 
implemented through global development agencies, such as the UNEP and the World 
Bank. So far, there is evidence of a dramatic reduction in emissions in developing 
countries, and all 143 of those members are on track to complete phase out of ODSs by 
2015. Between 1991 and 2004, the Fund received $1.68 billion from non-Article 5 
countries from which it has been able to implement over 4,000 projects that have assisted 
developing countries with technology transfer, capacity building, training, and 
institutional strengthening. 
By using the above measures of effectiveness, this chapter determines that the 
Montreal Protocol has contributed to the global process of solving a specific issue. 
Within the ozone depletion and climate change regime, Montreal is considered incredibly 
unique because of its universal status. All recognized states in the system have ratified 
the treaty and have complied with its agreements, bringing the total number of signatories 
to 191. The Montreal Protocol has also demonstrated success on a more basic level of 
cooperation and international agreements. While faced with many obstacles such as the 
challenge of sacrificing development for environmental policy in developing countries, 
the Protocol was still able to get near universal participation with the likelihood that 
emissions of ODSs are going to phase out of developing countries by 2015.
91
 The 
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Protocol is a flexible treaty and compliance relies on a flexible structure and the 
allowance of non-negotiated adjustments run by a secretariat, implementation 
committees, and meetings of the parties, which acted as a decision-making body during 
compliance issues. This body helped mitigate conflicts and allowed treaty language to 
change without sacrificing support.
92
 
The Montreal Protocol is widely acknowledged by states as being very 
successful—so successful that some environmentalists and state officials have speculated 
on using the Montreal model to apply to other issue areas, especially climate change and 
reduction of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol, many assert, could be more effective 
if it follows the same model as the Montreal Protocol.
93
 While this argument has its 
merits, the mere fact that state officials have acknowledged the Montreal Protocol as a 
possible standard legal framework for other environmental agreements indicates that it 
was effective in achieving external output and in creating internal process mechanisms to 
solve a substantial environmental problem. 
U.S. Policy and its Impact on the Montreal Protocol’s Effectiveness 
Characterizing protection of the ozone layer as a public good is a useful paradigm 
through which to view possible theoretical models for effectiveness. If State A is a large 
producer of ODSs, and expresses intent to ratify the agreement, State B is less likely to 
ratify because it can free ride on the reduced emissions without paying any cost. 
However, if State A has power or significant trade relations with State B, their 
interdependence would allow State B a higher likelihood of ratifying in order to preserve 
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the relationship.
94
 The decision to ratify the treaty is contingent on overall power and 
economic interdependence of states with each other.
95
 The number of states ratifying the 
Montreal Protocol is crucial to its success. The more states that commit to reducing 
ODSs, the lower the levels of ODSs and the smaller the depletion of the ozone layer, and 
the presence of a hegemon like the United States would help bring the level of emissions 
down domestically and globally. 
In the case of the Montreal Protocol, there is strong evidence indicating the extent 
of U.S. involvement has been instrumental in the continual success of the Protocol. The 
U.S., according to GAO reports to Congress, was responsible for up to 50 percent of 
global consumption of ODSs, and with the near complete phase out, the U.S. has 
contributed to half of the total global reductions seen so far.
96
 Therefore, the targeted 
global emissions reductions could not have been achieved without U.S. compliance with 
agreements. The U.S. diplomatic efforts and input by industry heavily influenced other 
major emitters to sign the Protocol in 1987. Because American industrial actors had 
developed appropriate chemical substitutes for several ODSs in the early stages of the 
Protocol, those substitutes have been used in Fund projects in developing countries to 
maintain production while reducing ODS emissions and complying with treaty 
provisions. The coalition between the scientific community and U.S. diplomatic efforts 
spearheaded international scientific research on the link between production of consumer 
goods to ozone depletion. Without the scientific base, agreement would have been more 
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difficult. For example, contention emerged during negotiations between the U.S. and 
developed countries that heavily relied on ODS consumption such as Germany, Japan, 
and the U.K. Through the intense diplomatic campaign involving state officials, 
economists, and scientists alike, the U.S. delegation was able to convince European 
actors to sign on. They would not have done so without the carrot and stick approach 
used by the U.S. Keeping in mind previous theories on how environmental agreements 
could be effective, it is clear that the U.S. helped rescale the ozone negotiations to include 
all relevant epistemic communities, industry, and environmentalists in addition to 
diplomats and policymakers. Including those actors in the discussion facilitated easier 
negotiation because they provided solutions to overcoming information deficits and 
asymmetries and practical means for achieving universal compliance. 
Additionally, the U.S. has supported the Multilateral Fund by contributing the 
largest amount of any other non-Article 5 country to investment and development 
projects in developing countries. Most of the funds have gone to projects in China and 
India, again implying that those states‘ ratification of the Protocol may not have 
happened without assurance that non-Article 5 countries would commit to assisting with 
emissions reductions.
97
 For China to ratify the Montreal Protocol, its delegation insisted 
on differential treatment for developing countries with regard to mandatory emissions 
reduction. In addition to concerns over limiting modernization and production to meet 
aggressive ODS emission reduction targets, China also expressed concern over the 
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availability of substitutes and the rapid timetable for future reductions.
98
 When the state 
parties to the Protocol negotiated the London Amendment in 1991, the delegation from 
China voiced these concerns and stated that they would not ratify without the approval of 
a Multilateral Fund that would provide the $40 million estimate needed to implement the 
treaty provisions.
99
 Because the U.S. preferred China‘s ratification of the treaty and 
inclusion in the ODS reductions, the delegation was successful in creating such a Fund, 
which has since allocated a majority of its funds to China. 
What would the Montreal Protocol and efforts to achieve agreement on ozone 
regulation have looked like without U.S. involvement? First, because the U.S. produced 
over 50 percent of the world‘s ODSs, the decision to fully comply with the Protocol had 
positive effects on the state of the environment. If no controls had been imposed in the 
1980s, the ozone hole would have been reduced 15.7 percent. Five percent of that amount 
would come from American industrial production alone, meaning both that long-term 
effects would be contingent on American participation in reductions and on a global 
agreement.
100
 There are several reasons why the U.S. would not have committed to 
regulating its industry without a global agreement, one of which was a concern of 
industrial actors domestically that were spending millions of dollars to develop chemical 
substitutes for ODSs. It would have been too costly for chemical companies to produce a 
substitute if there was no global market for it. In addition, while the short-term cost-
benefit for the U.S. would have supported unilateral action, future expectations of ozone 
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depletion indicated the necessity for other emitters and producers to sign on to binding 
emissions reductions. Without U.S. leadership in the ozone depletion regime and its 
support for binding emissions reductions, there may not have been an agreement at all. 
The U.S. was responsible for organizing scientific studies, developing alternative 
chemicals, and for convincing other large developed emitters (particularly Japan and 
recovering industrial states in Europe) to agree to regulation at all. Developing countries 
signed on because of a centralized mechanism responsible for allocating funding for their 
domestic projects, and contributions by the U.S. make up a significant portion of their 
funding. Finally, U.S. law reflects the consensus made by the states party to the Protocol 
in the early stages of negotiations that bans trade of products using ODS. The threat of 
trade restrictions with the United States has even compelled Taiwan, who is not a state 
recognized by the UN and has no international legal standing to sign the Montreal 
Protocol, to fully comply with its measures to preserve trade relations with the United 
States and European Community. 
It seems that this case study follows the theoretical models of a public good 
scenario heavily influenced by the presence of a hegemon. The U.S. is a powerful state 
with a high interest in an agreement around reducing ozone-depleting materials, and 
faced with long-term environmental consequences, it was interested in a global 
agreement to reduce unilateral cost and protect human health from dangers of a 
dilapidated ozone layer. So, the U.S. was willing to incur significant costs to fund 
research into alternatives, conduct scientific study, and reduce domestic consumption of 
ODSs in order to contribute to preserving the quality of the ozone layer. As a result, other 
states were compelled to sign the agreement, recognizing it as a legitimate force, which 
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led to universal ratification and a high capacity to solve a global problem, contributing to 
both the internal and external effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol. 
V. The International Aid Transparency Initiative 
The next case study through which to explore the relationship between U.S. 
involvement and multilateral effectiveness is the International Aid Transparency 
Initiative (IATI). This case study explores the background of the aid transparency regime 
to contextualize U.S. policy preferences towards this issue. This section then briefly 
summarizes U.S. policy towards foreign aid and aid transparency, beginning with 
promises made at the 2005 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris and the 
subsequent policies relating to transparency. I evaluate the independent variable, the level 
of U.S. involvement in IATI, via measures on the Multilateral Policy Scale. I measure the 
effectiveness of IATI so far, keeping in mind the two distinct indicators introduced in 
Chapter 1. IATI is evaluated based on its output performance and how well it has 
achieved its stated goals, and on the efficacy of its internal structures and how the 
institution has been able to contribute to the broader aid transparency regime. Finally, this 
chapter employs process tracing in order to uncover any causal connection indicating that 
U.S. participation has influenced IATI‘s effectiveness or not. I conclude that only certain 
aspects of IATI‘s effectiveness result from U.S. participation, and beyond these 
components, the U.S. has not demonstrated the political will to significantly influence the 
internal structures of IATI nor has the institution been shaped by U.S. policy concerns. 
In the last decade, the global development regime has undergone a significant 
shift towards transparency and open access to international aid given by donors to 
recipients around the world. In 2005, states gathered in Paris for a High-Level Forum on 
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Aid Effectiveness issued a Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that indicated the need for 
more properly managed foreign assistance that is focused on the needs and priorities of 
recipient countries. Representatives agreed that donor countries needed to take concrete 
steps to align their aid with the recipient‘s needs and priorities to increase aid 
effectiveness and to overcome several challenges presented by the realities of high 
amounts of foreign aid. Such realities, as specified by the Declaration include weaknesses 
in developing countries‘ institutions that prevent implementation of aid strategies, lack of 
multi-year and predictable commitments by large donors, weak partnerships fostered 
between donor and recipient, and corruption as a root cause for a lack in transparency and 
therefore accountability.
101
 This Declaration laid the foundation for what would become a 
significant shift in policy norms within the global development regime towards increased 
transparency. 
Many scholars have studied the impacts and effectiveness of foreign aid and 
indicate how aid transparency can be a crucial factor in how efficiently foreign assistance 
is put to use, how well intended projects are implemented, and whether the money ends 
up where it is supposed to be.
102
 According to scholars, donors often times lack to the 
capacity to monitor the implementation of foreign aid on the ground, leading to 
accountability problems both in the recipient country and to the citizens of the donor 
country. In addition, some donors explicitly use foreign aid as a tool for geopolitical and 
security interests, instead of development. While the primary operational cost of 
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instituting transparency measures rests primarily on donors, the benefits associated with 
transparency help civil society groups, legislatures, and people on the ground in 
developing countries to hold their government more accountable.
103
 
Two types of benefits that some scholars believe arise out of greater transparency, 
and, specifically, IATI, are efficiency gains and effectiveness gains. The former category 
implies that administrative costs for donors will be reduced and aid programs will be less 
susceptible to duplication or poor planning. By publishing to a common data standard 
routinely that can be read directly into aid management systems in recipient countries, 
donors can reduce the amount of coordination and data input required for their own 
agencies and at the country-level. The latter category includes the benefits of improved 
services resulting from transparency, and higher predictability that would be 
economically advantageous. Scholars predicted that IATI signatories would experience a 
sharp decline in the amount of their aid that was captured or diverted by recipient 
governments to use for other purposes besides providing public resources for their 
people.
104
 Increased monitoring of and information about an aid flow dramatically 
reduces the ability of an agent to divert resources. Normatively, greater aid transparency 
would allow for a less misallocation of resources in developing countries as well as a 
faster turnaround for results, advancing poverty alleviation. Publication of allocation data 
would allow donor countries to have access to the plans of other donors, and could 
                                                       
103 Matthew Collin et al., The Costs and Benefits of Aid Transparency (Wells, UK: AidInfo, 2009), p. 3, 
http://www.aidinfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Costs-and-benefits-analysis.pdf.;  United Kingdom 
Department for International Development, Transparent, Accountable Aid and More Effective 
Development?, by Rosemary McGee (London, UK) p. 2, 
http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/60827_dprmcgee_preprint.pdf.; Catherine Weaver and Christian 
Peratsakis, ―Engineering Policy Norm Implementation: The World Bank‘s Transparency Transformation,‖ 
Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice (November 2012), p. 1. 
104 Collin et al., Costs and Benefits of Aid Transparency, p. 10. 
 59 
provide a forum for civil society groups to have greater leverage over the improvement of 
aid implementation.
105
 
The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was launched at the 2008 
High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana and has since gained 33 
signatories, including the United States in 2011. After the conference in Accra in 2008, 
teams of field experts and technical advisory groups met to determine the scope of IATI 
and the details of the new data standard. One of the primary objectives of the agreement 
is, intuitively, more data. The amount of data that countries have that indicate types and 
levels of aid flows in and out of their country is low. In addition, IATI must be tailored to 
recipient governments‘ mechanisms for measuring aid flows to reduce transaction costs. 
Finally, experts suggested that IATI expand its focus to include a wider range of 
information in its standard. While the ―how much‖ and ―what for‖ questions are vital to 
the idea of transparency, other factors include aid agreements, contracts, project 
implementation status, future allocations and schedules, and intended sector.
106
  The 
United States announced its support for IATI at the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development in November of 2011, signing the agreement three years after its 
conception and agreeing to develop an implementation schedule for a massive 
publication of aid spending data from U.S. agencies including primarily the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the Department of State. 
Background: the United States and Aid Transparency 
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United States foreign aid comes from twenty-four federal agencies, the three most 
influential being USAID, the MCC, and the U.S. Department of State. In addition to the 
big three, other U.S. executive and specialized agencies disburse foreign aid annually. 
Foreign aid makes up approximately one percent of the federal budget per fiscal year, and 
has served as an important tool to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives.
107
 In 2005, the 
United States, along with other OECD states, multilateral donor agencies, and 
multinational corporations, participated in discussions at the Second High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness in Paris. The outcome document, the Paris Declaration, reflected the 
130 signatories‘ commitment to enhancing aid effectiveness by creating more efficient 
implementation systems within developing countries. This initiative, donors hoped, 
would strengthen country systems and institutions to allow aid to flow through 
governments and align with the aims of national development strategies.
108
 
As the HLF-3 in Accra approached, development organizations placed more 
emphasis on finding a common reporting and data standard that would require states to be 
more transparent about their aid flows. The discussions in Paris mentioned aid 
transparency as a pillar of effectiveness, but in Accra, the UK and Denmark pushed for 
other states to seriously address transparency as a critical objective. The United States, 
while committed to aid effectiveness in Paris, still lacked various data transparency 
standards that were being contemplated by other nations. The OECD, when evaluating 
global progress towards aid transparency, observed that recording aid in partner countries 
has been more of a challenge than originally anticipated. The lack of predictability in 
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foreign aid indicated a significant need for donors to examine their domestic political 
structures in order to create a reliable reporting system for publishing future aid 
disbursements.
109
 
At HLF-3 in 2008, the United States signed another document, the Accra Agenda 
for Action, representing a continuing multilateral interest in investing to improve aid 
effectiveness. The meeting successfully included civil society organizations into the aid 
effectiveness regime, to the protest of the United States and Japan, though NGOs were 
not invited to the table for discussion until HLF-4 in Busan in 2011.
110
 IATI was a side 
event at the Accra meetings, but by the end of the forum, several states and development 
organizations signed a document agreeing to create a common and open data standard. In 
this statement, representatives from Finland, the Netherlands, UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), the World Bank, Irish Aid, Germany, the UNDP, 
Australia (and AusAID), Sida, GAVI Alliance, Hewlett Foundation, Denmark, and the 
European Union announced their intention to put significant political pressure on 
domestic agencies and aid actors to adhere to an internationally-agreed reporting standard 
that would promote transparency for present and future aid disbursements.
111
 The 
International Aid Transparency Initiative began as a result of this agreement and was 
hosted by DFID in the UK. 
At the time, the United States claimed that it could not comply with the demands 
of the International Aid Transparency Initiative and did not intend to sign the agreement. 
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The U.S. had no common reporting mechanism that coordinated among its twenty-four 
agencies, much less the capacity to standardize with the international community. 
President Bush enacted several foreign aid policies during his two administrations, and in 
several ways bolstered the amount given by the U.S.
112
 However, his administration did 
not take any measures to seriously address aid effectiveness or transparency. Many 
opponents of his foreign policy criticized his foreign aid for being tied to strategic and 
economic interests instead of development. By the time IATI was discussed, Bush was on 
his way out of office and did not seriously pursue the effort to coordinate the various 
channels through which U.S. foreign assistance flows. 
United States Involvement in the International Aid Transparency Initiative 
This section analyzes the level of U.S. support for IATI relative to the Multilateral 
Policy Scale. While the United States delegation did not initially sign the IATI 
agreement, eventually officials in the Obama Administration reconsidered its position 
and signed the agreement three years after implementation, in 2011. However, while the 
ratification variable is present in the IATI case, U.S. compliance has been poor, with very 
few U.S. agencies reporting data to the IATI standard. The United States has, however, 
provided resources and assistance by sending representatives to Technical Advisory 
Group (TAG) and Steering Committee Meetings and continues to contribute to the 
institution‘s internal processes throughout its compliance period beginning in 2011. 
Finally, the United States has diplomatically supported the IATI standard, despite its 
initial hesitance to comply. This section demonstrates that while interaction with IATI 
has largely positive due to provision of resources, ratification, and diplomatic support, the 
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inability of the U.S. to comply with its obligations is hindering the amount of influence it 
holds over the success of the institution. 
Because coordination among the several aid agencies was so poor at the time of 
the HLF-3 in Accra in 2008, the United States delegation, led by Henrietta Fore, the 
administrator at USAID and director of U.S. foreign assistance, was hesitant to sign any 
binding agreement on a common data standard. During the side meetings that eventually 
created the foundations for IATI, the United States firmly asserted that it could not 
comply with such a rigorous standard and would not agree to such lofty publication 
targets.
113
 The primary objective at HLF-3 in Accra was the advancement of the 
principles of the Paris Declaration so recipient countries could take more ownership. Fore 
emphasized the importance of country ownership and of transparency, and hoped that the 
provisions agreed-upon in Accra could be enacted in U.S. policy.
114
 While the U.S. 
delegation recognized the need for increased transparency, they were aware that they 
could not comply so they did not sign. 
However, the U.S. demonstrated support for the principles behind IATI by 
enacting several policies oriented towards transparency during the intervening years. 
When Barack Obama took office in 2009, he immediately launched the Open 
Government Initiative that aimed to make government more efficient, transparent, and 
effective. Some components of this plan included opening various data sets to the public 
along with future plans by every federal agency. Accompanying these more technical 
aspects of transparency was a new effort to reform transparency in foreign aid. In 2010, 
                                                       
113 Stephen Davenport, Interview by Kathryn Beaver, Washington DC, March 9, 2013. 
114 Portia Palmer, "Accra Action Agenda Finalized: A Realistically Ambitious Development Agenda," PR 
Newswire (Accra, Ghana), September 4, 2008, 
http://www.ganges.com/news/view/Accra_Action_Agenda_Finalized_348074/. 
 64 
President Obama was able to renew commitments to foreign aid transparency at the 
Pittsburgh G20 Leadership Summit. In that year, the U.S. began using ―Data.gov‖ to 
publish amounts of high level ODA to the ―Greenbook,‖ which supplies past and present 
information about foreign aid to Congress.
115
 In addition to reporting data to the 
Greenbook, aid agencies also had to report to the OECD/DAC, both of which use a 
different data standard. 
In order to prepare for the conference in Busan in 2011, the United States 
launched a domestic aid transparency mechanism that would demonstrate potential 
capacity for implementing IATI. The Department of State, along with USAID, launched 
the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, which became the primary reporting mechanism 
through which all aid spending coming from the United States would be reported and 
public. The Dashboard was initially unorganized and unhelpful—agencies were slow to 
meet the reporting standards, and so the whole picture of foreign aid data was incomplete. 
But despite its shortcomings, the Dashboard allowed the U.S. delegation to come to the 
table in Busan and claim that it now had the capacity to comply with IATI.
116
 In 
November of 2011, the United States signed the IATI agreement, with the intention of 
making the Dashboard the centerpiece of their compliance and public data availability. 
Moving down the Multilateral Policy Scale, the United States‘ compliance record 
with the IATI standard has so far been poor due to the number of agencies that need to 
coordinate data procedures obstructs cooperation. After the IATI signature, the Foreign 
Assistance Dashboard began coordinating implementation data from various aid 
agencies, but has only published on the three biggest ODA donors: USAID, State, and 
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MCC and does not give a comprehensive record of foreign aid. Before agencies could 
begin to alter data reporting and comply with the agreements in IATI, the Office of 
Management and Budget had to publish a set of standard guidelines for agencies to 
follow. Until this document was released, the process of implementing IATI within the 
U.S. stagnated.
117
 In November of 2012, the OMB released Bulletin No. 12-01 containing 
guidelines for IATI implementation. The U.S. aid transparency process was to follow 
these principles: ―a presumption in the favor of openness, an initial focus on the 
publication of existing data online in an open format, detail, timeliness, and quality, 
prioritization [of high value data], comprehensiveness and comparability [across 
agencies], accessibility, and institutionalization.‖118 
Under these guidelines, agencies must publish data in Excel or XML formats, 
must update their submissions on a quarterly basis, and must provide new data to 
OECD/DAC, the Greenbook, and the Dashboard once per year, and to verify their data 
according to all three data repository‘s standards. The directive gives the Department of 
State responsibility for coordinating IATI implementation throughout the U.S. 
government and for communicating for with the IATI Secretariat on behalf of the United 
States.
119
 The United States released an implementation schedule in December 2012, 
satisfying the first of two major requirements required for compliance.
120
 Publish What 
You Fund deemed the U.S. plan ―unambitious,‖ but observers from within the U.S. 
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government believe the plan to be very ambitious given the coordination challenges 
among the twenty-four agencies.
121
 
As of February 2013, some United States agencies have published data according 
to the IATI standard. While the United States has signed the IATI agreement, produced 
executive and budgetary resolutions to implement the data requirements, and is currently 
considering foreign assistance legislation that would enforce the IATI standard through 
domestic law
122
, the U.S. has had a difficult time fully complying. Only State, MCC, and 
USAID have made significant progress on reformatting data systems, information 
management systems, and reporting techniques to adhere to the IATI standard. Other 
agencies have not made any significant process in streamlining their data reporting 
systems.
123
 Currently, out of five major U.S. donors, only an average of 34 percent of all 
ODA is published according to aid transparency standards. Agencies are just beginning to 
make a shift towards publishing according to the IATI standard, but are far behind their 
target dates. The MCC currently ranks ninth out of 72 donors for transparency and 
currently publishes 70 percent of all aid spending data, and has been the most successful 
of all U.S. agencies to implement the IATI standard.
124
 USAID is the second-best U.S. 
agency in its compliance record, having published 50 percent of all ODA data in 2012. 
USAID has yet to make its information management system compatible with IATI data 
and hopes to do so by 2014.
125
 The State Department, Department of Defense (DOD), 
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and Department of the Treasury are further below USAID and MCC, and are ranked 
forty-sixth, fifty-sixth, and thirty-fourth respectively. Compared to Publish What You 
Fund‘s first ranked agency, Department For International Development (UK-DFID), 
which has been deemed ―compliant‖ with the IATI standard, U.S. agencies are lagging 
significantly. MCC, USAID, and State hope to publish all of the required data by the end 
of 2013 through the Foreign Assistance Dashboard. Overall, however, U.S. agencies have 
sluggishly begun changing data standards to better comply with the IATI provisions. 
Despite a below-average compliance record, the United States provided technical 
support and resources to the IATI institution. The U.S. demonstrates its involvement 
through a few agencies‘ compliance with the IATI standards and through U.S. 
involvement in the various structural meetings that comprise the IATI institution, such as 
the Steering Committee, Secretariat, and Technical Advisory Groups. When Technical 
Advisory Groups convened to determine costs, benefits, and implications of the IATI 
data standard, the United States, along with several US-based think tanks and 
organizations, participated in the discussions.
126
 
Beginning in 2009, a representative from USAID attended the meetings, primarily 
focused on how to structure a standard that would be the most efficient for ultimate aid 
transparency goals. The discussions centered on the definitions, wording, and 
implementation challenges of many categories related to foreign aid and whether or not 
online databases or donor systems should be altered to accommodate the changes. The 
United States represented the interests of the world‘s largest donor, and was able to 
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weigh in on these key issues.
127
 USAID sent a representative to the October meeting in 
2010 that aimed to recommend aid management information systems to increase the 
efficacy through which agencies can standardize and report information, instead of 
relying on manual entry, as well as increasing dialogue in partner countries to raise 
awareness and learning scenarios for the standard to be the most effective.
128
 Until 2011, 
the U.S. did not formally participate in Steering Committee decisions as a signatory, but 
did contribute to decision-making processes after Busan. When the U.S. became a 
signatory of IATI, it had a representative on the Steering Committee and was able to 
participate in significant governance decisions within the institution. One of the most 
recent of these decisions was the debate over the selection of new hosts to the IATI 
standard after DFID announced it would end its tenure. The United States government 
representatives favored a hosting arrangement through OECD and its established DAC. 
Although, the MCC expressed its support for the alternative consortium arrangement 
through which various states and organizations would host IATI jointly. The Steering 
Committee chose the latter option, despite the preference of the United States.
129
 
Moving down the Multilateral Policy Scale, the U.S. supplied diplomatic support 
to IATI during the beginning years of its creation. The background section to this case 
study emphasized the immense diplomatic support that the Bush Administration offered 
the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action as positive forces for aid 
effectiveness in the coming years. However, the IATI agreement was not at the forefront 
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of U.S. political interests at that time, and there were few instances of U.S. officials 
speaking publically about the agreement. In a few statements after the 2008 Forum in 
Accra, some U.S. officials began emphasizing new measures of transparency that the new 
administration could continue in order to make financial activities of foreign assistance 
programs more transparent. Under Secretary for Management at the State Department, 
Patrick Kennedy, explained in an interview in 2008 the importance of coordinating 
among U.S. agencies offering ODA to increase transparency and accountability: 
We‘re working with our partners at AID as we‘re already working with our 
partners in Defense, and the Department of Justice, and the Department of 
Homeland Security to pull our operating environment together, to streamline it and 
make sure that we can achieve the greatest economies of scale. 
130
   
 
Despite not signing the IATI agreement, the U.S. delegation expressed support for the 
idea of a common standard and continued to attend technical advisory meetings among 
the signatories. During the first few years of the Obama Administration, several U.S. 
officials publically promoted the ideals of transparency in all government operations, not 
just foreign aid. ―My administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of 
openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a 
system of transparency, public participation and collaboration,‖ Barack Obama promised 
in his first inaugural address.
131
 His Open Government Initiative established directives 
and procedures for federal agencies to disclose various levels of information. While the 
Obama Administration‘s public and vocal support for transparency did not directly relate 
to IATI, several of those principles illuminated a path towards instruments such as 
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Data.Gov, the Dashboard, and eventually to the commitment to the IATI requirements. 
The ultimate gesture of diplomatic support was Hillary Clinton‘s speech at HLF-4 in 
Busan, when she declared the United States‘ commitment to aid transparency and 
intention on signing the IATI agreement. She opened the Forum in her keynote speech, 
declaring U.S. support for aid transparency and for the IATI Standard. 
And finally, I want to say a word about coordinating our efforts. This has been a 
topic of development conferences for so long that it is a cliché, but it is also still a 
problem. Many donors, like ourselves, have multiple agencies that engage in 
development. The United States Government alone has more than 15. And all too 
often, we require different measures of success, so it is easy to see how our good 
intentions can create frustrating burdens for our partners… I‘m pleased to 
announce that the United States will join the International Aid Transparency 
Initiative, and we will report data in a timely, easy-to-use format.
132
 
 
After the U.S. signed on, various U.S. aid agencies publically declared support for the 
agreement. In his remarks in Busan, the CEO of the MCC expressed, ―On behalf of the 
United States Government, I would like to express our strong support for inclusive, 
country-led, results-centered development. To maximize development effectiveness for 
the world‘s poor, the U.S. Government is committed to results in practice, not just in 
principle…demonstrated through U.S. IATI declaration.‖133 Rajiv Shah, stated in a Press 
Release, ―…The United States signed on to the International Aid Transparency Initiative. 
USAID‘s Evaluation Policy was widely heralded as the gold standard for measuring 
results on the ground, and MCC for their efforts on transparency… In the spirit of 
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accountability for results, we encourage all stakeholders to monitor adherence by all 
parties to the principles agreed in Busan…‖134 
The visual representations below capture the general evolution of U.S. policy 
towards IATI from 2008 to the present. 
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Therefore, U.S. diplomatic support before 2011 generally referred to the general 
emerging norms of global aid transparency and effectiveness, and revolved around 
various U.S.-initiated domestic policies that emphasize transparency and accountability 
principles. After the U.S. signed IATI, more directed positive diplomatic statements 
emerged as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, USAID Administrator, and MCC CEO 
publically declared U.S. commitment to the IATI standard. 
The Effectiveness of the International Aid Transparency Initiative 
Given the relatively brief period of time through IATI has been in force, 
evaluating effectiveness must be considered in light of significant time constraints and 
limitations. IATI went into effect in 2008, and while it has had five years through which 
to formulate, the process of coordinating domestic foreign aid reporting systems is slow 
and complicated, particularly in the case of the United States. I measure ‗effectiveness‘ 
based on the same principles in the other case studies, originated by the suggested 
methodologies from Gutner and Thompson and from Thomas Bernauer. 
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I first measure IATI based on its outcome performance, or how well it has 
achieved its stated goals so far. The key indicators for this measure are how many of the 
signatories have submitted implementation timelines and how much data have been 
published in the appropriate format. I then apply the second portion of the measure of 
effectiveness to this case by analyzing internal processes and structures in the IATI 
institution and how well the organization is contributing to the general aid transparency 
regime. The key indicators for this measure are the ability of the internal bodies, such as 
the Steering Committee, Secretariat, and TAG groups to overcome coordination problems 
between states in order to determine if the implementation of IATI is proceeding as 
efficiently as it could be. Through this indicator, I determine the extent to which IATI is 
contributing to solving the global problem and if the institution is sustainable for future 
activity. 
The first core output required to meet the compliance threshold for the 
International Aid Transparency Initiative is to publish an Implementation Schedule 
regarding when and where past, present, and future data will be published to the IATI 
registry and made public. Out of 35 signatories, 27 participants have published 
implementation schedules. Eight participants have not yet met this requirement, and they 
include GAVI, Global Fund, the International Labor Organization, OCHA, UNDCF, UN 
Women, and UN World Food Program. The World Bank has not updated its 
implementation schedule since May of 2011, and is behind-schedule for this particular 
output.
135
 With regard to this first output requirement, most signatories have been up to 
date with their implementation schedules. However, the IATI agreement expects these 
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schedules to be ambitious and implemented swiftly. Publish What You Fund, via their aid 
transparency tracking mechanism, scores the ambitiousness of donors‘ implementation 
plans through two criteria, the first being the stated intention to publish according to the 
IATI Standard, and the second promising to publish a public and regular data through 
open license and quarterly publication. Out of the 42 donors analyzed (some are not 
signatories to IATI, but many are), only fourteen are considered ―ambitious‖ by this 
methodology. Ten are considered ―Moderately Ambitious,‖ while six are deemed 
―unambitious.‖ Among these six bottom organizations are IATI signatories Australia, 
Germany, UNFPA, and the United States.
136
 A March 2013 evaluation of existing 
implementation plans indicates that donors need to be more ambitious in their aid 
transparency targets and consider publishing in fields that add value to the standards, 
such as the results of an activity.
137
 
The second core output to the IATI standard is the regular publication of foreign 
assistance data to the registry. According to various implementation schedules, no field of 
data has 100 percent publication. The field with the highest publication is ―Activity- 
Recipient Country,‖ meaning 72 percent of implementation schedules indicate a plan to 
publish the recipient country of a particular activity regularly and publically.
138
 Other 
fields are not as well represented and do indicate that the low levels of ambition of the 
implementation schedules have aversely affected the actual publication of data. 
Publish What You Fund first assessed donors‘ aid transparency records in 2010 
and their evaluations first discovered significant limitations in determining levels of 
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donor transparency. Data was not consistent or compatible, indicating significant room 
for improvement in IATI. The data itself showed a wide range of compliance among 
donors, with only three exceeding 70 percent of their foreign assistance data published.
139
 
Only the World Bank, the Netherlands, and the UK were able to exceed the 70 percent 
threshold in 2010. Many of the donors had not published to the IATI registry and in 2010, 
many donors neglected many fields at the organization and activity levels. The evaluation 
suggested that the IATI standard improve its compatibility with existing donor and 
recipient standards. In 2011, the general trends of aid transparency had improved, with 
more signatories signing onto IATI. Several donors improved in the amount of data 
published, but the 2011 evaluation indicated significant room for improvement in aid 
transparency. The overall average for donors was only 34 percent of data published, with 
only a handful above 50 percent. However, the performance of many of the top donors 
indicate that in 2011, greater aid transparency was possible and the common IATI 
standard had great potential for increasing the accessibility and availability of ODA data 
globally. Publish What You Fund observed in their 2011 pilot assessment 
For example, since the beginning of 2011, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK 
and the World Bank have published considerably more information about 
their aid activities. In particular, the Netherlands demonstrated how rapidly 
progress is possible (perhaps providing an example for donors using the 
extended CRS format integrated within their systems) as it was lifted up the 
ranking from joint 30th to 4th place through a major release of new data to 
the IATI Registry…140 
 
Therefore, the change in ranking for some donors indicates the forward momentum 
associated with a common data standard and the increasing norm for aid transparency. In 
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2012, aid transparency improved yet again, with DFID publishing over 90 percent of all 
ODA, and the World Bank close behind at 88 percent.
141
 Several organizations, including 
international NGOs, have agreed to publish their data to the IATI standard, but many 
have not yet produced any data sets for the IATI registry.
142
 It is clear from assessing the 
second core output component of IATI by determining how much ODA has been 
published to the IATI Registry and how trends in aid transparency have demonstrated the 
progress, there is still a long way to go for IATI to be a completely effective treaty. 
However, given the improvement since initial 2010 assessments, there is a probability 
that transparency will improve even more come the end of 2013 when many publication 
deadlines expire for donors. Many of the donors have successfully published 
implementation schedules and many have started to put data into the IATI Registry, but 
given that the global average of published ODA remains at a low 34 percent, there is 
significant room for improvement in donors‘ compliance with the IATI standard. 
The final indicator of effectiveness with which to judge IATI is the effectiveness 
of the internal structure of the institution and how that institution is contributing to the aid 
transparency regime. IATI is internally comprised of three institutional bodies, the 
Secretariat, the Steering Committee, and the Technical Advisory Group and its 
Secretariat. The Steering Committee and the TAG is comprised of all signatories and 
participating members of IATI, meaning that several organizations can participate in the 
implementation decisions of the standard without actually committing to publishing any 
data in a timely fashion. This is a significant organizational hindrance because even if 
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states or organizations do not commit to fulfilling the treaty obligations, they still have a 
seat at the table and are still able to offer input into the structural processes. This takes 
away a major incentive for compliance and participation seen in most international 
organizations. On the other hand, IATI is successful in involving a wide variety of 
stakeholders in the foreign aid regime and is accepting of input from donors, partner 
countries, NGOs, and multilateral institutions. By adhering to input from this wide 
variety of actors, IATI can create the most comprehensive and effective reporting 
standard that would achieve the best results. So, while the openness of the internal IATI 
structure could de-incentivize compliance, it also manages to incorporate a wider variety 
of viewpoints, ultimately making the standard better. 
However, regarding states‘ compliance with the standard the internal structure of 
IATI is generally weak, and instead of amassing power in the organization itself, the 
IATI institution delegates power to the member states for implementation, which leads to 
a weak monitoring and enforcement mechanism. In order to scrutinize enforcement and 
progress, the IATI implementation structure relies on existing mechanisms in OECD and 
in donor self-reporting.
143
 Whether or not a state complies with its IATI agreements rests 
highly on the political capital of aid transparency and the domestic policies and costs to 
following through on implementation schedules on time. If those domestic elements do 
not exist in an IATI signatory, a state could still get away with non-compliance and 
would not have to forfeit involvement in the initiative. For example, the several United 
States agencies have not seriously started reforming data reporting standards to comply 
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with IATI and many from within the USG believe that timely compliance from all aid 
agencies, even the biggest agencies such as State and USAID, is highly unlikely.
144
 
Despite the downsides to pursuing a true multi-stakeholder approach, the IATI standard‘s 
goals nicely complement the existing frameworks for international aid transparency. The 
standard requires a complete picture of all activities and projects from the beginning 
stages to the implementation of a project. It requires data to be produced in a timely 
manner to better coordinate between the needs of recipient countries and donors, as well 
as to improve the predictability of aid. Other ODA reporting standards do not have all of 
these elements in a single record. IATI will overcome some of the obstacles of keeping 
aid transparent by creating an efficient and streamlined standard for foreign assistance 
data. The more states that sign onto the IATI agreement, the better the standard can serve 
all stakeholders in the process. So, while IATI has yet to really achieve substantial 
success in reporting of foreign aid and suffers from a weak compliance mechanism, its 
multi-stakeholder approach has developed a very detailed standard that will eventually 
achieve meaningful transparency results. 
The Effect of U.S. Involvement on the Effectiveness of IATI 
In order to examine the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables in this case, this section uses process tracing to determine how U.S. 
involvement in IATI impacted its effectiveness so far. Through these methods, I will be 
able to determine if the U.S. has been a necessary factor for IATI‘s success and the 
potential components of IATI‘s effectiveness that are vulnerable to U.S. influence. First, 
there is a strong indication that the U.S. decision to ratify IATI has the potential to make 
the standard more effective because of the increase in the total reported aid spending data 
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that will be a part of the IATI standard. Some observers hope that the U.S. endorsement 
will carry a level of legitimacy that could influence other donors to be more transparent 
about their foreign aid. However, it is too early to tell if this is the case, and no evidence 
of this phenomenon exists. 
I also determine that the United States is unlikely to significantly influence the 
internal decision-making bodies of IATI because of its struggles with non-compliance, its 
reluctance to sign the treaty, and the presence of other more influential actors. This 
section ultimately concludes that in the areas of pure output performance, the United 
States can have a large amount of positive influence if it follows through on treaty 
commitments. However, regarding the internal process performance component of the 
effectiveness measure, the U.S. has little influence on the outcomes of the IATI structure. 
The United States‘ signature to IATI, despite being three years delayed, has 
marked a significant milestone for the initiative. The U.S. is one of the largest foreign aid 
donors and accounts for around 60 percent of total ODA. Therefore, if the U.S. complies, 
the total amount of data published according to the IATI standard will increase 
significantly. This is a crucial component of output effectiveness, because it will allow a 
large increase in foreign aid transparency regarding U.S. aid flows. This area of IATI‘s 
effectiveness has been most vulnerable to U.S. influence. So far the United States has 
posted over 400 datasets to the IATI Registry, and despite a low relative percentage to the 
amount left to publish, it still publishes the most out of all other donors. But only one 
U.S. agency, the MCC, has faithfully altered aid management systems to easily input data 
into the IATI format, while others have not had as much success. It is unlikely that the 
remaining U.S. governments will comply with their requirements on time, which would 
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significantly hinder IATI‘s output effectiveness, because without the U.S. data, the IATI 
Registry would be missing a significant portion of aid spending data from one of the 
world‘s largest donors. 
However, the other measures of effectiveness are much less vulnerable to U.S. 
influence. Even though the United States has been sending representatives to TAG 
meetings and Steering Committee meetings, there has been little evidence of the internal 
mechanisms yielding to U.S. preferences. For example, regarding the future hosting 
arrangements for IATI that occurred in November of 2012, the United States preferred 
for the hosting duties to fall with the OECD.
145
 The U.S. already reports data to the 
OECD/DAC standard and supported a more state-controlled entity hosting IATI. But, the 
Steering Committee decided instead to pass the hosting position on to a consortium of 
actors: the UNDP, Sweden, Ghana, Development Initiatives, and the UNOPS. This could 
indicate the Steering Committee‘s unwillingness to bend to U.S. preferences, due either 
to the United States‘ delayed signature or to the poor U.S. compliance record. 
Additionally, there is little political will for U.S. agencies to implement significant data 
standards, and almost no enforcement from the executive or legislative branches. 
Implementing new data standards and switching to more efficient and coordinated 
information managements systems are costly and slow undertakings and there is currently 
no political pressure within the U.S. to adhere to the IATI requirements. Because of this, 
the United States has a poor record on transparency, and while the endorsement of IATI 
could boost its output effectiveness, the U.S. is not powerful enough in this issue area to 
heavily influence the decisions made internally. 
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Finally, while many observers of the aid transparency schemes hoped that the US. 
endorsement would boost IATI‘s legitimacy in the eyes of other major donors, there has 
not been a significant push by other states to join the Initiative since November of 2011. 
Belgium is the most recent government signatory, and the only state that signed after the 
U.S. There is no evidence to suggest that Belgium‘s decision to sign IATI was based on 
the U.S. endorsement. Belgium had enthusiastically supported IATI in Busan, but was 
prevented from joining due to domestic political concerns and problems with their policy 
coherence for development.
146
 Therefore, there is currently no indication of states altering 
aid policies in order to sign IATI due to U.S. participation. This renders many scholars‘ 
assumptions of U.S. legitimacy and power unfounded, because not only has the U.S. not 
sparked any additional interest or participation from other states, it also has not been 
afforded significance within the organization. I argue this is due to the presence of the 
non-compliance variable. Because the U.S. has not demonstrated the capacity to comply 
with IATI to the extent of other signatories, it does not enhance the output effectiveness 
nor does it dominate internal process performance of IATI. 
VI. The International Criminal Court 
The third case study used to explore causality between U.S. policy and 
international organization effectiveness is the International Criminal Court (ICC), an 
organization that has generated significant controversy within the United States. This 
chapter first explores the trajectory of international criminal justice to contextualize both 
the creation of the ICC as a permanent world court as well as U.S. preferences towards 
such multilateral endeavors. Then, this chapter briefly reviews the primary U.S. 
                                                       
146 ―Belgium,‖ Concord Europe, Aid Watch, http://aidwatch.concordeurope.org/countries/project/belgium/ 
 83 
objections to the Rome Statute that led to initial hostility from U.S. officials from 2001 to 
2006. Then, the involvement of the U.S. in the ICC is fully explored relative to the 
variables on the policy scale. The ICC is then evaluated on its effectiveness through 
measures of both output effectiveness and internal performance which will determine its 
success so far in achieving its goals and the extent to which it has contributed to 
international legal efforts to end impunity. Finally, the two variables are examined to 
determine if U.S. policy affected the ICC‘s effectiveness and what those conclusions 
illuminate about the U.S. as an indispensible power. 
Background: The United States and the International Criminal Court 
Liberal insitutionalist scholars as well as many western democratic leaders have 
historically advocated for a permanent court with an international jurisdiction to hold 
individuals accountable for offenses such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes of aggression. After the turmoil in Rwanda and Yugoslavia during 
the 1990s, the United Nations Security Council created two regional ad hoc tribunals, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), to cover the crimes committed in those regions and to 
bring individuals to justice. While the two courts operated under the mandate of 
individual accountability and reconciliation, many critics and victims have expressed 
dismay at the number of successful apprehensions and indictments of war criminals. 
Several states in the United Nations, understanding this criticism and recognizing that 
possible mass genocide incidents could occur in the future, felt called to establish a 
substantial, permanent legal body to adjudicate conflicts on the basis of individual 
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responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.
147
 The idea of a 
world court sparked opposition in some scholarly and political circles. The principle of 
sovereignty and ―the sanctity of internal affairs‖ created obstacles to supporters of global 
and compulsory jurisdiction.
148
 Legal scholars feared such a court would impede on 
states‘ sovereignty by disregarding domestic legal processes and systems. After 
multilateral response efforts stalled in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 
humanitarian intervention, a popular and contentious topic in international affairs, came 
under intense scrutiny as scholars and policy makers struggled to identify how to prevent 
and address crimes of such magnitude. 
During the Clinton Administration, the United States publically supported the 
existence of a permanent world court, and became a significant actor in initial 
negotiations to consider establishing such an institution. Members of a negotiation team 
from the United States worked closely with the International Law Commission (ILC) 
Task Force to develop an institution that would allow for a more efficient forum for 
addressing serious crimes that would reduce the costs of constant vigilance and action 
during an international humanitarian crisis.
149
 Despite having moderate success in the 
initial planning stages, the final outcome of the negotiations, the Rome Statute creating 
the International Criminal Court, did not meet several U.S. objectives.  Many military 
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leaders, as well as leadership in Congress, communicated with the White House and the 
State Department to express their concern with the possibility that an international court 
could hold jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel with little to no oversight by the 
United Nations or without clear definitions of many of the key crimes, notably genocide 
and war crimes. During the final negotiation sessions in Rome in 1998, the U.S. 
delegation signed the treaty in order to be an original signatory party, but left with major 
objections to the Rome Statute.
150
 
While the ICC enjoyed support from President Clinton, George W. Bush 
immediately rejected U.S. ratification by supporting legislation in Congress limiting 
American officials‘ interaction with the ICC. In May 2002, the Bush Administration 
announced that it had no intention of forwarding the Rome Statute for Advice and 
Consent to Ratification and wished abolished any legal obligations attributed to its 
signature. The letter to the U.N. Secretary General requested that the status depository list 
of signatories to the Rome Statute reflect that the U.S. does not consider itself legally 
bound to provisions of the treaty.
151
 This unprecedented and conspicuous ―unsigning‖ 
allowed for the document to enter into force in 2002 without U.S. signature, cooperation, 
or promise of future ratification. The final treaty contains two fundamental cornerstones 
that comprise the ICC‘s mandate. The first is one of individual accountability for crimes 
in order to end impunity for individuals responsible for committing them. The second 
principle is one of complementarity, which qualifies the level of jurisdiction within which 
the ICC can act. The Court can only try crimes if it deems domestic courts unable or 
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unwilling to prosecute according to due process. This principle allows for the retention of 
state sovereignty and retains a focus on strengthening the rule of law inside troublesome 
states. The Court has since issued arrest warrants and indictments for war criminals in 
eight situations that are within its jurisdiction. 
In the following section, I detail U.S. involvement in the treaty negotiations and 
with the ICC since the Rome Statute was negotiated in 1997. Opponents of the ICC 
within the U.S. government have legally excluded the U.S. from formally participating in 
the Court‘s functions and initially treated the ICC with intense hostility. There are two 
parallel concepts that fully encompass U.S. objections to the Court: legal or structural and 
political or substantive.
152
 Structurally, the main objection of U.S. representatives was 
Article 12 of the Rome Statute that allowed the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over 
nationals of non-states parties if one of the four key crimes was committed in the territory 
of a state party.
153
 Opponents of the Court held a substantial concern that U.S. nationals 
on peacekeeping missions or other endeavors abroad would be vulnerable to prosecution 
by the ICC, even though the U.S. did not sign the treaty or consent to the use of the ICC 
in adjudicating international crimes.
154
  To U.S. officials present at the Rome Conference 
and in Washington, this jurisdiction far overreaches the norm of international law by 
disregarding states‘ legal procedures.155 During the discussions over how to characterize 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, the U.S. delegation consistently rejected the concept of 
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universal jurisdiction, which would give the Court the ability to initiate legal proceedings 
against an individual regardless of their location or nationality. However, the ICC does 
not operate under universal jurisdictional principles, but rather under complementarity, 
which disqualifies many objections to the Rome Statute by U.S. observers. Many critics 
then retort that complementarity is too subjective in nature because the ICC would be the 
actor that determines whether or not a state is willing or able. The Office of the 
Prosecutor conducts complementarity assessments by investigating domestic legal 
structures and processes.  Judges in the Pre-Trial Chamber then determine if the evidence 
amassed by the Prosecutor renders the trial admissible. If the state-level proceedings are 
deemed effective and authorized by the Prosecutor, then the Court has no legal grounds 
to try the same individuals.
156
 While supporters of the ICC within the United States argue 
that the complementarity principle prevents universal jurisdiction and would effectively 
protect American citizens against ICC prosecution, opponents of the Court (and the U.S. 
treaty delegation) maintained concern over the Rome Statute‘s threat to sovereignty.157 
The U.S. delegation also had concerns about the Court‘s jurisdiction in an infraction of 
international law that could occur on American soil. Many members of Congress have 
asserted that the Court‘s presence in a criminal investigation occurring within the United 
States‘ borders would contradict the U.S. Constitution, an unacceptable condition of any 
criminal court.
158
 Many opponents of the Court in the State Department and the White 
House were so concerned about the idea of U.S. citizens‘ vulnerability, they initiated 
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bilateral non-surrender treaties, known as ―Article 98 Agreements,‖ that would prevent 
U.S. extradition to the ICC from any state engaged in an agreement with the U.S.    
 Another major legal objection held by U.S. critics stems from the perceived lack 
of oversight of the ICC Prosecutor. As per Article 15, prosecutors are allowed to refer a 
case proprio moto, and without the consent of a larger body (i.e. the Security Council or 
ICC judges).
159
 The role of the Prosecutor feeds into critics‘ more general worry over 
accountability. According to the statute, the ICC has complete autonomy from the United 
Nations and, in effect, from the Security Council. While the Council can refer cases and 
initiate investigations, they cannot prevent an investigation from occurring, particularly if 
the situation moves through one of the other approved channels for bringing a case to 
trial, including the prosecutor, which incites U.S. fears of vulnerability.
160
 
Politically, the objections also come from the perceived American role on the 
global stage. At the time of the conference, U.S. officials contended that because the 
United States was the world‘s strongest power, it often found itself in unique diplomatic 
and military situations around the globe. This status, according to some authors, requires 
―special interests and protections‖ for soldiers and peacekeepers abroad that may be 
vulnerable to ICC prosecution. Such protections are not included in the Rome Statute.
161 
John Bolton, a strong opponent to the Court and Under Secretary of State to President 
Bush, criticized the Rome Statute for being not only ambivalent with its definition of 
genocide, but also contradictory to what the U.S. agreed to at the Genocide Convention 
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of 1948.
162
 The definitions offered for war crimes and crimes against humanity are, 
according to Bolton, even more ambiguous, although other state officials do not share 
that view. Bolton viewed the ambiguities about what does and does not constitute a war 
crime could have drastic consequences for policy makers in the U.S. who are not party to 
the treaty, and may therefore unintentionally commit a violation of international law 
while protecting U.S. interests abroad.
163
 The fear of U.S. personnel vulnerability reflects 
a consensus among court opponents: that the unique situations of the U.S. military and 
peacekeeping troops are not adequately protected jurisdictionally from a court and from 
prosecutors who are not held accountable by a governing body. 
However, as a member of the UN Security Council, the U.S. does have a narrow 
avenue through which it can interact with the Court, and it has demonstrated significant 
variation on the independent variable. This section determines that while the U.S. is not a 
signatory to the treaty, American diplomats and representatives on the Security Council 
during the Bush‘s second term and during Obama‘s administration shifted away from the 
hostile and obstructionist attitude and instead now chooses to publically support the 
actions of the ICC through diplomatic channels, and in some situations, through Security 
Council Resolution. 
Structurally, this is what emerged from the Rome Statute: the ICC consists of 
seven offices that oversee and run all administrative, legal, and judicial aspects of its 
functions. The ICC is funded through contributions by state parties, but can receive 
financial assistance from the UN budget if a case is referred by the UNSC and obtains 
                                                       
162 Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the ICC, p. 170 
163 Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the ICC, p. 170 
 90 
approval by the General Assembly.
164
 The United States approved this measure, 
believing that members of the UN who would not be states party to the Rome Statute 
should not be obligated to finance it.
165
 The Presidency consists of three judges, elected 
by their fellow members of the bench who oversee all other divisions—excepting the 
Office of the Prosecutor—and any administrative tasks facing the Court, such as the 
Office of the Registry, the Office of Counsel for Victims, the Counsel for Defense, and 
the Trust Fund for Victims‘ Families. The United States played a large role in the process 
of including defense counsel into the structure of the Court, and its inclusion adhered to 
the American standard of due process. The Office of the Prosecutor is independent of the 
Presidency‘s authority and is headed by the Prosecutor of the ICC. This office is 
responsible for gathering evidence and making substantive claims for the Court‘s 
consideration. The lack of oversight of the Prosecutor was a main objection of the U.S. 
delegation, and contributed to the ultimate concern very about the degree of 
independence held by the Prosecutor‘s office and the degree of autonomy held by the 
Court itself. This fundamental lack of oversight, as well as Article 12 of the treaty, leaves 
U.S. nationals exposed to prosecution by the ICC even though their government has not 
signed. 
Identifying the Level of U.S. Involvement 
In order to test the effects of U.S. policy on the effectiveness of the ICC, this 
section identifies the level of involvement as the independent variable. The Multilateral 
Policy Scale ranges from ratification to obstruction, indicated by efforts to pursue 
alternative means of international justice. Since negotiations for the ICC began in the 
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1990s during the Clinton Administration, the level of U.S. support has varied over time. 
This variable has changed and adapted along with the urgency of global events and with 
the varying foreign policy objectives over three presidential administrations. This section 
explores the scope of the cases that have faced the ICC since 2002 and will use the range 
of policy options in order to capture the general trend of U.S. support for the institution. 
In addition, this chapter samples various significant cases in the ICC‘s docket that best 
represent the level of U.S. involvement in the organization‘s activity. 
While it is unlikely that the U.S. will ever ratify the Rome Statute, the U.S. has 
demonstrated capacity and willingness to comply and cooperate informally. The first 
forum through which the U.S. can engage with the ICC is through the UN Security 
Council. Out of the seven situations facing the Court, the United Nations Security 
Council has referred the situations in the Darfur region of Sudan and in Libya to the ICC 
Prosecutor for consideration. So far, the UNSC has not discussed or referred any other 
situation to the ICC, and the U.S. has therefore had two opportunities to support or 
obstruct an investigation. These referrals must constitute a unanimous resolution from the 
UNSC and compels the Office of the Prosecutor to begin an investigation in those 
regions. In 2005, the United States conspicuously abstained from the referral in the 
Darfur case.
166
 This allowed the measure to pass through the UNSC and effectively 
opened an investigation into the atrocities occurring in Darfur. Many scholars have 
speculated that the unwillingness for the U.S. to vote against ICC involvement in Darfur 
was an indication of its improving support.
167
 The Bush Administration made clear that 
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the option of not using its veto power in the Security Council did not indicate a change in 
the administration‘s attitudes over the ICC, but it did represent a shift in attitude towards 
the Court along with willingness to recognize its influence in an unstable region.
168
 
The other referral came as a response to Colonel Qaddafi and his government‘s 
transgressions against the Libyan protestors in 2011 and did gain an affirmative vote 
from the U.S. delegation in the UNSC.
169
 While this certainly represents the Obama 
administration‘s stated goals to further cooperate with the ICC, there has been little 
conscious effort to ratify or amend the Rome Statute, which would permit consistent and 
full U.S. involvement and indicate full support. Indeed, the situation in Libya indicates a 
warming attitude towards the ICC by the Obama administration. The five other cases 
being assessed by the International Criminal Court to date have resulted from either state 
referrals (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Central African Republic) 
or from independent referral by the Office of the Prosecutor and subsequent approval by 
ICC judges (Kenya and Cote d‘Ivoire).170 Therefore, the space for the U.S. to get 
involved in referring a case to the ICC jurisdiction is limited. The U.S. has not shown any 
inclination for signing the treaty and has had a limited role in recommending its 
involvement in situations. 
Additionally, the U.S. has been able to informally comply with the ICC by 
attending the meetings of the parties to the Rome Statute as observing members. The 
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states party to the Rome Statute have met eleven times since 2002, and in 2009, the 
United States began participating as an observatory member, indicating a growing 
willingness to engage with the Court‘s functions. In an address, U.S. Ambassador-at-
Large of War Crimes Stephen Rapp expressed the desire to continue a growing 
partnership between the U.S. and the Court and to further norms of impunity into the 
future. However, despite the willingness to improve the partnership and to open new 
avenues of cooperation, the U.S. has not been reconsidering its legal stance towards the 
Rome Statute.
171
 Despite lobbyist groups, academics, and influence from liberal 
politicians, the U.S. has not drastically reconsidered its refusal to ratify the Rome Statute. 
The United States, under current domestic law, is not permitted to directly aid the ICC in 
its investigations or to provide funding or intelligence to the Office of the Prosecutor. In 
response to the divergence of the final treaty text from provisions initially approved by 
the U.S. delegations, U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) introduced a law in the U.S. 
Senate that expressly prohibited U.S. officials from cooperating with the ICC. The 
American Service-Members‘ Protection Act was designed to ―protect United States 
military personnel and other elected and appointed officials of the United States 
government against criminal prosecution by an international criminal court to which the 
United States is not a party.‖172 The law was part of an appropriations bill in 2002 and 
was approved 397-32 in the House and 92-7 in the Senate.
173
 President George W. Bush 
signed the bill into law in 2002. Despite statements from the Bush Administration from 
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2005-2008 stating that the U.S. would cooperate with the Prosecutor if asked, the ICC 
emphasized that it had no intention of asking for U.S. assistance in cases.
174
 
When President Obama‘s Administration began, however, more concrete action 
occurred that would allow a new level of cooperation between the U.S. and the ICC. The 
Obama Administration has allocated resources to capacity building in national courts to 
ensure justice while constantly encouraging state involvement with ICC prosecutions. In 
the 2010 National Security Strategy Report, President Obama emphasized U.S. 
commitment to impunity and to assisting ICC cases as consistent with U.S. law. While 
some resources and intelligence have been allocated to some situations where genocide, 
crimes against humanity, or war crimes has been taking place, it was never in direct 
cooperation with the ICC.
175
 Overall, the value of this variable is weak and any U.S. 
support that the ICC receives is purely rhetorical and diplomatic. 
There has been strong evidence that in recent years, the United States has offered 
diplomatic support to some investigations facing the Court.  This variable, too, has 
undergone significant evolution since 2002 and is the most dynamic component of this 
study. In 2002, when the U.S. disengaged from the Rome Statute, rhetoric from U.S. 
officials was particularly caustic. Members of Congress deemed the ICC a ―monster.‖176 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs Marc Grossman publically stated that the ICC 
undermined UN efforts to establish peace and security, creates an unchecked power, 
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inherently flawed, and a threat to U.S. sovereignty.
177
 Other prominent officials 
publically made similar remarks at the time.
 178
 However, after the Bush Administration 
became involved in ending the genocide in Darfur, the United States demonstrated a 
slight, yet persistent shift in the tone with which it treated the ICC diplomatically. State 
Department officials in 2006, particularly pragmatists such as Deputy Secretary of State 
Robert Zoellick and State Department Legal Advisor John Bellinger III, announced that 
the U.S. was ready to cooperate with ICC investigations in Darfur, despite their 
preference for alternative means of justice. Bellinger stated: 
Moreover, over the past couple of years we have worked hard to 
demonstrate that we share the main goals and values of the Court. We did 
not oppose the Security Council‘s referral of the Darfur situation to the 
ICC, and have expressed our willingness to consider assisting the ICC 
Prosecutor‘s Darfur work should we receive an appropriate request. We 
supported the use of ICC facilities for the trial of Charles Taylor, which 
began this week here in The Hague. These steps reflect our desire to find 
practical ways to work with ICC supporters to advance our shared goals of 
promoting international criminal justice. We believe it important that ICC 
supporters take a similarly practical approach in working with us on these 
issues, one that reflects respect for our decision not to become a party to 
the Rome Statute.
179
 
 
The Obama Administration continued this positive diplomatic trajectory by becoming an 
observer member to the International Criminal Court in 2009, allowing the U.S. to 
observe meetings, but not enjoy the privileges of voting and policy accorded to members. 
This is currently the most ideal relationship to be expected from U.S.-ICC relations. At 
those meetings, Ambassador Rapp has made several positive policy statements indicating 
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diplomatic support for ICC investigations and for assisting the ICC in ensuring justice for 
victims and ending global impunity. President Obama stated in his National Security 
Strategy in 2010: 
Those who intentionally target innocent civilians must be held accountable, 
and we will continue to support institutions and prosecutions that advance 
this important interest. Although the United States is not at present a party 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and will 
always protect U.S. personnel, we are engaging with State Parties to the 
Rome Statute on issues of concern and are supporting the ICC‘s 
prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent 
with the requirements of U.S. law.
180
 
 
In order to capture the evolution of U.S. policy and involvement with the Court since 
1997, these visual representations roughly codify the presence of certain variables across 
four years. 
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Having captured the general trend of U.S. involvement with the ICC since 2002 and the 
evolution of concrete support, provision of resources, and diplomatic support, this chapter 
assesses the level of U.S. involvement in two specific cases that have been before the 
ICC. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is a crucial case in analyzing the effect of 
the U.S. on the ICC‘s effectiveness, because it is one of only two cases that have received 
a verdict from the Court, and is the only trial that has resulted in a conviction. Joseph 
Kabila, as head of state in the Democratic Republic of Congo, referred the situation in 
Ituri—known as one of the bloodiest regions of the DRC and rife with ethnic violence—
to the ICC in March 2004 where the case was subsequently approved by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber as falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC. In 2007, the same Pre-Trial 
Chamber announced that there was enough evidence to bring down the charges of 
―enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years into the FPLC 
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[English: UPC] and using them to participate actively in hostilities.‖181 Such crimes fall 
under the general category of war crimes, one of the four key crimes that warrant ICC 
jurisdiction. The presentation of evidence began in January 2009 and formally closed in 
March 2011. In March 2012, Lubanga was convicted of enlisting child soldiers after three 
years of turbulent legal proceedings and is currently serving a fourteen-year prison 
sentence in The Hague. 
The involvement of the United States in this specific situation was extremely 
limited. The case was not referred to the ICC through the UNSC, excluding the U.S. from 
the decision-making process, and therefore leaving it without opportunity to object to the 
ICC proceedings. At this time, the U.S. was still pushing for using local tribunals instead 
of the ICC and would have staunchly opposed a Security Council referral if there had 
been discussion. Therefore, beginning at the top of the Multilateral Policy Scale, the U.S. 
did not have the opportunity to decide whether or not to vote to refer the situation to the 
ICC because the government of the D.R.C. initiated the case through the state referral 
process. The state leaders referred the case to the ICC themselves, willfully relinquishing 
Lubanga to The Hague. In fact, at the time of arrest, Lubanga was already detained inside 
the D.R.C. and only required a simple transfer. The United States did not provide 
evidence or investigative support, due to domestic legal restrictions and the nature of the 
ICC‘s investigative procedures, which relies on national governments to gather evidence 
and transport witnesses. 
However, there are more affirmative results with regard to the ―diplomatic 
support‖ variable. While several U.S.-based NGOs came forward in support of legal 
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action taken against Lubanga, no formal diplomatic statement was made by any U.S. 
official about the transfer of Lubanga to the ICC‘s custody in 2006. After his conviction 
in 2012, however, the State Department issued a statement hailing the decision as one 
that is ―an historic and important step in providing justice and accountability for the 
Congolese people. The conviction is also significant for highlighting as an issue of 
paramount international concern the brutal practice of conscripting and using children to 
take a direct part in hostilities.‖182 Therefore, the diplomatic support from the U.S. for the 
Court and its prosecution of Lubanga and representative of the shift in the level of 
involvement that the U.S. was willing to have in an ICC case. 
The other case that provides insight into the level of U.S. involvement is The 
Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, which formally concluded in December 2012. 
This was the second verdict handed down by the ICC, but it resulted in acquittal and 
Ngudjolo was immediately released. The Prosecutor charged Ngudjolo with nine counts 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, sexual slavery, inhumane 
treatment, use of child soldiers in hostilities, and unlawful attacks against civilians.
183
 
The charges were based on a 2004 attack also in the Ituri region of the D.R.C. that 
involved Ngudjolo commanding troops to invade the village of Bogoro that was occupied 
by a rival rebel group and full of civilians who were slaughtered by the incoming troops, 
many of them children under fifteen years of age. 
Like in the Lubanga case, the case against Ngudjolo was referred to the ICC by 
the government of the D.R.C., therefore excluding United States from involvement in 
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recommending the case to the Prosecutor. Additionally, there was no investigative 
assistance or provision of resources to the Prosecutor to gather evidence against 
Ngudjolo. However, there was some diplomatic acknowledgement of the trial, and was 
included in a 2010 statement by Ambassador Rapp exemplifying U.S. continued support 
for the ICC.
184
 When asked if there was a specific reaction by the administration to 
Ngudjolo‘s acquittal, Spokesperson for the State Department Victoria Nuland vaguely 
acknowledged a U.S. stance. 
So we‘re obviously reviewing the trial‘s decision. We also understand that 
it is subject to appeal. I would note that in announcing the verdict, the 
chamber made clear that the prosecution had not proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he was the commander of the combatants involved 
in the attack on the village, and thus he wasn‘t responsible within the 
meaning of the Rome statute. So again, they also – the judges in the case 
emphasized that his acquittal didn‘t mean that in its opinion no crime had 
been committed there. It‘s just that within their definition, they couldn‘t 
link him to it.
185
 
 
She did not come out directly in support for the verdict, but said that the U.S. will 
continue to monitor the appeals process that is underway in the Office of the Prosecutor. 
She emphasized that Ngudjolo was acquitted because the Prosecutor did not meet the 
burden of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) that he was the commander behind the 
attack in Bogoro, but that did not necessarily mean that no crime was committed. In this 
instance, the level of diplomatic support for an acquittal was much lower than that of 
Lubanga‘s guilty verdict. This indicates that the U.S. evaluates the ICC‘s success on the 
basis of successfully applying judicial principles in order to imprison war criminals. This 
is an interesting departure from the original concerns expressed during the treaty 
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negotiations and the Bush Administration, and represents an evolution of the U.S. 
opinion and attitudes toward the ICC. 
The Effectiveness of the ICC 
For the purpose of this study, ―effectiveness‖ is conceptualized as the ability of an 
institution to achieve its stated goals, taking into account whether or not it was able to 
solve the problem it was created to address, or ―output effectiveness,‖ and the extent to 
which the organization contributed to fixing the problem it was created to solve, relative 
to how its internal process ―performance‖ affected the output that was observed. The 
Rome Statute establishes basic normative goals for the International Criminal Court. It is 
lacking in concrete goals, but it did establish mechanisms through which to evaluate its 
performance so far. The Rome Statute was created to ―put an end to impunity 
and…contribute to the prevention of crimes‖ by establishing a ―permanent institution‖ 
that is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions and respects the norms of 
international justice.
186
 Therefore, effectiveness is measured in three areas that apply to 
output effectiveness and internal performance: ending impunity, preventing future 
atrocities by changing state behavior (external), and adherence to international legal 
norms (internal). In order to apply the above-stated measure of effectiveness to the ICC, 
it is imperative that the literature on the subject of evaluating the Court since 2002 be 
thoroughly explored. This section explores various scholars‘ interpretations of assessing 
ICC effectiveness, which demonstrates how this thesis contributes to the foundation of 
literature by systemically measuring effectiveness. In applying the measure generally to 
the overall performance of the ICC since 2002, this chapter explores the above measures 
in light of a no-Court counterfactual and will discuss how the landscape of ending 
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impunity through international legal justice systems would have looked like if the 
international system continued creating regional ad hoc courts to address acts of 
genocide. Then, this chapter continues the analysis of the two case studies: the Lubanga 
and Ngudjolo trials and will apply the dependent variable measures in order to determine 
effectiveness on a smaller scale. 
Many scholars support the idea that it may be too early to assess the effectiveness 
of the ICC. Cedric Ryngaert supports this view simply because so few cases have been 
fully decided.
187
 If he defines effectiveness as an institution‘s ability to achieve its 
intended or desired goal, or in the specific case of the ICC ―to help end impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community,‖188 he 
believes that mere arrests and investigations of the ICC do not contribute to this overall 
goal.
189
 Ryngaert focuses on the complementarity principle, narrowing his measure of an 
―effective court‖ to one that will ―encourage the ownership of the judicial process, and 
thereby strengthen the rule of law throughout the State system, and thereby guarantee 
long-term social and political stabilization.‖190 The ICC would be maximizing its 
influence, resources, and effectiveness, if and only if it asserted its jurisdiction for 
situations in which states cannot genuinely prosecute individuals. According to Ryngaert, 
as long as the complementarity principle holds true, the ICC can be an effective 
institution in the realm of international criminal justice.
191
 Aside from a brief analysis of 
how the European Union contributes to the effectiveness of the ICC, he is generally 
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inconclusive about the effectiveness of the Court so far. Considering the time lapse 
between his analysis and more current ICC advancements, I have ample opportunity for 
my study to gauge effectiveness empirically, particularly in connection to U.S. policy, 
buy considering both arrests and complementarity as measures of process performance 
and output effectiveness. 
Other scholars determined that it is not, in fact, too early to assess the 
effectiveness of the ICC, and have offered some analysis regarding how well the ICC has 
lived up to its mission and to the stipulations of the Rome Statute. Their conclusions have 
generally been positive, stating that since 2002, the ICC has fulfilled its mission to 
increase accountability of perpetrators.
192
 They assert that the Court has belied several of 
the initial objections from critics by not engaging in extraneous or illegitimate human 
rights situations and by appearing more dependent on the final oversight of the Assembly 
of States Parties than critics initially anticipated.
193
 The Court has held true to its 
commitment to the principle of complementarity, and as other scholars suggest, has been 
able to operate efficiently without impeding on states‘ rights to prosecute their own 
nationals in their own courts. This section builds on this literature and will demonstrate 
several cases in which the ICC had the opportunity to over-reach on its mandate but has 
not. 
Another indication in the literature on the ICC‘s effectiveness has been its efforts 
to protect the rights of defendants and ensure a fair trial. Judges in the Uganda and Darfur 
cases have appointed legal counsel to defendants and required the prosecutor to disclose 
all evidence, including evidence that could mitigate the perpetrated crimes. These high 
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standards of due process have so far proved unwarranted American critics‘ concerns that 
the individual prosecutor and the Court‘s judges would operate with little oversight or 
regard for legal procedure.
194
 Legal procedure speaks to organizational effectiveness as 
part of the performance variable and is crucial to understanding how efficiently and how 
well the Court is addressing these crimes in accordance with international law.  Due 
largely to the relatively small amount of time the ICC has had to establish itself as an 
independent judicial institution, coverage of the Court‘s effectiveness is brief and 
inconclusive. Some authors claim that it is too early to assess effectiveness of the ICC, 
while others suggest that it has had a positive record since 2002, giving lukewarm 
analysis for each situation. This study is seeking to corroborate the existing assumptions 
and analysis by systematically studying the effectiveness of the ICC. The research design 
is structured around a range of independent variables (U.S. actions towards the Court) 
and their effect on effectiveness of the ICC generally and in two cases that have resulted 
in a verdict since the 2002 ratification of the Rome Statute. 
By using the stated goals in the Rome Statute, it is possible to determine a level of 
output effectiveness of the ICC from 2002 to 2013. While acknowledging the relative 
youth of the ICC, this section will determine that a strong assessment of effectiveness can 
be observed empirically by using the two verdicts the Court has produced along with the 
investigations.  Since 2002, the ICC has issued twenty-seven indictments, instigated 
eighteen cases, have four individuals in custody, and six individuals who are not detained 
but have voluntarily presented themselves at trial in response to a summons. Two 
individuals, including Ngudjolo, have been released after an acquittal or a non-
confirmation of charges in the Pre-Trial stages. Three individuals are currently in custody 
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in their domestic states and have not yet been extradited to the ICC, and the remaining 
alleged criminals remain at large. If analyzing the ICC on the basis of the numbers of 
criminals prosecuted, the results are a mixed bag. In 2002, before the ICC was created, 
only ad hoc criminal procedures were in pace against individuals wanted for key crimes 
and those courts are narrowly mandated and region-specific. Most likely, many of the 
criminals under ICC indictment would still be at large. In this way, the ICC has been 
successful in making large advancements in ending impunity and holding individuals 
accountable for providing a legitimate forum for justice with a global scope. 
However, progress has been slower than it needs to be. It has so far taken the ICC 
an average of five years to try an individual for war crimes—Lubanga was transferred to 
The Hague in 2006 and his verdict was issued in March 2012. Similarly, Ngudjolo was 
transferred to The Hague in 2008 and his verdict was issued in December 2012. 
Additionally, slow progress has been evidenced by the amount of time between the entry 
into force of the Rome Statute and the first arrest, which was four years. However, in the 
last four years, the ICC has picked up the pace, indicting the remaining twenty-five 
individuals in the past six years. 
Therefore, there has been upward trajectory of indictments and a drastic shift in 
the impunity of war criminals since 2002. Considering the preliminary examinations that 
are currently underway in the Office of the Prosecutor, this upward trajectory is likely to 
continue. Preliminary examinations involve assessment of facts relating to alleged crimes 
under Article 15 of the Rome Statute to see if they fall under the jurisdiction of the Court, 
if there are applicable domestic courts that are willing and able to prosecute the crimes, 
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and if there is an interest in justice.
195
 The preliminary examinations indicate that the 
Court is continuing to pursue individuals responsible for serious crimes by considering 
jurisdiction in Afghanistan, Honduras, the Republic of Korea, and Nigeria. It is 
considering admissibility—assessing complementarity and gravity—in Colombia, 
Guinea, Georgia, and Mali. The Office of the Prosecutor has recently closed a 
preliminary examination on crimes occurring in Palestine. According to the Rome 
Statute, a state can confer jurisdiction to the Court by ratifying the treaty or making an ad 
hoc declaration to accept the Court‘s jurisdiction. Because Palestine‘s statehood status is 
so controversial, the Office of the Prosecutor felt that it was not in the position as an 
entity to make a decision regarding Palestinian statehood, but would accept jurisdiction if 
relevant bodies in the UN General Assembly were to make such a determination.
196
 Not 
only is this statement a good example of the ICC ceding its authority in matters outside of 
its scope, but it also indicates a willingness to investigate crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide wherever they occur in the future. 
The Court‘s record of investigations and indictments indicates an increase in 
frequency of cases within the last six years, as well as an expected continuation of such 
growth. This pattern indicates a growing level of effectiveness when assessing the 
counterfactual situation and the ability of the Court to achieve its goal of ending 
impunity, and the extent to which it participated in doing so. If not for ICC investigations, 
many of the cases would not have achieved as high a level of scrutiny, nor would they 
have been held to the same international standard. However, considering only two 
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verdicts have been issued, with only one conviction, the ICC still has a long way to go 
towards reversing the trend of impunity. 
Another provision of the stated goals in the Rome Statute is to prevent future 
atrocities from occurring. While this is an unattainable goal for any individual, 
organization, or government to achieve, as well as being challenging for scholars to 
analyze, the ICC has had some deterrent effects. There has been explicit evidence of 
hostile parties attempting to decrease direct assault on civilians after a prosecutor has 
started an investigation in the region. While this does not mitigate the egregious nature of 
their crimes, it does imply that states and war criminals are starting to recognize the Court 
as a crucial component of increasing international scrutiny and justice. The Court has also 
been marginally effective at increasing domestic forms of accountability.
197
  This was 
particularly true when the Prosecutor moderated negotiations between Joseph Kony, his 
Lord‘s Resistance Army (LRA), and the Ugandan government, looking for sufficient 
grounds to intervene. Negotiations ceased when Kony would not cooperate with peace 
agreements set forth by the government, allowing the ICC to claim jurisdiction according 
to complementarity, and allowing neighboring states to decrease their support for the 
LRA.
198
 Kony is now indicted on twelve counts of crimes against humanity and twenty-
one counts of war crimes at the International Criminal Court.
199
 This is an instance of 
success when the ICC has had a presence in a case, causing involved parties, and states to 
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alter their behavior. However, relatively little success in this area has occurred otherwise. 
State governments in Libya have not yet cooperated with the Court by relinquishing Saif 
Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi.
200
 Similarly, Sudan has not complied with its 
obligations per Security Council Resolution to relinquish its leaders to the ICC for trial, 
notably because Sudan‘s president is wanted among them. 
The final goal stated in the Rome Statute that is a measure of effectiveness in this 
case is to end impunity with respect to international legal norms. This measure captures 
the internal performance variable because it focuses on the internal process of the 
institution.
201
 By analyzing the ability of the Court to adhere to international legal norms, 
I can capture the efficiency with which the institution accomplished its main external 
output goal, which is ending impunity. The extent to which the Court follows proper legal 
procedure could have an impact on its ability to hold criminals accountable for crimes 
with respect to common legal procedure as agreed upon by the member states. Out of the 
twenty-seven indictments before the Court, one case was dismissed from consideration at 
the Pre-Trial stage on grounds of insufficient evidence. In that case, Callixte 
Mbarushimana was accused of participating in an armed conflict in the southern regions 
of the D.R.C., but the Prosecutor failed to provide sufficient evidence linking him to the 
crime, and the case was subsequently dismissed. Similarly, Mathieu Ngudjolo was 
acquitted of his charges after a full trial on the grounds that the Prosecutor did not have 
sufficient evidence against him.
202
 Many international actors expressed distress at this 
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statement, but while Ngudjolo was released, this measure and the one against 
Mbarushimama indicate the willingness of the ICC judiciary to uphold due process 
principles and rule of law according to the Rome Statute. 
Before the ICC was created, the international trends for criminal justices were 
moving toward establishing regional ad hoc institutions to try war criminals for their 
involvement in specific genocides or incidents. The ICTY and the ICTR offer some 
insight into how international criminal justice would have looked like if the ICC had not 
been created. The ICTY and ICTR‘s progress was slow at first, the institutions having to 
appeal to private donors and to the United Nations for funds to keep going, and having to 
rely heavily on cooperation of states. The institutions themselves were mainly vehicles 
for providing justice, and had no coercive capacity to make arrests or obtain access to 
witnesses. All of those functions relied heavily on state government cooperation, which 
proved to be a burden on the tribunals‘ operations.203 The ICTY eventually passed down 
over 100 indictments and many war criminals are currently serving prison sentences. As 
of 2001, at the beginning of the ICC‘s tenure and eight years after the ICTY‘s 
establishment in 1993, around forty war criminals still remained at-large. The 
indictments-to-arrest ratio within the ICTY‘s first ten years was very high, but many 
scholars questioned its effectiveness as an international justice institution. Because it 
relied so heavily on state cooperation at the investigation stage and had no control over 
its docket. However, scholars have determined that ICTY proceedings have been 
consistently fair and aligned with accepted legal norms. Eventually, states in the UNSC 
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delegated enough power to the ICTY for it to carry out sentencing and justice towards 
convicted individuals that were consistent with legal norms.
204
 
The ICTR was established in a post-conflict situation, unlike its counterpart in 
Yugoslavia, and began operations with 95,000 defendants in custody of the Rwandan 
government. In the initial stages, the ICTR struggled with jurisdiction relative to the 
national courts system and suffered from lack of cooperation among states. Its legal 
procedures and standards of due process were identical to those at the ICTY, and even 
though those standards ensured strict adherence to legal norms, the institutions itself had 
little power to carry out arrests, investigations, and witnesses.
205
 Therefore, it took 
significant effort by UN Security Council actors and in-state actors to create ad hoc 
tribunals. It would be impossible to create such organizations in every region affected by 
conflict. States would have to decide if a situation was bad enough to be worth the 
expense of creating a tribunal, therefore limiting the scope of these institutions to only the 
most extreme cases of genocide.  If a permanent court had not been established, states 
may have grown tired of incurring significant costs to set up such narrowly mandated, 
regional tribunals that relied heavily on state cooperation. 
Compared to this counterfactual, the ICC has achieved success in some ways, but 
has stagnated in others. The ICC has more autonomy than the two regional courts, and 
has the power to conduct investigations and assemble evidence. It has also has a global 
scope and jurisdiction over a wider range of crimes, and is a more significant contribution 
of ending world impunity than the ad hoc tribunals. However, the ICC has yet to 
demonstrate strict adherence to legal norms. Overall, the ICC has been effective because 
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it has furthered the course of international criminal justice by expanding the scope of 
crimes and overcoming many of the coordination costs related to establishing several 
smaller tribunals. The ICC has indicted individuals based on the four key crimes within 
its jurisdiction that might not have warranted enough attention or pressure from states to 
establish a tribunal. 
During the trial of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the Prosecution 
committed several procedural errors that nearly resulted in dismissal. Several times over 
the course of the trial, the Prosecutor was criticized for misuse of evidence and for not 
adhering to proper procedure for entering evidence and full disclosure. According to the 
final decision document written by ICC judges, the first attempt at a hearing was 
suspended in June 2008, after the Prosecutor failed to disclose a vast amount of 
―potentially exculpatory evidence,‖ which they are bound to do by the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence.
206
 The hearing resumed after the evidence was disclosed to the Court in 
November 2008, and the prosecution called its first witness in 2009. 
This procedural gaffe received some media attention and, finally, criticism about 
the Court‘s ability to operate fairly for such vast crimes was given a focal point. 
According to the New York Times, the documents were released to the Prosecution on 
the request that they remain confidential. But even so, confidential materials are not 
permitted to enter into evidence in a trial setting, which the Prosecution attempted to do 
anyway.
207
 The ICC judges issued a statement calling into question the trial process and 
feared that it ―has been ruptured to such a degree that it is now impossible to piece 
                                                       
206 ‗Trial Chamber I‘ ICC, p. 11 
207 Marlese Simons, "International Court Says It May Discard First Case," New York Times, June 17, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/17/world/europe/17hague.html?ref=thomaslubanga 
 113 
together the constituent elements of a fair trial.‖208 Despite these setbacks, the hearing 
resumed, only to be stayed again in July 2010. This time, the ICC judges cited ―non-
compliance with an order for disclosure of an intermediary‖ on the part of the Prosecutor, 
who willfully and clearly refused to comply with the orders of the Court.
209
 This stay was 
reversed in October, and proceedings and witness testimony resumed until December, 
when the defense counsel requested a permanent stay of proceedings because ―the 
intermediaries used by the prosecution had prepared false evidence and the Prosecutor 
was aware that some of the evidence connected to these individuals was untruthful and 
failed in his obligation to investigate its reliability.‖210 The trial was then formally closed 
in May 2011 and deliberations began. Lubanga was not convicted until nearly a year later 
in March 2012. 
Clearly, these procedural faults came from the alleged disregard for procedure and 
conduct by the Prosecutor and his deliberate methods in ignoring and attempting to 
conceal evidence against his case. Additionally, the trial proceedings, namely the process 
of admitting evidence, the requirement of disclosure of evidence to the other side, and the 
timely review of evidence, suffered. In the case of The Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
procedural error significantly hindered the timeliness of the verdict along with the overall 
process of convicting a war criminal. This indicator of poor internal performance had a 
negative impact on overall effectiveness because it jeopardized the judicial process by 
making it slow and inefficient and because it risked acquitting an alleged war criminal 
not due to proper standard of evidence, but because the Prosecutor was not following 
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procedure. The Court‘s ultimate goal, or external output, is ending impunity, and 
procedural error was almost detrimental to this goal during the Lubanga trial. 
Overall, the International Criminal Court has been successful in opening cases 
and trials against war criminals that violated international law against civilians. With one 
conviction, along with some arrests and numerous investigations, the status of impunity 
for war criminals is better than it was before the Court was established. Despite a slow 
start, the ICC has been able to increase the frequency of its investigations and has gained 
legitimacy globally. However, another factor in effectiveness is the ability of the ICC to 
impact state behavior. The ICC has not performed well in this regard. The cases in which 
the ICC was most effective usually involved cases that were state-referrals, because the 
ICC could rely on domestic resources to secure an arrest and a guarantee that certain 
individuals would be extradited for trial. But in cases where compliance was required via 
Security Council resolution, or an independent case by the Prosecutor, impact on state 
behavior has been poor and impunity for war criminals is still a reality. Additionally, 
while the judiciary is seemingly prepared to adhere to judicial norms, the procedural 
errors in the trial committed by the Prosecutor compromised the Court‘s legal legitimacy 
could have resulted in a war criminal remaining at large. 
U.S. Involvement and its Effect on the ICC’s Effectiveness 
After isolating both variables and applying them to the case study, this section 
completes the process tracing procedure in order to establish a relationship between the 
level of U.S. support for the ICC and its overall effectiveness. The previous section of 
this chapter demonstrated empirically that the level of involvement and the degree of 
cooperation by the U.S. in the Court‘s affairs have increased over the last several years. 
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The evidence also shows that the number of indictments and investigations have 
increased over the last several years. This has occurred in part due to the United States‘ 
willingness to cooperate via the UN Security Council and referring situations in Darfur 
and Libya to the ICC. The Security Council Resolutions compel Libya and Sudan to 
cooperate with the ICC and extradite wanted individuals. However, compliance in these 
cases has been poor and the U.S.‘s continuing support has not seemed to impact the 
ability of the ICC to compel extradition. Because of the American Service-members‘ 
Protection Act, American officials are legally prohibited from cooperating with the ICC. 
American politicians since 2002, even in the Obama Administration, are particularly 
sensitive about the ability of the Court to try individuals from states that have not signed 
or ratified the Rome Statute. Even though the cases in Sudan and Libya have been 
referred by UNSC votes, both of those states are not parties to the Rome Statute, and 
could indicate a reticence by the U.S. to get involved in the ICC‘s efforts in those 
situations. 
If the U.S. were a state party to the ICC, it would have been able to provide more 
resources to conduct investigations, particularly in regions it occupies. However, while 
the U.S. could use their capacity and resources to find war criminals at large, there is a 
limit to how much the U.S. could contribute to ensuring those individuals were extradited 
to The Hague. One of the primary restrictions on the mandate of the ICC is state 
sovereignty, in that another state cannot force a non-state party to the Rome Statute to 
offer custody of a convicted criminal. In Libya, though the U.S. contributed to finding 
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al Sanousi, the men are in the custody of Libyan 
officials and are not compelled by any legal body to extradite them to The Hague. 
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Whether or not the U.S. was a party to the ICC would not determine Libya‘s compliance 
with the UNSC Resolution. The U.S. is also helping with the global hunt to locate Joseph 
Kony after the crimes he committed in Uganda. Using satellites and aircraft, the U.S., in 
conjunction with the Ugandan government (not the ICC), has followed Kony‘s trail 
across central Africa. So far, their methods have been ineffective against his efforts to 
conceal his whereabouts, and as of April 2013, the U.S. government suspended their 
search for the elusive warlord. So, while the U.S. can provide increased capacity for 
locating war criminals, they are not necessarily as effective. If Kony was captured, the 
Ugandan government, as a state party would be obligated to extradite him to The Hague 
despite the preferences of the United States, although at this point, the U.S. would prefer 
to see Kony tried before the ICC. 
However, the evolution of U.S. attitudes and the increase in diplomatic support 
since 2006 has affected the legitimacy of the Court in a positive manner. The ICC no 
longer has to face the global community with the U.S. as an enemy. The Court is now a 
viable means for holding individuals accountable and for opening investigations in war-
torn regions, and this increase in legitimacy could be attributed to vocal support from the 
United States diplomatically and inside the UN Security Council. Out of 127 states party 
to the Rome Statute, 35 states signed on after 2002. After the U.S. altered its position on 
the ICC in 2006, 22 states signed on to the Rome Statute, the most recent being Cote 
d‘Ivoire in February 2013. However, the U.S. still has the power to restrict ICC influence 
on the Security Council, and if a referral was against the U.S. geopolitical or strategic 
preference, they could vote no. However, evidence indicates that the U.S. is generally 
supportive of the ICC in the Security Council. While this support has allowed indictments 
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and investigations to occur in Libya and Sudan, those cases have seen the least amount of 
success. Without resources and cooperation on the ground, the ability of the U.S. to 
influence those situations is limited. 
Another trend documented in this case study was the Court‘s record on adherence 
to legal procedure and evidence gathering. This variable also directly relates to the U.S. 
role in the ICC. If the U.S. was legally able to provide assistance in investigations, 
problems gathering sufficient evidence for charging individuals with crimes of such 
magnitude might be solved more easily. Given that the U.S. is a large power and has the 
resources to have an immense global presence, it follows that it would be able to supply 
ample assistance in investigations. Additionally, when the Rome Statute was being 
negotiated, the United States influenced various aspects of definitions that would impact 
later jurisdictional decisions. For example, the U.S. delegation fought hard at the 
discussion table for the definition of war crimes to include both internal conflicts and 
crimes against women.
211
 Both of those aspects of war crimes have arisen in charges 
against individuals in front of the ICC. 
Additionally, in order to ensure that the Rome Statute complied with the 
Constitution, the U.S. delegation pushed for greater adherence due process and 
components of American law, including rights of the defendant, which were intended to 
put limits on the Prosecutor. If the United States was a state party and was able to impact 
policies and decisions in the Office of the Prosecutor, those due process principles might 
be stronger. If the U.S. was a party to the Rome Statute, it would have a vote at the 
meeting of the Assembly of States Parties that has the authority to manage oversight of 
the Prosecutor‘s Office and the Executive, influence the functions of the Rules of 
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Evidence and Procedure, and the authority to establish independent monitoring 
mechanisms for different functions of the Court to ensure efficacy and adequate 
protection of legal principles.
212
 During the negotiations, the U.S. delegation prompted 
several due process provisions and subsequent administrations have maintained support 
for due process. If given voting power in the Assembly, the U.S. would prefer stringent 
oversight over legal procedure regulations and the activities of the Prosecutor. 
After measuring the variables and tracing their impacts on each other, it is clear that the 
United States has influenced the Court‘s effectiveness in some ways. The dramatic 
increase in diplomatic support from the U.S. for ICC investigations has allowed the Court 
to enjoy an increase in legitimacy. States are beginning to alter their behavior in order to 
cooperate with the Prosecutor, greatly influencing their output effectiveness. In addition, 
some states have witnessed a deterrent effect from the presence of an ICC investigation, 
particularly in Uganda where state willingness to prosecute the LRA leaders has led to a 
marginal decrease in LRA activity and external support. Additionally, the United States 
has allowed the ICC to open investigations in Sudan and Libya and without the 
affirmative U.S. vote, no ICC investigation would be occurring at all. 
However, the ICC still has significant room for improvement when it comes to 
several performance measures such as adhering to due process and achieving state 
compliance in cases that were not state referrals. These variables significantly impact the 
output effectiveness of the organization, and must be considered according to Gutner and 
Thompson‘s framework. While the ICC judges have shown willingness to dismiss cases 
according to the standard of evidence agreed upon in the Rome Statute, one case has been 
compromised by the Prosecution‘s inability to amass necessary evidence and follow 
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proper trial procedures. The U.S., having been the architect of many mechanisms in the 
Rome Statute that limited the influence of the Prosecutor, would support a continuation 
of adherence to international norms and standards of evidence. Finally, the U.S. law that 
restricts official cooperation with the ICC also restricts the amount of American resources 
abroad that could be mobilized to gather evidence, assist in very difficult investigations, 
and make arrests of criminals still at large. 
The ICC still has encountered roadblocks when attempting to arrest certain war 
criminals without a police force. State sovereignty principles preclude any foreign 
enforcement team to enter a territory and arrest its citizen without jurisdiction. Because 
the ICC relies on states for arrests and extradition, the U.S. may not have as significant an 
impact on the current problems in Sudan and Libya, who are currently refusing to offer 
up indicted individuals to The Hague. Neither diplomatic support from the U.S. or an 
affirmative Security Council vote is sufficient to solve this problem. Therefore, U.S. 
diplomatic support and votes on the Security Council have positively influenced the 
ICC‘s effectiveness in its ability to tackle impunity and increase its legitimacy. But the 
unwillingness to cooperate by providing resources is negatively impacting the ICC‘s 
ability to gather evidence and employ smooth and efficient trial procedures. But, there is 
little evidence to support that the ICC‘s current problem with state compliance could be 
helped by U.S. involvement. While the U.S. can enhance the reach of the ICC by 
providing assistance in investigations, it cannot overcome principles of state sovereignty 
and the Court and will continue to be challenged as it grows to become a more significant 
actor on the world stage. 
VII. The Kyoto Protocol 
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This chapter addresses the Kyoto Protocol as another case study in order to 
determine how U.S. involvement in a treaty or multilateral endeavor influences that 
institution‘s effectiveness. After significant advances in international environmental 
cooperation during the 1990s, states gathered in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 to negotiate and 
sign a binding agreement that would commit developed countries to collectively reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) to five percent below 1990 levels. This chapter 
will first explore the background of United States‘ participation in international climate 
change negotiations to contextualize their level of involvement in the Kyoto regime. 
Then, using the variables indicated on the Multilateral Policy Scale, this chapter 
demonstrates that the level of U.S. involvement with the Kyoto Protocol has been 
consistently negative. The U.S. has not ratified, complied with, or supported the 
institution in any way since 1997, and has sought to obstruct the success of the Kyoto 
Protocol by lobbying for alternative methods for addressing climate change. 
After determining the level of U.S. involvement, this chapter explores the 
effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol relative to the measures discussed in chapter one.
213
 
Similar to the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol is a hard law treaty that demands 
significant domestic industrial regulation from its signatories, it distinguishes between 
developed (Annex I) and developing (non-Annex I) nations, and requires extensive 
cooperation to be successful. However, by measuring both Kyoto‘s output 
effectiveness—how well the treaty has adhered to its stated goals—and internal process 
performance—how efficiently the treaty structured has operated and how well it 
contributed to the overall global process to address climate change—this chapter can 
evaluate its effectiveness. Finally, this chapter employs the process tracing method to 
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determine if a causal relationship exists between U.S. involvement and the effectiveness 
of Kyoto so far. 
Background: United States and Climate Change 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
signed in 1992 to establish an international legal framework through which international 
cooperation over climate change could be managed. After the success of the Montreal 
Protocol and the Vienna Convention on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, global 
attention fastened to other consequences of rapid industrial development during the 20
th
 
century and their effects on the atmosphere. Since 1990, scientists at NASA tracked the 
average global temperature annually and discovered that a majority of the 1.4 degree 
overall increase had occurred in the ten years before 1990.
214
 Scientists readily 
discovered that human activity altered the cycle of carbon dioxide from the earth into the 
atmosphere, a phenomenon that came to be known as ―the greenhouse effect.‖ While 
plants and animals on land and in the ocean naturally exchange CO2 via the atmosphere, 
emissions from burning coal, oil, and natural gas release excess carbon that increase CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere, trapping heat. When ―greenhouse gases‖ such as CO2, 
methane, nitrous oxide, and water vapor cannot escape the atmosphere, heat gets trapped 
and the global temperature will rise. 
The connection between human activity and climate change became a primary 
focus in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, but states took little action to seriously address 
these problems.
215
 By 1992, scientists had determined that the average global temperature 
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had risen at an unprecedented rate over the previous ten years, thus setting the stage for 
an international agreement to address climate change.
216
 At the Rio Earth Summit of 
1992, 172 heads of state agreed to consider alternative energy options, patterns of 
production involving greenhouse gasses, and increased reliance on public transportation 
systems, which produced two outcome documents on sustainable development and 
environmental responsibilities of states.
217
 The United States participated in the Rio Earth 
Summit and is a signatory to the UNFCCC. In 1993, President Clinton intended to fulfill 
the obligations inscribed in the UNFCCC by pushing domestic legislation to seriously 
address climate change and sustainable development mechanisms through U.S. aid 
commitments. His administration developed the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) in 
1993, a $1.9 billion venture that responded to the ―twin challenges‖ of reducing the 
effects of climate change while protecting the American economy.
218
 The CCAP 
proposed to cut emissions down to 1990 levels by the year 2000 by committing to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gasses, partnering with businesses exhibiting green production 
practices, creating new jobs, and investing in future technology to develop alternative 
energy processes.
219
 The CCAP was an ambitious policy that eventually was swallowed 
up by higher priority environmental initiatives. That same year, Congress struck down a 
tax on heat content of fuels (Btu tax) after extensive negotiations with President Clinton‘s 
White House.
220
 Without constant improvement and attention, the CCAP was doomed to 
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consistently fall short of its targets, specifically, reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 
2000. The pessimism that accompanied the CCAP through its first few years in the 1990s 
paved the way for tense domestic and international negotiations of appropriate strategies 
and interests to consider when pledging to reduce emissions. By the beginning of 
negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol, the Clinton Administration had achieved relatively 
little progress domestically in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
In 1997, the parties met again to address the shortcomings of the Rio Declaration 
and the progress made in the five years since it entered into force. In these meetings, 
states endeavored to create a legally binding treaty to mitigate the causes of climate 
change. The meetings produced the Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, 
during the worldwide refocus on the commitments made in Rio. The Kyoto Protocol to 
the UNFCCC, agreed in 1997, is a binding legal mechanism for developed states (Annex 
I) to reduce aggregate emissions of greenhouse gasses by 5.2 percent below 1990 levels 
during a pre-determined five-year commitment period.
221
 The states negotiating the terms 
of the treaty included several flexibility mechanisms to assist Annex I states in achieving 
such substantial reductions. The Protocol allows states to create emissions trading 
schemes, which commoditize carbon emissions and incentivize investment in cleaner 
energy technologies. States that have not used their allotted units of carbon dioxide and 
weigh in under their target can sell those units to states that will go over the limit.
222
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In order to address the constant battle between development and environmental 
policy, the Kyoto Protocol also has a Clean Development Mechanism that awards 
emissions credits to developed countries for funding clean development projects in non-
Annex I countries that help meet emissions targets.
223
 Finally, states can join other states 
to jointly implement treaty provisions and undertake simultaneous projects for carbon 
emission reduction and count those towards their targeted reductions under Kyoto.
224
 
Annex I countries are mandated to reduce emissions below 1990 levels by signing the 
treaty, but non-Annex I countries are not legally bound to such restrictions, which 
became the primary objection by the U.S. Despite international skepticism, the Protocol 
entered into force in February of 2005 on the ninetieth day after being ratified by 55 
nations.  
The first commitment period for the Kyoto standard began in 2008 and ended in 
December of 2012. At the December 2012 Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 
UNFCCC, states voted to renew the Kyoto Protocol for another commitment period after 
attaching amendments on issues such as the length of the commitment period and list of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) chemicals. The second commitment period began January 1, 2013 
and will end in 2020.
225
  Currently, the Kyoto Protocol has 190 state parties, with one 
notable exception: The United States has not yet acceded, ratified, or approved the 
Protocol. The United States government, while initially supportive of the Kyoto Protocol 
or a similar binding legal treaty that restricted carbon emissions, ultimately rejected 
several components of the final document and eventually exhibited unwillingness to 
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cooperate under the terms of the treaty. Citing unequal costs and irreparable economic 
damage, U.S. administrations since 1997 have refused to consider any emissions 
reduction treaty that employs a similar framework as Kyoto.
226
 
Scholars have considered various factors in the United States‘ international and 
domestic decision-making process regarding climate change and environmental policy. 
Facets of the domestic political system and aspects of the U.S. political culture do not 
easily facilitate emissions reduction. First, because the U.S. political system was created 
to prevent the tyranny of big government, checks and balances and the influence of 
public opinion often discourage extensive intrusions into the private sector. The 
American public tends to view regulations and excessive taxation as intrusions on 
individual freedom. Many global environmental issues involve a multitude of 
stakeholders in domestic and international policy, and the U.S. is no exception. Industrial 
and agricultural actors have an extraordinary amount of influence in Congress through 
political donations, providing jobs to constituents, and lobbying power.
227
  Any policy 
restricting emissions would require extensive coordination between several government 
agencies, the executive branch, both houses of Congress, industry, interest groups, and 
the public. Additionally, American political culture and the historical reliance on natural 
wealth have created the emissions-dependent development path that the U.S. is so reliant 
upon, making the decision to curb development and progress for the sake of the 
                                                       
226 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for the United States becoming 
a signatory to any international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:SE00098. 
227 Henry Lee, Vicky Arroyo Cochran and Manik Roy, ―US Domestic Climate Change Policy,‖ Climate 
Policy1, no. 3 (2001): p. 382; Joanna Depledge, ―Against the Grain: United States and the Global Climate 
Change Regime,‖ Global Change, Peace and Security 17, No. 1 (February 2005): p. 12. 
 126 
environment non-intuitive.
228
 Such attitudes, along with pushback from certain political 
factions, make climate change policy politically suboptimal. However, they do not 
necessarily preclude the possibility of regulation on emissions. U.S. ratification of the 
Montreal Protocol successfully regulated industrial production in order to phase out 
harmful emissions for the ozone layer. However, a similar scenario for climate change 
has not yet unfolded. At the negotiations over the UNFCCC in 1992, the delegation 
representing the U.S. was one of the only developed countries not to agree to set 
domestic emissions reduction targets.
229
 
Under a Democratic administration, the U.S. delegation entered COP 1 in 1995 
with a more engaged attitude than at the Rio Convention, determined to negotiate an 
acceptable emissions reduction agreement that would seriously address climate change. 
The U.S. delegation established several objectives for the negotiations, including binding 
reductions for all countries, not just developed nations even though they tended to be the 
highest emitters.
230
 A powerful coalition of developing countries called the ―Green 
Group‖ challenged this notion and successfully influenced the negotiations to broker an 
agreement that reflected the Berlin Mandate, which codified the polluter pays paradigm, 
placing the entire cost of reducing GHG emissions on Annex I countries, paving the way 
for the Kyoto Protocol. 
This mandate carried over into COP 2 in 1996 where the U.S. delegation agreed 
to negotiate legally binding emissions reductions and to align themselves with a majority 
of their Western allies by accepting the polluter pays paradigm, much to the chagrin of 
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domestic industrial actors and the Republican Congress. After proposing a timetable that 
would place binding targets on all nations, including developing countries by 2005, the 
U.S. delegation proposed a strategy to satisfy both the principles in the Berlin Mandate 
(polluter pays paradigm) and the U.S. Congress, which was frustrated by the lack of 
developing country participation. This strategy would allow a seven-year window for 
industrialized nations to bear the cost of binding reductions while developing countries 
prepared their economies domestically for implementation beginning in 2005. Both the 
coalition of developing countries in the negotiations and Congress rejected the proposal. 
In response to the debates over developing country participation in the Kyoto 
negotiations, Congress passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, formally requesting to the 
President that the delegation not accept any treaty that does not include binding emissions 
reductions on developing countries. While not legally compelling, the bipartisan 
Resolution put significant limitations on the delegation because it indicated that 
ratification by the Senate would be unlikely for any treaty not adhering to those state 
aims.
231
 The Resolution additionally demanded that the U.S. delegation not accept any 
treaty that would harm the U.S. economy. The Clinton Administration‘s proposals also 
differed significantly from the rigorous measures proposed by other industrialized 
countries at Kyoto. In order to keep economic effects to a minimum, President Clinton 
continued with his CCAP plan, but extended the deadline to 2008, pledging to reduce 
emissions to the 1990 level by that deadline. Other nations in the negotiations were under 
the impression that all industrialized countries would have to reduce their emissions 
below the 1990 level. 
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The final objective of the U.S. delegation was to create a series of flexibility 
mechanisms to mitigate the costs of meeting the assigned emissions targets. The 
delegation was willing to compromise on the level of reduction, but would absolutely not 
accept moving the deadline earlier than 2010. In addition the U.S. delegation proposed 
mechanisms such as borrowing, banking, joint implementation, and emissions trading as 
ways to assist countries in meeting their reductions targets. Banking refers to allowing 
unused emissions credits to carry over into future reductions periods, while borrowing 
would allow one country to borrow emissions allowances from future periods to meet the 
present one. The banking option did make it into the final treaty, but the borrowing 
option did not. These mechanisms were innovative to other countries at the table, but 
further exemplified the exceptionalism of U.S. ambitions to make the binding targets as 
easy as possible on the domestic economy. 
Eventually, eighty-four states adopted the Kyoto Protocol without developing 
country participation, thereby placing high costs on the U.S. and other Annex I states for 
reducing emissions past 1990 levels, a higher amount than advocated by President 
Clinton. The U.S. delegation decided to work with the international community instead of 
abandoning the core environmental beliefs of the Administration, despite the increasing 
opposition in Congress. The U.S. signed the Protocol in 1998, but leadership in the 
Senate declared the ratification ―dead-upon-arrival.‖ The Clinton Administration sent 
delegations to future discussions over the implementation of the Protocol, and continued 
to support the UNFCCC vision, but when George W. Bush won the Presidency in 2000, 
the new president rapidly declared that he had ―no interest‖ in the provisions of the Kyoto 
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Protocol and that pursuing CO2 reduction had been a mistake.
232
 Even though many U.S. 
officials during the Clinton Administration pledged to continue with the Kyoto process in 
order to broker a version of the Kyoto Protocol that the U.S. could ratify, the strong 
rhetoric against the principles of the Protocol from President Bush shocked many in the 
international community. Since the rejection of the statute, the U.S. has continued to 
reject the Kyoto Protocol as it is, despite ratification by 190 nations, and has begun to 
address climate change independent of the international community. 
U.S. Involvement in the Kyoto Protocol 
The United States‘ interaction with the Kyoto Protocol, relative to the Multilateral Policy 
Scale, evolved significantly from the time negotiations began in 1996 to the present 
discussions. The U.S. has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, completely rejecting the 
provisions of the treaty and choosing to address climate change unilaterally, bilaterally, 
and even through other multilateral forums. The U.S. has not complied, even informally, 
with the expectations of the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. has not offered any resources to the 
Kyoto Protocol‘s mechanisms. While the U.S. initially showed substantial diplomatic 
support for an international agreement with binding emissions targets like Kyoto, over 
time, that support withered, and the Protocol as it has stood has enjoyed relatively little 
diplomatic recognition from the United States since 2005. 
With respect to the first level of the Policy Scale, the United States has not ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol and there is evidence of the lowest value: obstruction. The delegation 
to the negotiations in 1998 put a signature on the treaty as an indication of U.S. 
willingness to continue to work on making the Protocol a treaty that the U.S. Senate 
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could ratify—a treaty that met the two main U.S. objectives: binding reductions for 
developing countries and no harm to the U.S. economy.
233
 The Republican controlled 
Congress at this time had already slashed spending on several mandatory and 
discretionary funding programs that attempted to reduce emissions, which made 
movement toward Kyoto emissions targets less likely. President Clinton, after signing the 
UNFCCC and planning the CCAP program, continued to support the idea of an 
international treaty addressing climate change. At COP 2, the U.S. delegation, led by 
Undersecretary of Global Affairs Timothy Wirth, stated that the U.S. would support 
binding emissions reductions in an international agreement.
234
 In 1997, before the 
negotiations for the Protocol began, Clinton addressed the National Geographic Society 
stating, 
Today we have a clear responsibility and a golden opportunity to 
conquer one of the most important challenges of the 21st century -- the 
challenge of climate change -- with an environ- mentally sound and 
economically strong strategy, to achieve meaningful reductions in 
greenhouse gases in the United States and throughout the industrialized 
and the developing world. It is a strategy that, if properly implemented, 
will create a wealth of new opportunities for entrepreneurs at home, 
uphold our leadership abroad, and harness the power of free markets to 
free our planet from an unacceptable risk; a strategy consistent with our 
commitment to reject false choices.
235
 
 
From the early days of his presidency, Clinton had consistently spoken on behalf of the 
scientific research that attributes climate change to human development and its 
subsequent dangers for the Earth‘s environment. However, when the international 
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negotiating began, many skeptics inside his administration significantly limited the U.S. 
position. According to the head of the U.S. delegation at the Kyoto negotiations, Under 
Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, 
Congress held the key to Kyoto implementation. He expressed the Clinton 
Administration‘s willingness to implement national policy and continue to work with the 
international community on forming an acceptable agreement, but that no action should 
take place without the consent of Congress.
236
 Indeed, Congressional attitudes 
significantly limited the ability of the executive‘s treaty-making power. The Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution, passed by Congress in June of 1997, determined the proposals that the U.S. 
delegation would take to Kyoto and established the circumstances under which the Senate 
would ratify such a treaty. 
The United States should not be a signatory to any protocol…which 
would mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement 
also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the 
same compliance period or would result in serious harm to the U.S. 
economy.
237
 
 
During 1998, the House of Representatives held several hearings debating the science, 
geopolitics, and economics of the Kyoto Protocol provisions. During a hearing before the 
House Committee on Small Business, several scientists from the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) informed policy makers of the scientific projections on the 
effects of climate change on human life. Conservative members of the committee met 
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these analyses with skepticism. In a hearing titled, ―The Kyoto Protocol: the 
Undermining of American Prosperity- The Science,‖ Chairman James Talent (R-MO) 
began the proceedings stating, ―My research into this subject suggests that the 
catastrophic global warming predictions of the Kyoto Protocol are based primarily on the 
pretense of a consensus within the scientific community, when in fact no such consensus 
exists.‖238 Declaring the scientific reports initially misleading, Chairman Talent 
continued to criticize and question the scientists in attendance regarding their global 
warming data. During yet another hearing before the House Committee on Foreign 
Relations, members of the committee expressed concern over the costs to American 
citizens in industry, the effect of emission reduction regulation on job creation, and 
infringement upon U.S. sovereignty. Congresswoman Jo Ann Emerson, who observed the 
Kyoto negotiations, vehemently condemned the agreement as harmful to American 
citizens and to the American economy. 
The scientific community is at odds about whether or not so-called 
global warming is happening, so…on one hand we have an uncertain 
―threat of global warming.‖ On the other hand, we have the reality of a 
treaty that will destroy American jobs and leave American families 
scrambling to find ways to simply pay the monthly electric bill.
239
 
 
Finally, there was a domestic concern from Congressional leadership over the effects of 
climate change negotiation on U.S. national security interests. The language in the Kyoto 
Protocol addresses circumstances where military action may need to use more fuel 
emissions in the interest of national security, and allows any multilateral operation 
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pursuant to the United Nations Charter to be exempt from emissions reductions. 
However, according to U.S. critics, this exemption is highly problematic for unilateral 
U.S. military operations that should not be restricted by an international treaty.
240
 When 
the negotiation process ended and the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, the U.S. Senate, 
declared that it did not meet U.S. standards for climate change regulations and would 
therefore have no chance of being ratified. Congressional leaders cited this decision as 
one based on concerns over cost to American taxpayers, non-conclusive and 
contradictory scientific study, and national security interests. However, the U.S. remained 
committed to attending future negotiations among parties to the Protocol to broker a 
treaty that would eventually require binding emissions reductions for developing 
countries, therefore, possibly allowing the treaty to pass in the Senate. 
Before the U.S. could broker a deal that assured developing country participation 
and acknowledgement of American exceptionalism in economic and military terms, 
George W. Bush was elected President with help from an ideologically conservative base 
and support from industry. In June of 2001, President Bush declared the Kyoto Protocol 
―fundamentally flawed‖ due to its costs to the American economy and the expected one 
percent decrease in U.S. GDP through implementing measures, the treaty‘s lack of 
inclusion of developing countries, the difficulty with which other industrialized nations 
will have with their implementation programs, and the idea that the provisions of the 
treaty are based on uncertain scientific data.
241
 During the Bush era, the executive and 
legislative branches abandoned any pretenses towards signing the Protocol as it stood. 
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The United States stopped attending implementation meetings and the parties to the 
Protocol continued to discuss implementation periods, enforcement mechanisms, and 
flexibility targets without input from the world‘s most powerful polluter. 
When President Barack Obama took office in 2009, his administration quickly 
acknowledged the dangers facing the world due to global warming. During his 2008 
campaign and as a president-elect, Obama introduced a domestic cap-and-trade program 
that would effectively regulate greenhouse gas emissions for domestic businesses through 
a market structure incentive program and promised to invest $15 billion per year for 
alternative energy solutions. He praised the continual effort of the international 
community toward addressing climate change, but he did not express any intention to 
sign the Kyoto Protocol, and began coordinating an effort to negotiate an alternative 
treaty to obstruct the existing regime.
242
 The views on climate change gratified several 
world environmental leaders and organizations, warranting recognition from the UNEP 
Executive Director Achim Steiner, and from the director of the UNFCCC, Yvo de Boer. 
Both indicated that Obama‘s apparent willingness to engage with the international 
community over climate change issues was a promising step towards achieving a climate 
change agreement that the U.S. could sign and comply with, unlike the Kyoto Protocol.
243
 
However, President Obama‘s cap and trade program was never signed into law and 
reflected continued Congressional unwillingness to seriously regulate industrial GHG 
emissions. 
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The U.S. continued to attend meetings of states parties to the UNFCCC in 
Copenhagen, Durban, and Doha, but entered the meetings with a specific objective of 
replacing the Kyoto Protocol, not signing it or improving it. Therefore, after President 
Clinton left office in 2001, there has been no significant effort on the part of the U.S. 
President or Congress to reconsider a new policy towards the Kyoto Protocol and ratify it 
as it stands. Instead, the U.S., has, over the last ten years obstructed the Protocol‘s 
legitimacy by pushing for a better alternative. Accordingly, after the U.S. pulled out of 
the agreement, many environmental scholars, observers, and states viewed the treaty as 
fundamentally ineffectual and the international community has attempted to replace it. 
The U.S. has supported efforts to create a new treaty and to institute unilateral emissions 
reductions programs rather than comply with the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, 
indicating that it has satisfied the ‗obstruction‘ component of the Multilateral Policy 
Scale. This means that the U.S. not only refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and accept 
such aggressive regulations on domestic industry, but also has actively sought alternative 
solutions to addressing global climate change, therefore undermining the Protocol‘s 
relevance and effectiveness. 
Because the U.S. is not a signatory or member of the Kyoto Protocol, there has 
been no effort to institute the reduction targets in the Kyoto treaty—five percent below 
1990 levels—into domestic law which would allow the U.S. to comply informally. 
According to reports from the Department of Energy, total U.S. CO2 emissions from 
energy consumption rose steadily from 2001 to 2007, from 5754.533 million metric tons 
to 6,026.284 million metric tons, but began to fall between 2007 and 2011, from 6,026 
 136 
million metric tons to 5,490.631 million metric tons.
244
 In addition to the slight decrease 
in total emissions in the past five years, domestic carbon emissions per capita underwent 
a more dramatic reduction. The number of metric tons per person per year decreased 14 
percent from 2008 to 2010, indicating an overall decrease in individuals‘ carbon 
footprints. While the federal government imposed relatively few regulations on industry, 
increased media attention around the effects of climate change have created more mindful 
citizens who make choices in their everyday lives to limit their effect on the global 
warming phenomenon, whether it be purchasing a hybrid vehicle, being more mindful to 
fuel economy standards, or riding bicycles instead of driving cars. Rising gas prices and 
the general economic slow down since 2008 also contributed to emission reductions, 
leading to a steady per capita emissions decrease in the last four years. However, total 
emissions have fallen only slightly and levels are still over three times as high as any 
other emitter globally. In addition, any progress that the U.S. has made towards 
mitigating effects on the atmosphere has not been because of Kyoto Protocol provisions 
or mandates. The U.S. has not provided any improvement according to the treaty goals 
for Annex I countries and does not operate according to such targets. 
The United States has not provided any financial support or resources to the 
Kyoto Protocol or any of its mechanisms, nor has it engaged with any joint 
implementation or clean development projects to promote global climate change.  In 
addition, while committed to sustainable development through other mechanisms such as 
the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund, the U.S. does not 
contribute to developing country sustainable development projects through the Kyoto 
Protocol mechanisms themselves (i.e. the Clean Development Mechanism). 
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The United States originally introduced the three flexibility mechanisms, the 
CDM, joint implementation, and the carbon emissions trading during the initial 
negotiations at Kyoto, all intended to make the targets easier for Annex I countries to 
meet and to make the treaty easier to sell to a hostile Congress. The U.S. delegation was 
successful in codifying joint implementation, clean development initiatives, and carbon 
commodification, which were included in the final treaty. But, the U.S. didn‘t join and 
therefore does not participate in their implementation or their activities. Instead, the U.S. 
has pledged to join other similar organizations such as the Green Climate Fund, which 
was created at the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC in Cancun, Mexico in 2010, and 
pledged to contribute to a kick start fund of $30 billion over a three year period, 2010 to 
2012 for sustainable development.
245
 The U.S. pledged $1.7 billion between 2010 and 
2012 to support developing countries‘ sustainable development, low emissions 
projects.
246
 Therefore, in the past three years, the U.S. has supported alternate 
mechanisms for funding development projects and has preferred to put funding into 
UNFCCC mechanisms, not Kyoto mechanisms, due to the general U.S. opinion that the 
Kyoto agreement is too flawed to be effective. 
The Kyoto Protocol, since 1997, has received relatively little diplomatic support 
from the United States. In its early days, the U.S. enthusiastically pursued a binding 
international agreement that would impose global emissions targets and attempt to 
mitigate the greenhouse effect. Even after Congressional skepticism over the economic 
consequences to the U.S. economy and the lack of developing country participation, 
                                                       
245 ―Governance and Mandate,‖ The Green Climate Fund, http://gcfund.net/about-the-fund/mandate-and-
governance.html; Note: Green Climate Fund is a body mandated by the UNFCCC as a whole and is distinct 
from the Clean Development Mechanism, which is a mechanism only for the Kyoto Protocol. 
246 ―Summary of Developed Country Fast-Start Climate Finance Pledges,‖ World Resources Institute, 
(November 18, 2011) p. 6, http://pdf.wri.org/climate_finance_pledges_2011-11-18.pdf. 
 138 
President Clinton continued to support the Kyoto efforts. In a statement in December of 
1998, Clinton praised the efforts by Vice President Gore and Deputy Secretary Eizentat, 
―I am very pleased that the United States has reached an historic agreement with other 
nations of the world to take unprecedented action to address global warming. This 
agreement is environmentally strong and economically sound…no nation is more 
committed to this effort than the United States.‖247 In the same statement, Clinton 
acknowledged the limitations of the Protocol in the view of its opponents and expressed 
the desire to continue working with the other members of the Kyoto Protocol to reach an 
international agreement that would include developing country participation. The U.S. 
continued to attend COP meetings for the parties of the UNFCCC, in 1998 in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, in 1999 in Bonn, Germany, and in 2000 in The Hague, Netherlands in 
order to discuss implementation plans for the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. delegation‘s main 
objective was to include any language in the treaty that would convince the U.S. 
Congress that there is a potential for future developing country participation.
248
 This 
objective was not realized and when President Bush took office in 2001, U.S. diplomatic 
support for the Kyoto Protocol chilled and no longer indicated willingness to ratify the 
agreement upon further negotiations. 
This post-2001 shift in stance towards the Kyoto Protocol began a roundly 
negative diplomatic campaign against the Kyoto Protocol. After the initial statements by 
President Bush in June of 2001 when he declared the treaty fundamentally flawed, other 
U.S. officials in diplomatic capacities continued to express the Administration‘s 
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criticisms of the treaty. Later in 2001, Harlan Watson, who was a senior climate change 
negotiator and a ―special representative‖ of the United States, spoke publically against 
the Kyoto Protocol at an international conference in London. 
The United States does not believe that the Kyoto Protocol is the right 
answer to the challenge of climate change. The Protocol is flawed -- its 
targets are arbitrary and in many cases unrealistic, it does not include 
developing countries, and its costs would harm the U.S. economy. The 
United States has made it very clear that it does not intend to ratify the 
Protocol.
249
 
 
At COP 7 in Marrakesh, Morocco, where the implementation plan for the Kyoto Protocol 
was decided in 2001, the United States representative Paula Dobriansky emphasized the 
distinction between activities under the Kyoto Protocol and activities under the 
Framework Convention. The U.S. would continue to constructively contribute to 
discussions on reducing climate change and fostering global participation under its treaty 
obligations for the UNFCCC, but will not accept any obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol, funding or otherwise.
250
 
In addition to the explicit diplomatic condemnation of the Kyoto Protocol 
received by U.S. officials after 2001, the administration initiated more subtle diplomatic 
efforts to ensure the demise of the Kyoto Protocol as the dominant international 
agreement on mitigating climate change. The Bush Administration began reiterating in 
subsequent COP meetings that the U.S. recognized that the problem of climate change 
could not be solved unilaterally, and was committed to finding an ―acceptable‖ global, 
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multilateral solution to reduce GHG emissions.
251
 At this point, the United States began 
pursuing two diplomatic avenues. The first was to begin to use the COP meetings as 
negotiations for an alternative multilateral treaty that would include developing country 
participation and less stringent obligations for the United States, lowering the impact on 
the economy. The second was to begin negotiating bilateral agreements with other 
nations and attack climate change by circumventing existing multilateral channels. In 
2001, the United States signed a joint research agreement with Italy
252
 and a joint climate 
mitigation agreement with Spain.
253
 In 2002 alone, the U.S. engaged in bilateral 
partnerships to reduce climate change with ―Australia, Canada, China, seven Central 
American countries (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and Panama), the European Union, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New 
Zealand, on issues ranging from climate change science to energy and sequestration 
technology to policy approaches.‖254 
In addition to bilateral approaches, the Bush Administration sponsored smaller 
multilateral initiatives with a more regional focus. In 2005, the U.S., Australia, South 
Korea, China, Japan and India created The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate which addressed sustainable development, low emissions 
trading, and a development bank to finance clean energy projects. The U.S. proposed 
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spending $52 million towards this initiative in the 2007 Appropriations budget.
255
 In 
2007, the State Department released the U.S. delegation‘s goals for the climate 
negotiations at COP 13 in Bali, which included a ―roadmap‖ for future climate change 
negotiations to be decided by 2009 and implemented in 2012, after the expiration of the 
Kyoto Protocol‘s first commitment period.256 President Obama continued upon this 
trajectory, and sent delegations to Copenhagen in 2009, Cancun in 2010, and Durban in 
2011 in order to negotiate a new international agreement on reducing climate change. The 
results of these conferences have so far dismayed climatologists, scientists, and 
environmentalists alike, for states have yet to produce a viable new treaty with binding 
targets and timeframes. COP 15 in Copenhagen was expected to be a turning point in 
international climate change agreements, and President Obama expected to broker a new 
treaty that would replace Kyoto and remain within the UNFCCC. The parties fell short of 
this aspiration. The only outcome of Copenhagen was the ―Copenhagen Accord‖ which, 
while setting ambitious goals for climate finance, did not clearly give a date for which 
emissions targets should be met when and contained no compliance mechanism that 
would incentivize any nation to stop emitting GHGs.
257
 Finally, in Doha, Qatar in 
December of 2012, parties to the Kyoto Protocol surprised many climate change watchers 
by renewing the Protocol for a second commitment period, to expire in 2020. 
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The level of U.S. involvement in the Kyoto Protocol largely falls on the negative side of 
the Multilateral Policy Scale. The evolution of the independent variable is demonstrated 
in the visuals below: 
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The Senate, from the beginning of the negotiations refused to ratify a treaty that did not 
include developing country support or economic flexibility. By the end of the Clinton 
Administration, the U.S. delegation did not succeed in brokering a Protocol that would 
satisfy the requirements delineated by the Byrd-Hagel Resolution and despite Clinton‘s 
ambitions to revise the treaty, the Kyoto Protocol was never ratified. The Bush and 
Obama Administrations also agreed that the treaty was flawed and that U.S. ratification 
of that particular agreement would not be feasible. They, therefore, began pursuing 
alternative means to address climate change and to fulfill their obligations under the 
UNFCCC. In addition to opposing the Kyoto Protocol, both administrations sought to 
replace it with bilateral agreements or new multilateral treaties under the UNFCCC 
framework. Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol was never an option for the United States, and 
all efforts to negotiate a Protocol that the U.S. could sign ended in 2001. 
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The Effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol 
In order to address effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, this chapter employs the 
framework previously addressed in the first section by combining the theories of Gutner 
and Thompson and those of Thomas Bernauer.
258
 The Kyoto Protocol is assessed based 
first on output performance and how well it has achieved its stated goals so far. The 
primary scope of this measurement will be from 2008 through 2012, its first commitment 
period and will be applied to total global reductions as well as various geographic 
regions. This section then assesses the extent to which the Kyoto Protocol contributed to 
the global process of mitigating climate change through international agreements by 
looking at its internal structural mechanisms and the contributions Kyoto has made to 
further multilateral approaches to environmental issues. 
Generally, scholars who wrote before the Kyoto Protocol even entered into force doubted 
its ability to be a successful treaty. Scientists, after calculating the costs of implementing 
the Protocol, determined that even with U.S. participation, aggregate emissions for 
Annex I countries would only fall to about 3 percent below 1990 levels, not the 5 percent 
as initially stated.
259
 Without United States support Protocol mechanisms would be 
underfunded and the market that drives carbon trading would be significantly limited. In 
addition to those institutional effects, by 2002, parties to the Kyoto Protocol, absent the 
U.S., China, and India, covered only 30 percent of global emissions. In addition to the 
lack of U.S. support, some observed that the EU, Japan, and Canada were not on target to 
meet their reduction targets, which, in 2004, made the Protocol‘s entry into force 
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unlikely.
260
 It was also unlikely that China, India, or Brazil would agree to any reduction 
in carbon emissions, since those delegations repeatedly emphasized their lack of 
responsibility for the problem and their limited capacity to implement the changes.
261
 
Some of the problems that scholars associate with the Kyoto Protocol and its 
shortcomings deal with economics of global warming agreements and the structure of the 
emissions limits. 
First, reductions past 1990 levels seemed arbitrary to many observers to the 
agreement. The criticism that choosing a historical date leaves out several more accurate 
indications of reducing the impact on the environment such as carbon concentrations, 
temperature, or costs.
262
 In addition, some scholars considered the idea of limiting 
quantity of emissions troublesome because it does not consider differentiated economic 
growth among states and uncertain technological futures.
263
 Some literature suggests that 
instead of assigning a quantity reduction of carbon emissions relative to a baseline year, 
the international community should decide on a harmonized domestic carbon tax and 
establish the desired baseline at a zero-carbon-tax. This approach would prevent volatility 
in carbon prices and allow states to operate on more familiar terms: countries have been 
debating and negotiating over tariffs and tax treatment for many years. Quantity-based 
emissions reductions require more knowledge of science and technology than was 
available. While those structural observations are not without fault, the arguments 
represent a consensus that the Kyoto Protocol was structurally flawed. Relating to those 
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structural problems, some scholars also posit that Kyoto was a short-term agreement with 
the intention of being a long-term agreement. The treaty assumes that developing 
countries could make rapid reductions in a short time frame, but it does not acknowledge 
the sheer length of time it will take in order to implement sustainable and lasting 
substitutes for GHG emissions. Technological advancement, alternative energy science, 
and industrial turnaround could take decades to develop to the extent expected by the 
emissions targets in the Protocol.
264
 It is not a sustainable document, which has became 
evident in the lead up to the first commitment period, which was only five years. The 
most recent COP meetings have reflected the general opinion that the Kyoto Protocol is 
not a sustainable framework, because a majority of those meetings are spent attempting to 
negotiate a replacement. Therefore, the literature on the effectiveness of the Kyoto 
Protocol is largely based on skepticism and structural criticism. Before the Protocol 
entered into force, and before the first commitment period began, many authors disagreed 
with the agreed framework and were dubious about its ability to achieve lasting 
environmental effects without the support of the United States, China, India, or Brazil. 
The first indicator of effectiveness measured in this chapter is how well the 
institution achieved its stated goals. Scientifically, the Kyoto Protocol wanted to reduce 
aggregate GHG emissions for Annex I countries to 5.2 percent below 1990 baseline 
levels. Looking at various scientific indicators of climate change including CO2 
emissions, global temperature, sea levels, and Arctic ice areas, it is easy to see why 
scientists have been dismayed by the lack of progress. Since 2005, global carbon 
concentration in the atmosphere has risen nearly twenty parts per million (ppm), up from 
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378 to 395 ppm.
265
 Global temperatures have risen approximately .8 degrees Celsius in 
the last century. Land ice and Arctic ice have continued to decline sharply, and the sea 
level has risen nearly two meters since 1900. While a century may seem like a long time, 
the speed with which climate change effects can occur has created a rather dismal portrait 
of the next 100 years if countries continue their ―business as usual‖ emissions. 
Scientists have determined the physical consequences that will accompany every 
degree increase in global temperature. Approaching a one-degree
266
 increase, crop yields 
will begin to decline in several developing regions, coral reefs will incur irreversible 
damage, and mountain glaciers will melt, significantly impacting water supply in some 
regions. Above a two-degree increase in global temperature, scientists predict that there 
could be a 25 to 60 percent increase in people at risk of hunger, significant impacts on 
water supply, increased frequency of floods and hurricanes, large extinction, and the 
onset of complete destruction of the Amazon basin. Scholars have also determined that 
the environmental degradation associated with climate change could significantly impact 
security arrangements due to food shortages and migrations.
267
 Above a three-degree 
increase, various ecosystems would become irreversibly damaged and all areas of the 
globe would be affected by food shortages, increased intensity of storms and forest fires, 
water shortages, and abrupt changes in the climate system. Around the five-degree 
increase mark, rising sea levels would threaten coastal cities such as London, New York, 
and Shanghai.
268
 Globally, GHG trends per capita have decreased since 2008 in the 
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United States and Europe, but have dramatically increased in China, India, and other 
developing countries. However, total global GHG emissions continue to rise 
dramatically, despite total reductions by the EU. However, the question this section 
answers is, how much of these environmental effects were caused by the Kyoto Protocol? 
Looking at the original treaty goal regarding binding emissions reduction targets- 
at 5 percent below 1990 levels for Annex I, on face value, it appears that the Protocol has 
been successful in this regard. Out of the 37 Annex I countries, their aggregate reductions 
reached around 8 percent below 1990 levels during the first commitment period.
269
 This 
apparent success is mitigated by two factors. First, most of the progress in global 
emissions reduction came from Europe, where many of the EU countries underwent rapid 
de-industrialization in the post-Cold War era, accounting for an inevitable decline in 
emissions. While deindustrialization does mitigate climate change, the Kyoto Protocol 
targets themselves did not cause this emissions reduction in Europe. The second 
mitigating circumstance is the dramatic increase in GHG emissions from developing 
countries, which has driven total global emissions upward. The Kyoto Protocol does not 
include binding restrictions on these non-Annex I countries‘ emissions, but rather 
attempts to incentivize Annex I parties to invest in clean development projects through 
the CDM, joint implementation and carbon trading mechanisms. The data trends, 
showing a rapid increase in emissions in non-Annex I parties indicate that those 
mechanisms have not had significant success in mitigating climate change in regions that 
do not have the internal capacity to meet reduction targets. Therefore, while the original 
treaty goal was accomplished during the first commitment period, its significance was 
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greatly mitigated by external factors and the inability of the Protocol to adequately stem 
emissions from developing countries. 
The second measure of effectiveness addresses how much the institution has 
contributed to global processes to stem climate change through international cooperation. 
This section analyses internal process performance in addition to how that institutional 
structure is contributing to the global discussion on environmental governance relating to 
climate change. The Clean Development Mechanism, discussed in the initial Protocol 
agreement in 1997 and officially adopted in Marrakesh in 2001, is one of the most 
frequently scrutinized institutional mechanisms relating to climate change and sustainable 
development. While established to incentivize Annex I countries into investing in clean 
energy projects in non-Annex I countries by having those emission reduction credits 
applied domestically, the CDM plays a complicated role in achieving sustainable 
development. Several studies have concluded that CDM tends to prefer cost-effective 
projects as opposed to projects that would be the most sustainable, which has caused 
friction between the CDM and leaders of recipient countries, who feared that Annex I 
countries would fund the cheapest, easiest options with little regard to the development 
needs of the recipients.
270
 In a study conducted in 2006, the resulting data on the impact 
of CDM projects exemplified this trade-off between cost effective development projects 
that will achieve rapid carbon reductions and sustainable development. While only 1 
percent of the projects were projected to achieve sustainable development, over 75 
percent of the projects achieved carbon reductions.
271
 While successful in the short term, 
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these projects have not succeeding in establishing sustainable development in regions and 
those developing countries have continued to emit at a higher rate. 
The other prominent internal mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol is the carbon-
trading scheme that was implemented as a flexibility mechanism for Annex I countries to 
achieve their targets. This system allots a certain amount of emission permits per state, 
and if the state had extra units to spare, it can sell them to countries that exceed their 
assigned targets. The price of carbon should be higher than costs of cutting emissions, to 
incentivize firms into reducing emissions instead of relying on the purchase emissions 
credits. The markets can be implemented at the national or regional level and 
governments would be responsible for setting emissions limits on certain sectors or firms. 
The European Union currently has the largest regional market for emissions trading, and 
has been moderately successful in reducing emissions. Calculations for the emissions 
reduced due to carbon trading scheme were above 50 million tons of carbon, with around 
65 percent of firms participating in cleaner energy initiatives.
272
 
However, the European system represents a modest success compared to the nine 
billion metric tons of carbon in the atmosphere as a product of GHGs and has not 
experienced a good record of implementation. The European system currently assigns 
firms their emissions allowances based on past emissions problems, incentivizing firms to 
emit extra tons of CO2 in order to get more allowances down the road. In addition, 
because this market structure is forward-looking and firms are attempting to maximize 
future benefits, the price of carbon in future periods is a very important factor. But the 
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Kyoto commitment periods are only five years in length and are not suited to long-term 
price assessment of carbon units. Again, with the implementation of carbon markets 
under Kyoto Protocol provisions, problems arise due to the short-term nature of the 
treaty. The Kyoto Protocol with its various scientific uncertainties and short commitment 
periods does not encourage investment in sustainable development or in firms to invest in 
long-term carbon reductions and therefore is unable to contribute to the expanding global 
climate change efforts. 
The final measure of internal process performance as it relates to internal 
effectiveness focus on the compliance and enforcement mechanisms currently employed 
by the Protocol. The inability to create reliable enforcement mechanisms has been one of 
the most publically criticized components of the Protocol during the first commitment 
period. In 2011, Canada withdrew from the agreement, citing economic difficulties and 
inability to even come close to meeting its Kyoto obligations. After Canada‘s withdrawal, 
Russia announced that it would not be taking any additional measures to comply with the 
Protocol and did not renew their commitments at the Doha meeting. Canada, in recent 
years, has demonstrated its preference to align itself with U.S. domestic climate change 
legislation. During debates in the Canadian House of Commons in 2011 on climate 
change, some MPs emphasized that the United States should be a target for Canadian 
investment in sustainable development.
273
 In addition, the Canadian government has 
agreed to align its emissions reduction regulations with those of the United States in order 
to reduce GHG emissions by seventeen percent by 2020.
274
 Therefore, there is some 
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evidence that Canada is following the U.S. example on climate change policy, and if the 
U.S. had joined the Kyoto Protocol, Canada might not have withdrawn. 
One of the most difficult principles for any international organization is how to 
keep nations within the regime even if it is not in their interest. A Compliance 
Committee, made up of twenty representatives from different regions, monitors a 
complex compliance system under the Protocol. When a state submits a question 
regarding possible non-compliance, the Enforcement Board of the Compliance 
Committee assembles preliminary and annual reports to determine if a state is in non-
compliance with its treaty commitments. If so, the Committee enacts consequences that 
consist of an action plan to make up for lost emissions and loss of participation in various 
financial mechanisms.
275
 Thus, the compliance mechanism is structured to incentivize 
states to comply by making non-compliance costly. However, if a state does not comply, 
it submits itself themselves to the sanctions imposed by the Compliance Committee.  
Under these circumstances a state can either accept the increased financial burden, or 
withdraw from the agreement. As evidenced by the recent withdrawal of Russia and 
Canada because of non-compliance, states are more likely to choose the latter option 
because the costs of remaining party to the treaty outweigh the benefits. Overall, despite 
being a crucial step towards a legally binding agreement to mitigate climate change, the 
Kyoto Protocol is a short-term document with longer-term mechanisms, rendering them 
slow and ineffective. The cost-benefit scheme of complying with the Kyoto Protocol is a 
crucial component in assessing how the U.S. might impact the Kyoto Protocol‘s 
effectiveness. The next section will explore the relationship between the variables. 
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U.S. Impact on the Effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol 
This section applies process-tracing methods to both variables to determine 
whether U.S. involvement has had an impact on the Kyoto Protocol‘s effectiveness. 
Several aspects of the Kyoto Protocol‘s effectiveness assessment can be influenced by 
U.S. policy, and this section argues that in some areas, increased U.S. support could help 
the Protocol be more effective, particularly in the CDM and emissions trading 
mechanism. However, the overall progress and structural shortcomings of the Kyoto 
Protocol—problems with compliance or investment—would not have been more 
effective even if the United States had joined and cooperated from the very beginning. 
This finding contradicts the ―indispensible‖ theory, because it indicates that the U.S. may 
not possess the ability to make an institution operate more efficiently and achieve better 
results. The primary rationale for this finding comes from the economic and technical 
preferences demonstrated by the United States over decades of addressing climate threats, 
and from the emissions regulation trajectory the U.S. was on during the implementation 
period of the Kyoto Protocol. Both of those factors would have significantly limited the 
U.S.‘s ability to comply with the treaty. This section argues that instead of incurring fines 
and costs for non-compliance, the U.S. would have withdrawn from the treaty in a similar 
manner to that of Canada. 
First, it is imperative to address certain mechanisms within the Kyoto Protocol 
that could be significantly improved with a higher level of U.S. involvement. First, the 
Clean Development Mechanism, a crucial tool to ensure developing country support, 
relies on the willingness of Annex I countries like the United States to invest in projects 
that encourage sustainable development in non-Annex I countries. The CDM‘s record on 
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establishing long-term, sustainable results has been poor, with donors preferring cost 
effective solutions in the short term instead of investing in sustainable projects. If the 
United States participated in this system, it is likely that they would be willing to invest 
in more sustainable projects. Evidence for this preference was first demonstrated during 
the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol. A clean development mechanism that would 
encourage developing country participation was an American idea. One of the reasons for 
such a mechanism is that it provides offsets in the U.S.‘s own domestic reductions 
targets. Any CDM-funded project in a development country would give the developed 
country more carbon allowances to meet its treaty obligations. Because the U.S. would 
have to incur such dramatic reductions in carbon emissions, it would have had to rely 
heavily on offsets from development projects. In addition to the flexibility afforded to 
U.S. industry from extra carbon allowances, these projects will also reduce emissions in 
developing countries and hopefully incentivize them to cut back on emissions as well. 
Given the vigor with which the U.S. pursued developing country participation, they 
would have been able to strengthen the CDM through investments. Additionally, during 
the past five years of the Obama Administration, the U.S. has demonstrated its 
willingness to invest in clean energy technologies and industries both domestically and 
abroad through the Clean Energy Ministerial, partnerships to reduce short-lived 
pollutants, enhancing tariff agreements with APEC countries, and encouraging 
sustainable use of unconventional natural gas resources in other regions.
276
 U.S. 
involvement would therefore increase the frequency of CDM projects, their 
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sustainability, and overall carbon reduction in developing countries, which is one of the 
biggest problems facing the Kyoto regime. 
By joining the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. would have developed an emissions 
trading scheme, similar to that in Europe that would have allowed for greater flexibility 
in meeting targets. The U.S. has had a strong preference for emissions trading schemes 
over the past decade, having successfully implemented emissions trading markets for acid 
rain and nitrous oxide.
277
 The Obama Administration attempted to institute a cap-and-
trade program upon arrival in office in 2009 that would require firms to meet 20 percent 
of their energy demands with alternative sources, but the legislation was defeated in the 
Senate.  By being bound to treaty obligations to make significant reductions, U.S. 
Congress would be more compelled to pass cap-and-trade laws that would allow firms 
more incentive and flexibility to meet rigorous reduction targets. So while 
implementation of an emissions trading scheme in the U.S. would help reduce overall 
global emissions, it would still be ill-suited to incentivizing long-term investment if 
adhering to the Kyoto Protocol‘s short commitment period. The EU ETS is suffering 
from low carbon prices and low incentive for long-term investment in cleaner energy 
because the commitment periods for Kyoto are so rapid. The U.S. joining the Protocol 
and implementing a similar emissions market would succumb to the same problem and 
would not make the Kyoto Protocol more structurally efficient in this way. 
However, in the other aspects of the Kyoto Protocol‘s effectiveness, the United 
States has a much more limited impact. One of the primary downfalls as discussed above 
is the weak compliance mechanism and high costs of compliance. Canada and Russia 
have withdrawn from the treaty because they did not want to continue to incur greater 
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costs associated with meeting additional targets and paying extra for non-compliance. 
The United States, if they ratified the Kyoto Protocol and accepted their emissions 
reductions, would have faced a commitment to reduce emissions by seven percent below 
1990 levels. Given that President Clinton‘s CCAP required merely returning to 1990 
levels by the year 2000, which had already proved to be too costly for U.S. industries, the 
U.S. would have a hard time complying with even more rigorous demands. The Kyoto 
Protocol asked an additional seven percent increase that would have cost the average 
American citizen an extra thousand dollars a year. By 1997, when negotiating the 
Protocol, the U.S. was not on target to meet the requirements in the CCAP. 
There was a norm within U.S. policymaking that began during the domestic 
CCAP and Kyoto debates that linked absolute emissions reduction to GDP. Without 
economic growth, the U.S. government has consistently argued that investment in clean 
energy initiatives could not happen.
278
 So, emissions in the U.S. continued to rise until 
2006 and dropped slightly in 2007, but did not come close to achieving the standard of 
seven percent below 1990 levels, much less, the promises by subsequent administrations. 
Because of the lack of progress made by the U.S. before the Kyoto Protocol was ratified 
or before the first compliance period started, the U.S. could not have complied with its 
treaty obligations and would have incurred significant costs. The U.S. has not only 
demonstrated a preference to prioritize economic issues over environmental issues, but 
has also pushed for alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol, indicating that if faced with 
increased costs due to non-compliance, the U.S. would likely withdraw from the treaty 
and choose to pursue an alternative climate change framework. The determination that 
the U.S. would not have been able to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, even if the Senate 
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had ratified it, complicates several tenets of hegemonic stability theory and the basis of 
Albright‘s original claim. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the presence of a hegemon 
does not facilitate cooperation because the structure of the institution made compliance 
too costly and the hegemon would seek an alternative. The Kyoto Protocol is in the same 
position, even without the U.S. ever having joined, and is largely seen as a weak, 
ineffective agreement that should be replaced within the next few years. 
IX. Conclusions 
After examining the case studies, it is clear that United States policy toward a 
multilateral institution has a certain amount of influence over that institution‘s 
effectiveness. These case studies suggest that while U.S. support is not a necessary 
condition for cooperation, it is necessary for more effective cooperation. Generally, 
higher values of U.S. involvement correlate with higher values of effectiveness, and areas 
with lower values of U.S. involvement correlate with lower effectiveness scores. Several 
multilateral regimes have continued to operate without U.S. support, but this thesis 
concludes that those institutions tend to be less effective than those with U.S. support. In 
order to expand upon the trends that emerged in the empirics of this paper, this 
conclusion reviews findings of each case to summarize major empirical observations. 
Then, this section explores a broader case study comparison in order to identify new 
theory and to suggest directions for future research. 
Summary of Findings 
In the case of the Montreal Protocol, the United States has ratified the agreement, 
maintained a good compliance record, contributed to the internal and structural 
components of the institution and has supported the agreement diplomatically. The 
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independent variable in this case did not result with as wide a variety as it did in other 
cases, and remained consistently positive despite several factors that could have reduced 
U.S. cooperation and support. The agreements made in the Montreal Protocol entered 
U.S. law in 1991 and consumers drastically reduced consumption of ODSs and has 
allowed the United States to meet and surpass every deadline agreed upon for developed 
states. The U.S. has successfully phased out nearly all of the ODS in domestic 
consumption, and has also contributed to the Montreal Protocol internal structure by 
sponsoring and investing in continued scientific study of the ozone layer and its 
interaction with certain chemicals, in contributing large amounts of funding and 
leadership to the Multilateral Fund, which ensures compliance and participation from 
developing countries, and by promoting the American industrial sector which 
successfully created an economically and environmentally-viable substitute which 
allowed nearly universal ratification. 
According to the definition of effectiveness explained in the introductory chapter, 
the Montreal Protocol has been very effective both in output effectiveness and internal 
performance. It has achieved a near global phase out of ODSs and universal participation 
in both developed and developing countries. Internally, the success of the Multilateral 
Fund and the development of an economically viable substitute for CFCs have influenced 
developing countries to sign onto the agreement. The Montreal Protocol‘s enforcement 
mechanism that relies on trade restrictions with states in non-compliance has ensured 
high levels of compliance. The United States‘ involvement in the Montreal Protocol had a 
significant impact on the treaty‘s ability to achieve universal ratification and high levels 
of compliance.  Because the United States produced over 50 percent of ODS emissions, 
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the Montreal Protocol could not have achieved complete global phase-out without U.S. 
participation. In addition, the United States‘ efforts to develop a chemical alternative to 
ODSs and the U.S. government‘s sponsorship of extensive scientific research on 
atmospheric chemistry influenced other states to sign the agreement. The Chinese 
delegation during the meetings of the Montreal Protocol stated that they would not sign 
an agreement unless developed countries would support their reduction efforts. Similarly, 
the United States influenced developed countries to sign onto the Protocol such as Great 
Britain, France, and Germany. Finally, U.S. compelled ratification due to domestic laws 
that restrict trade with producers of ODSs. Without the U.S. support for scientific study 
and development of alternatives, many actors would not have been compelled to sign on. 
If the U.S. had not joined the Montreal Protocol, ozone depletion would have accelerated. 
Without an international agreement, U.S. industry would not have invested in finding 
chemical alternatives because there wouldn‘t have been a market for them. Therefore, in 
this case, there is a clear indication that the U.S. greatly contributed to the capacity of the 
treaty to be more successful, achieve more compliance, and have a further reach by 
reaching universal ratification. 
Moving down the Multilateral Policy Scale, the International Aid Transparency 
Initiative demonstrated United States‘ support for an institution despite hesitating to sign 
an agreement. Despite supporting the efforts towards aid effectiveness and transparency 
enshrined in the Paris Declaration of 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, the 
United States did not immediately sign on to IATI. The U.S. participated in the 
discussions of the Technical Advisory Group of IATI after its establishment in Accra, but 
did not initially sign the agreement because it could not comply with the publication 
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obligations. The U.S. faces extraordinary domestic challenges to coordinate all aid 
spending data from twenty-four agencies because they all differ in types of data 
management systems, fields of coverage, and initial levels of publication.  Despite not 
being an original signatory to IATI, the U.S. government, particularly during the 
beginning of the Obama administration, attempted to build up capacity to comply with 
aid transparency norms through the Open Government Platform and the Foreign 
Assistance Dashboard. The Dashboard, while rudimentary in 2008, was intended to be 
the centerpiece of U.S. accomplishments in HLF-4 in Busan in 2011, and Hillary Clinton 
announced that the U.S. would sign IATI. Despite signing the agreement, passing the 
necessary domestic legislation to begin publishing to the standard, and putting out an 
implementation schedule, the U.S. has struggled to comply. The Millennium Challenge 
Corporation has achieved a high level of compliance but other U.S. agencies have lagged 
behind. Many voices from inside the U.S. government are skeptical about whether the 
U.S. will ever be able to fully comply with the IATI standard because there has been no 
significant effort from most agencies to reformat data reporting mechanisms. 
With the U.S. signature, 60 percent of global aid spending data is now committed 
to be published to the IATI standard, however, many countries, including the U.S., have 
gotten off to a slow start in their publications, which negatively affects IATI‘s output 
effectiveness. The internal process of IATI also suffers from a lack of a meaningful 
enforcement mechanism. Neither the IATI Secretariat nor the Steering Committee have 
any oversight on enforcement, and instead delegate enforcement authority to states. If 
states do not have the necessary political will, there is no way for the institution to ensure 
compliance. However, IATI does make significant advancements towards the goal of aid 
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effectiveness by using a multi-stakeholder approach, which reflects the emerging norms 
in the aid transparency regime. The U.S. has so far had a limited impact on IATI‘s 
effectiveness. The Steering Committee has not demonstrated the willingness to bend to 
U.S. preferences, and due to the slow U.S. compliance, the average data publication for 
global aid spending data remains at 34 percent. In addition, while some insiders hoped 
that U.S. signature could encourage other donors to join, there has been little evidence 
that the U.S. is a deciding factor in this area. There has not been an increase in interest by 
other states to join IATI, and only one (Belgium) has done so in the year since the U.S. 
signature. So, while U.S. involvement has hindered output effectiveness in that it is 
slowing down the publication level, it does not seem to have an impact on internal 
capacity or increased ratification by other donors. 
In the case of the International Criminal Court, the United States‘ position 
evolved significantly since 1997 when the Rome Statute was signed. While initially 
supportive of a permanent world court, the Bush Administration eventually withdrew 
support for the ICC due to several irreconcilable problems imbedded in the legal 
framework of the Court‘s structure and scope. The United States has not ratified the 
treaty, and, more than likely will not do so in the future. Until 2006, the U.S. pursued an 
active obstructionist policy towards the ICC, attempting to undermine its operations by 
promoting alternative international justice mechanisms. Diplomatically, the U.S. opposed 
the Court and passed the American Service-members‘ Protection Act that prohibited any 
U.S. official from cooperating with the Court. However, after experiencing intense 
political pressure on intervention in the Darfur genocide in 2006, the Bush administration 
abstained from a Security Council vote to initiate an ICC investigation in the region, 
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allowing the measure to pass.  In the years prior, the U.S. would have obstructed such an 
action, but after this point, the Administration demonstrated a more positive attitude 
towards the Court‘s activities by softening its public tone and engaging with the ICC 
Prosecutor. After Barack Obama took office, the attitude towards the Court thawed even 
more significantly, and U.S. officials adopted a more positive demeanor towards the 
Court‘s activities and praised the ICC on its first verdict in April of 2012. In 2011, the 
U.S. voted affirmatively to initiate an ICC investigation in Libya, and in March of 2013, 
worked together with the Rwandan government to extradite a wanted Congolese war 
criminal to the Hague for trial, a remarkable display of cooperation between the ICC and 
its most fierce opponent. 
After analyzing the effectiveness of the ICC so far, it became apparent that the 
ICC has increased in global legitimacy as a force for justice. The number of arrests, 
investigations, and cases has increased since 2006 at the time of a tacit U.S. endorsement.  
However, there are two areas in the Court‘s functioning that do no operate at their full 
capacity. The first is the uneven record on adherence to legal norms, which have 
threatened to end trials and close investigations on guilty war criminals. In addition, the 
Court still lacks capacity to affect state cooperation and has limited resources to 
apprehend individuals unless there is state cooperation. However, the ICC has 
contributed to the international criminal justice regime due to its emphasis on due 
process, complementary jurisdiction, and its global focus, and is a better alternative to 
establishing regional tribunals. 
The United States‘ involvement increased the Court‘s legitimacy by supporting 
the ICC in the Security Council and by actively supporting the Court‘s efforts in various 
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situations. In addition, due to the U.S.‘s initial preferences, if the U.S. had been a part of 
the ICC, it would have pushed for stricter adherence to legal norms and due process 
because it was adamantly against a Court that operated too unilaterally. The U.S. could 
offer increased intelligence and resources that could improve the ICC‘s record with 
finding war criminals and increasing the deterrent effects of an ICC investigation. Again, 
capacity and legitimacy emerge as two components of an organization‘s effectiveness 
that is influenced by U.S. involvement. 
Finally, the lack of United States involvement in the Kyoto Protocol has adversely 
affected both the agreement‘s external effectiveness and internal process performance. 
During the 1990s, the U.S. negotiated with other states party to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in order to create such an 
agreement. However, due to the Berlin Mandate, which codified the ‗polluter pays‘ 
paradigm, the end product—the Kyoto Protocol—placed all of the binding reduction 
requirements only on developed Annex I countries, and developing economies such as 
China and India would not be bound to costly restrictions. Due to this structural 
framework, and because of the ambitious targets contained in the Protocol, the U.S. did 
not sign, but continued to negotiate with other states during the Clinton administration to 
improve it. However, in 2001, President Bush declared the Kyoto Protocol as fatally 
flawed and withdrew the U.S. from any responsibilities or negotiations. Since then, the 
U.S. has maintained a distant and hostile policy toward the Kyoto Protocol, condemning 
it diplomatically, refusing to abide by its GHG reduction targets, channeling development 
assistance through alternative mechanisms, and actively seeking to negotiate a new treaty 
that would replace the Kyoto Protocol in subsequent years. 
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Indeed, contrasting the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol has been weak and 
largely ineffective. It did, however, meet its original goal of reducing collective CO2 
emissions in Annex I countries to 5.2 percent below 1990 levels during the first 
compliance period. But, most of this progress came from Europe that underwent massive 
deindustrialization after the Cold War, not necessarily from compliance with the Kyoto 
Protocol. In addition, emissions in developing countries have exponentially increased and 
global levels of GHGs are still continually rising. The Kyoto Protocol flexibility 
mechanisms including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), joint implementation, 
and emissions trading have been moderately successful at enticing developing countries 
to sign onto the agreement but not in reducing emissions or promoting sustainable 
development. 
The U.S. is one of the world‘s largest emitters, and global climate change could 
have been mitigated if the U.S. had adopted and complied with their obligations. In 
addition, the U.S. has demonstrated a preference to invest in sustainable development 
initiatives to spur GHG reduction in developing countries, but chooses to do so through 
alternative mechanisms to the CDM, which would be more effective with U.S. support. 
Both of these counterfactuals indicate that the Protocol‘s capacity suffers because of U.S. 
hostility. The U.S. has diplomatically campaigned for an alternative international 
agreement to replace the existing Kyoto regime, undermining its strength and legitimacy. 
Many states and climate change observers have rendered it useless and ineffective 
because it has not adequately mitigated GHG emissions, and some have even withdrawn 
from the agreement. However, by examining the counterfactual of the U.S. supporting the 
arrangement, there is little evidence that would indicate the U.S. support would have 
 166 
facilitated long-term cooperation. The trajectory of U.S. GHG emissions before Kyoto 
indicates that the U.S. could not have complied with the treaty provisions, even if it had 
signed the agreement. Instead of incurring the fines and costs of non-compliance along 
with the costs of cutting emissions at a more rapid pace, the U.S. would likely have 
pulled out of the agreement and searched for an alternative that was more aligned with its 
economic interests. Therefore, this case study indicates that the U.S. holds a considerable 
amount of influence over capacity and legitimacy, but not over compliance or 
cooperation in general. 
Theoretical Trends 
Over these four case studies, several trends emerged through the process tracing 
exercise. First, in three of the four cases, legitimacy played a large role in how U.S. 
policy could act to the benefit or detriment of a multilateral institution. When applied to 
national governments, ―legitimacy‖ refers to the acceptance of a government by a 
majority of citizens as being the rightful government. When applied to international 
organizations, legitimacy requires a more complex conceptualization because it is 
difficult to determine who the constituency is. Who confers legitimacy? States are the 
primary actors in creating IOs, but the ―global citizenry‖ and the people of the world also 
benefit from international cooperation. Therefore, legitimacy can be conferred on an IO 
from both states and global society. In light of this study, legitimacy for international 
organizations is conceptualized as the acceptance of an IO as a rightful authority by a 
majority of states. States are the primary actors, and while legitimacy on IOs can be 
indirectly conferred by the general public, states ultimately determine how and if they 
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will interact and comply with a multilateral institution. These decisions have a greater 
impact on its short and long-term effectiveness. 
Throughout this study, when addressing whether or not U.S. involvement in an 
institution impacted its effectiveness, I observed that legitimacy consistently emerged as 
an element of effectiveness on which the U.S. had an extraordinary impact. In the case of 
the Montreal Protocol, by providing consistent diplomatic support, compliance, and 
ratification the U.S. government altered the policies of other emitter states and compelled 
them to join the agreement by implementing trade restrictions on states that continued to 
consume ODSs and as a result, all states in the system have accepted the Montreal 
Protocol as a legitimate authority on ozone depletion and emissions. Its exceptional 
compliance record demonstrates this. In the ICC case study, the U.S. has not ratified the 
agreement, but has supported the Court in almost every way informally. Because the U.S. 
no longer obstructs the Court‘s operations, the Court is becoming a more prominent actor 
in international and domestic conflicts and has been called upon by the Security Council 
twice in the past seven years, indicating increasing legitimacy from the perspective of 
both states and individuals. There is ample evidence of the U.S. having a negative impact 
on the Kyoto Protocol‘s legitimacy due to diplomatic antagonism and obstruction. The 
U.S. is leading the charge to brokering an alternative agreement that would replace the 
Kyoto Protocol. Most states now prioritize negotiating a new agreement instead of 
putting extensive resources into complying with one they perceive as old and ineffective. 
States no longer recognize the Kyoto Protocol as the authoritative agreement by which to 
structure domestic policy on climate change. Therefore out of the four case studies, three 
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cases present the ratification variable or the diplomatic support variable and contain 
evidence that those measures caused increases in legitimacy in the eyes of states. 
[H1]: The presence of U.S. ratification or diplomatic support for a multilateral institution 
tends to increase legitimacy. The presence of diplomatic antagonism or obstruction 
towards multilateral institution variables tends to decrease legitimacy. 
 
Another trend unearthed in the case study analysis is one of capacity, resources, and 
scope. In three out of four cases, when the U.S. provided resources to an institution, that 
institution tended to have a higher level of internal process performance and therefore 
enhanced effectiveness. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, the U.S. contributed both to 
the development of alternative substances to ODSs and to the success of the Multilateral 
Fund, both of which ensured participation and compliance from a large number of states, 
both developed and developing. Conversely, in cases where the U.S. refused to provide 
resources, organizations suffered from problems in limited capacity. In the ICC case, the 
refusal to offer resources to the Court and its offices are negatively impacting the internal 
processes and capacity. The U.S. has demonstrated preferences for adhering to strict legal 
norms and could influence the Court in a more positive way if it had any bearing on the 
internal structure. Also, if the U.S. repealed its domestic law prohibiting U.S. officials 
from cooperating in ICC investigations, it could widen the reach and influence of the 
Court, helping improve its record with arrests and indictments. Finally, the Kyoto 
Protocol suffers immensely from a lack of internal capacity. Its internal mechanisms are 
weak and its compliance record is poor. The United States has undermined the Clean 
Development Mechanism by choosing to use alternative institutions to promote 
sustainable development through substantial amounts of aid and investment. If the U.S. 
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was a party to the Kyoto Protocol and instead chose to use the Kyoto mechanisms, those 
mechanisms would be stronger and more effective. 
[H2]: U.S. provision of resources enhances internal capacity. Alternatively, when the 
U.S. withholds resources, institutions‘ capacities are diminished. 
 
IATI was the only case study that did not offer any strong evidence supporting the 
above claims. While some observers hoped that the U.S. endorsement of IATI would 
enhance the legitimacy of the institution in the eyes of other major donors, there has been 
no evidence of other states signing onto the IATI standard because of the United States‘ 
participation. Similarly, U.S. involvement in providing resources and participating in the 
internal bodies of IATI did not change its level of internal effectiveness. IATI has been 
effective in pushing the agenda on aid transparency and contributes to the global regime 
because of its multi-stakeholder approach, but U.S. preferences did not determine this 
structure. 
The institution‘s main shortcoming is a weak enforcement mechanism and its 
inability to compel states and organizations to comply. Because the U.S. currently has not 
complied and is not likely to comply, it has little to no ability to set agendas or influence 
decisions, and it certainly would not favor more strict compliance enforcement. However, 
the IATI case did illuminate a trend deserving of further research. The compliance 
variable matters a great deal in how the U.S. is able to influence IATI. It is too early to 
tell how the lack of U.S. compliance will affect IATI‘s ability to achieve its goals in a 
few years‘ time, but clearly, non-compliance has limited the United States‘ ability to 
influence legitimacy or internal capacity. Because this was the only case study that had 
both the ‗ratification‘ and ‗non-compliance‘ variables, future research should be done on 
similar cases to understand why the non-compliance could undermine the U.S. diplomatic 
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support, provision of resources, and even ratification in a multilateral institution. This 
case study could indicate that compliance is the most important aspect of U.S. policy 
towards a treaty and without comply, the U.S. may not have any impact on how 
effectively an organization operates internally. 
Finally, when analyzing the dependent variable according to Thomas Bernauer‘s 
methodology by assessing the extent to which the institution contributed to solving a 
global problem, several trends emerged that indicate a significant U.S. role in promoting 
emerging international norms. When states first began negotiating the Montreal Protocol, 
the idea of internationally agreed environmental regulations was not a solidified practice 
in international cooperation, and signified the beginning of the idea that states must 
cooperate to solve immense environmental problems. The United States‘ support for such 
an institution helped further the idea that states must firmly commit to regulate 
production for the sake of the environment. The Montreal Protocol itself was very 
successful in prompting states to phase out the production and consumption of chemicals 
that damage the ozone layer, and there have been positive environmental results. By 
objecting to the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. has not rejected this emerging 
norm of international cooperation on environmental issues, but has chosen to support an 
alternative institution to achieve this goal. 
Analysis of the ICC case also reveals a significant U.S. contribution to furthering 
the international norms of individual accountability for crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and war crimes. After the U.S. began supporting the Court‘s actions, states 
have been more receptive to the idea of global justice and accountability from a 
permanent world court such as the ICC. This furthers the international processes of 
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solving a goal such as ―ending impunity,‖ which, while impossible to attain, can be 
furthered by increasing state cooperation with the ICC which leads to more indictments, 
more arrests, and more verdicts. The IATI case also demonstrates an instance where the 
United States has played a role in furthering the emergence of aid transparency as a pillar 
of aid effectiveness. After 2009, the United States government instituted several reform 
plans to make government activity more transparent and in alignment with these aims, 
supported IATI in 2011, indicating a growing support for transparency as an international 
norm. Even though U.S. support for IATI has not caused a massive influx in state support 
and has not demonstrated compliance, there is potential for IATI to contribute to solving 
the complex problems associated with aid effectiveness by making data more transparent. 
Overall, it is clear that in addition to levels of effectiveness related to achieving external 
goals and high internal process performance, the U.S. has contributed to furthering 
international norms in several of the case studies discussed. 
So, does the U.S. matter for institutional effectiveness? Yes, U.S. policy seems to 
influence the capacity and legitimacy of organizations. Both of those factors are crucial 
for organizational effectiveness because they can both determine how well an institution 
meets its output goals and how efficiently it operates. These trends support some 
proponents of the theories discussed in the first chapter. The U.S. is a powerful state and 
when it chooses to ratify an agreement and invest in providing resources, it able to alter 
state behavior and provide resources that enhance cooperation to the benefit of everyone 
in the system. Is the U.S. indispensible for cooperation? No. Across the four case studies, 
there was no trend that would indicate that cooperation could not exist without the U.S. 
ratification or compliance. However, while the U.S. is not necessary for cooperation, it 
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does seem to be necessary for effective cooperation. Based on the observed trends in the 
four case studies, this thesis generates theories that could influence whether or not the 
U.S. ratifies an international agreement, provides diplomatic support, or offers resources 
will determine the level of legitimacy and capacity for that institution. 
Implications and Direction for Further Study 
By analyzing four in-depth case studies, this research confirms some existing 
assumptions on the U.S. role in multilateralism. Scholars previously assumed that the 
United States contributes a great deal to multilateral institutions through its extensive 
resources and authority as a world superpower. By systematically testing that assumption 
through process tracing and case study methods, I determine that the U.S. does influence 
the capacity and reach of an institution. By offering its share of resources, whether it be 
funding, manpower, military power, or technological contribution, the United States 
could make an organization operate to its full capacity and be more effective in adhering 
to its mandate. Additionally, U.S. support, through ratification or diplomacy, consistently 
caused an increase in legitimacy—more states cooperate with agreements that the U.S. 
has ratified and supported. However, the IATI case study indicated that even in the 
presence of U.S. ratification and diplomatic support, a poor compliance record could 
mitigate the United States‘ influence on legitimacy and capacity. 
The implications for these findings are immense, substantively and academically. 
The findings confirm many assumptions used by scholars when analyzing U.S. 
participation in international organizations as well as confirming Robert Keohane‘s 
revised theory of hegemonic stability, which states that the presence of a hegemon is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperation, but leadership from a powerful state can 
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help cooperation emerge. This study confirms that the U.S. is not indispensible for 
international agreements, but does tend to make those agreements more effective. In 
addition, the methodological framework developed, particularly the Multilateral Policy 
Scale, can be applied to any future study involving U.S. multilateral policy. By 
encompassing a holistic measurement of the possible policy options, the scale could be 
useful for any scholar qualitatively evaluating U.S. foreign policy with regard to 
international cooperation. 
Substantively, this theoretical trend could imply profound realities for the future 
of U.S. multilateral engagement. This theory places significant emphasis on U.S. 
leadership in forging sustainable international agreements across a wide swath of issue 
areas, and could imply that while cooperation can exist without U.S. support, agreements 
would be much more effective with U.S. support, leaving the future of sustainable 
cooperation with the political preferences in Washington. These possible implications for 
U.S. policy and future international cooperation agreements leave ample room for further 
scholarship. This thesis did not prove a theory, but instead, it generated a theory, which 
now needs to be tested with other case studies. By using the Multilateral Policy Scale and 
different case studies that vary along that continuum, other scholars can apply the same 
test to different case studies and contribute to the theoretical basis generated through 
these four cases. 
By developing a sustainable model for testing the level of U.S. involvement in an 
international organization, this thesis systematically explored untested assumptions in 
existing literature. Before, there had been no empirical study of how U.S. policy 
influenced the effectiveness of international organizations and through which avenues it 
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had the most effect. Now, there are intense analyses of case studies that illuminate some 
causal trends between the variables, and posit that U.S. ratification, diplomatic support, 
and provision of resources tends to make organizations more effective through enhancing 
both legitimacy and capacity. In addition, the case studies hint at how non-compliance 
can limit how much influence the U.S. can wield over a multilateral institution‘s 
effectiveness. The theories generated in this thesis not only modify the ―indispensible 
power‖ thesis propagated by Madeleine Albright and Hillary Clinton by revealing that 
U.S. involvement in an institution is not a necessary condition to ensure cooperation, but 
also confirm several existing scholarly assumptions that the U.S. is an important force for 
effective cooperation and by remaining committed to multilateral cooperation could 
contribute to a greater overall success in solving global problems. 
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